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Abstract
The first study in this dissertation shows that standard estimates of returns to edu-
cation capture the e↵ects of labor characteristics and ability. It finds that accounting
mainly for sector, occupation and region reduces returns to education by three-fifths.
Accounting for ability using sibling fixed-e↵ects estimation further reduces returns
to schooling by almost half, yields no significant returns to primary and incomplete
secondary education, and yields increasing returns to higher education. Earnings
and returns to schooling are una↵ected by education quality when controlling for
province and key city fixed e↵ects. Returns to schooling and ability are higher in ur-
ban areas and regions considered as economic centers suggesting that internal labor
migrants are driven by returns to education and ability.
The second part of this thesis develops a demand and supply model of migra-
tion to estimate the impacts of proximate and underlying factors on both perma-
nent and temporary migration from the Philippines using a Vector Auto-Regressive
model. Results show that permanent migration is positively related to destination
wages but also to domestic wages and employment indicating that they are posi-
tively selected from the local labor force. Permanent migration is negatively related
to local demand for labor proxied by GDP per capita but also to local labor supply;
positively related to destination demand for labor and negatively related to destina-
tion labor supply (both lagged two periods). Temporary migration is also positively
related to destination and Philippine wages, negatively related to local labor de-
mand and supply, and positively related to destination labor demand. However,
temporary migration is also positively related to destination labor supply indicating
that they are negatively selected in the destination labor force.
The third study aims to estimate the returns to migration and education for
overseas Filipino workers. It finds that earnings of overseas Filipino workers in
most key destinations are higher than those of domestic workers, but their returns
to schooling are not significantly di↵erent from, or are even lower than, those of
domestic workers. These findings together with the result of a Heckman selection
vii
viii
model confirm the negative selection of temporary migrants. Apart from purchasing
power parity gains to either earnings or returns to schooling, there are also monetary
gains in the conversion of foreign earnings to the local currency through the US dollar
as in the case of remittances.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Returns to Education
Education is important for individual earnings and national economic growth. With
much of the Philippine labor force in the 1980s-1990s having only elementary ed-
ucation, returns to education were highest at the primary level (e.g. Hossain and
Psacharopoulos (1994)). The costliness and inaccessibility of higher education meant
that returns to higher education were low. Poor education was a cause of slow growth
in the Philippines in the 1980s–1990s. On the other hand, the rising share of the
labor force with higher education is associated with increasing returns to higher
education in recent years. Similarly, the respectable economic performance in the
past decade is associated with higher human capital content of labor.
While there have been many studies on returns to education in the Philippines,
these have focused on the quantity of education. However, while the Philippines
fared better than some of its neighbors in terms of enrollment, it fared poorly in
terms of income per capita and economic growth. This suggests that quantity of
schooling does not su ciently explain personal earnings and economic growth. Ed-
ucation quality may be as important as or more important than education quantity.
Previous studies found high returns to schooling in the Philippines. This study
shows that these are overestimated by the omission of observable demographic and
labor characteristics as well as unobserved ability. Moreover, the high returns to pri-
mary education documented in the literature defy explanation. I argue that these
are due to certain questionable assumptions and may be capturing the e↵ects of
education quality and ability.
In light of the foregoing, this paper aims to account for education quality and
ability in returns to education in the Philippines. To do this, standard estimates of
1
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returns to education are used as a benchmark. Using pooled cross-section data, re-
turns to education are estimated using the human capital earnings function, relating
wage to years of schooling, experience and experience squared, controlling for year
fixed e↵ects. The basic Mincerian is then augmented by controlling for sex, marital
status, region, sector, occupation, class, tenure and urbanity. Measures of primary
and secondary education quality are also included and their e↵ect on returns to
schooling determined. To account for ability, fixed e↵ects estimation is employed on
sibling data. This amounts to relating the di↵erence in wages between siblings to the
di↵erence in their education, all other things equal. The idea is that siblings have
very similar unobserved “ability” that can be eliminated by di↵erencing. Returns
to education are also estimated by education level. While schooling and education
quality may be subject to measurement error, this is addressed by using fixed e↵ects
instrumental variable estimation.
Estimates from a basic human capital earnings function show returns to school-
ing of around 12 percent. Controlling for sex, marital status, region, urbanity, sector,
occupation, class of work, and tenure reduces returns to schooling by three-fifths and
raises the explanatory power of the model from a third to over half of the variation
in earnings with sector, occupation, and region accounting for most of the variation.
Controlling for province or city fixed e↵ects reduces returns a bit more and raises
the explanatory power of the model further. On the other hand, education qual-
ity is insignificant to earnings and does not a↵ect returns to quantity of education.
However, returns to schooling for the test cohorts are higher than non-cohorts as
the former are younger and returns to schooling increase over time.
Accounting for sibling fixed-e↵ects further reduces returns to schooling by
almost half, suggesting that most of what were hitherto considered as returns to
education are actually returns to ability. This confirms the idea of wage premiums for
ability on top of returns to education. Moreover, there are no significant returns to
primary education and barely significant returns to incomplete secondary education.
Fixed e↵ects instrumental variable estimates are not substantially di↵erent from
fixed e↵ects estimates suggesting negligible measurement error in observed schooling.
Standard estimates for returns to primary and incomplete secondary education turn
out to be returns to ability. This means that workers with only basic education are
paid not so much for the productive content of their education but for the innate
ability that allowed them to pursue primary or secondary education. This suggests
that basic education plays a signaling rather than a productivity enhancing role.
Truly significant returns to education accrue only starting from secondary education
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completion, through college, up to post-graduate education. Moreover, returns to
ability generally rise as education level increases, consistent with the signaling theory
of education where higher education signals higher ability.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling across years, by sex, across
marital status, regions, sector, occupation, class of work, tenure, and urbanity.
While returns to schooling are higher in urban areas and in regions considered
as economic centers, the reductions are also higher with fixed e↵ects estimation.
These suggest that migrants are motivated by higher returns to education and have
higher ability. With international migration being an alternative to internal migra-
tion, international migrants are also driven by higher returns abroad and are likely
to be more able than non-migrants. Returns to migration and to the education of
migrants are the subject of the third study in this dissertation.
1.2 Determinants of Migration
Before analyzing the returns to education for Filipino migrants, it is important to
analyze the reasons that motivate them to migrate. The Philippines is the ninth
largest source of international migrants, with 4.3 million Filipino migrants worldwide
in 2010. In 1981-2012, there were 1.9 million registered Filipino migrants. The
number of Filipino migrants grew from only six per thousand in 1960 to 44 per
thousand in 2010, including only those born in the Philippines or those who have
Filipino citizenship. Including those not born in the Philippines or those who have
foreign citizenship but have Filipino ancestry more than doubles the stock of Filipino
migrants. While permanent migrants have the largest share, temporary migrants
are the fastest growing and among these, rehires are the largest and fastest growing.
Why are increasing numbers of Filipinos migrating? Why is the share of temporary
migrants growing faster? Few studies have analyzed the factors motivating Filipino
migration. Those that do either lack empirical evidence or analyze a limited set of
factors, focusing on push factors without consideration of pull factors.
The second part of this dissertation aims to determine the factors driving mi-
gration. Its contribution lies in the analysis of both push and pull factors as well
as the analysis of both permanent and temporary migration. The analysis starts
with an estimation of the e↵ects of Philippine and key destination income and labor
force on migration. The underlying model assumes that wages and employment
behave according to changes in labor demand and supply. However, including only
income and labor force may generate bias as their e↵ects may be capturing the ef-
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fects of wages and employment. Moreover, with distortions in the economy such as
legislated wages and regulated employment, the e↵ects of changes in labor demand
and supply may not be as expected. To account for distortions, the model is aug-
mented by analyzing the e↵ects of wages and employment in the Philippines and
key destinations.
Regressing permanent migration on income and labor shows that emigration is
positively related to the labor force. As the labor force increases, the corresponding
decrease in wages would shift the migrant supply curve outward raising the wage
di↵erential between the US and the Philippines. As a result, more Filipino workers
are willing to migrate at any given US wage. Emigration is significantly related to
Philippine income only when accounting for structural break. However, the positive
relationship is contrary to expectation. This is due to wages rising faster than
income. Consequently, employment was not rising fast enough and unemployment
was growing. This suggests that a migration hump (where migration increases with
income) occurs only in as much as wages are growing faster than income thereby
depressing employment and motivating migration. Emigration is positively related
to lagged US income. As US income increases, the corresponding increase in US
wages compels employers to substitute US workers with migrant labor. The lagged
e↵ect is understandable given the information and transactions cost for migration.
Conversely, emigration is negatively related to lagged US labor force. As the US
labor force increases, the resulting decrease in wages would increase the quantity
demanded for US labor.
Standard models of migration relate migration to wages and employment in
the origin and destination countries. Others model migration as a function of in-
come and labor force underlying labor demand and supply. Both implicitly assume
no distortions in the economy and that wages and employment respond to income
and labor in a free market. In economies with legislated wages and regulated em-
ployment, the e↵ects on migration of changes in income and labor force may not
be as expected. Moreover, either set of factors may be capturing the e↵ects of the
other, generating biased estimates. Accounting for distortions has an implication
on the e↵ects of changes in labor demand and supply on migration.
Controlling for wages, permanent migration is not significantly related to in-
come and labor force. On the other hand, wages have a positive e↵ect even when
controlling for income and labor force. Holding income and labor force fixed, an
increase in wages creates or increases excess labor supply, motivating migration.
Controlling for US wages raises the e↵ects of US income and labor force. An in-
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crease in income, controlling for labor force and wages, raises the quantity of labor
demanded relative to quantity supplied, thereby increasing migrant demand. An
increase in labor force raises the quantity of US labor supplied relative to quantity
demanded, holding income and wages fixed, decreasing migrant demand. Emigra-
tion is positively related and highly elastic to US wages. Controlling for US income
and labor force, an increase in US wages decreases US employment, requiring mi-
grants to fill the decrease in US native employment. Emigration is negatively related
to remittances. An increase in remittances increases local labor demand, increasing
employment and decreasing the supply of migrants.
Accounting for employment using a vector auto-regression model shows that
permanent migration is positively related to domestic wages, holding labor demand
and supply and employment fixed. Higher wages raise the quantity of labor supplied
creating unemployment even at existing employment levels. Emigration is also posi-
tively related to domestic employment, controlling for labor demand and supply and
wages. Higher employment reduces wages relative to what workers are willing to
accept. Emigration is negatively related to national income. A decrease in income
reduces the quantity of labor demanded at the same wage, creating unemployment.
Otherwise, employers are willing to pay a lower wage at existing employment levels.
Emigration is negatively related to the domestic labor force, with labor demand,
wages and employment fixed. With higher labor supply at the same wage, producer
surplus rises, increasing the quantity of labor supplied.
Permanent migration increases with destination wages. As US wages increase,
the quantity of US labor demanded decreases. If migrants can be paid lower than the
wages for US labor, migrants can fill the decrease in US labor. Emigration increases
with destination income as this increases the demand for labor; but is undeterred by
subsequent declines. Emigration decreases as the destination labor force increases
as this creates excess labor supply at prevailing wages and employment levels. Em-
igration is positively related to remittances. If remittances increase labor demand
holding wages constant, the increase in the quantity of labor supplied had wages
increased would have to migrate.
Like permanent migration, temporary migration is also positively related to
the Philippine labor force but it is not related to income and remittances. In-
creases in income and remittances would not a↵ect OFW deployment if wages rise
proportionately more, making employment and unemployment unchanged. OFW
deployment is positively related to lagged Saudi income. As Saudi income increases,
Saudi wages increase attracting more migrants. At the same wages, the quantity
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of labor demanded also increases relative to the quantity supplied increasing the
demand for migrant labor. OFW deployment is positively related to lagged Saudi
labor force, contrary to expectation. An increase in Saudi labor force would increase
OFW deployment if Saudi wages are downward-rigid, with native employment not
increasing. The additional labor demand would have to be filled up with migrant
labor at lower wages.
Controlling for Philippine wages, Philippine income and remittances are neg-
atively related to OFW deployment, as expected. A decrease in income and remit-
tances, holding wages fixed, would decrease quantity of labor demanded relative to
quantity supplied, increasing the supply of migrants. Controlling for lagged Saudi
wages, OFW deployment increases with lagged Saudi income. As Saudi labor de-
mand increases, fixed wages increase the quantity of Saudi labor demanded relative
to quantity supplied, increasing the demand for migrant labor. OFW deployment is
positively related to lagged Philippine and Saudi wages. Controlling for Philippine
income, an increase in Philippine wages would increase unemployment, increasing
the supply of migrants. An increase in Saudi wages, controlling for income, would
decrease the quantity demanded for native Saudi labor. Optimal employment is
filled with migrant labor.
Accounting for employment, temporary migration is also positively related
to domestic wages, as well as to Saudi wages. However, OFW deployment is not
significantly related to domestic employment and Saudi employment. Temporary
migration is also negatively related to domestic income and positively related to
Saudi income. OFW deployment is also negatively related to the local labor force.
On the other hand, OFW deployment is positively related to Saudi labor force. Con-
trolling for wages and employment, the increase in the quantity of labor demanded
has to be filled with migrants at lower wages. OFW deployment is also positively
related to remittances.
Permanent and temporary migration generally behave alike in response to var-
ious push and pull factors. However, there are a few di↵erences. Permanent migra-
tion is positively related to domestic employment, controlling for labor demand and
supply and wages. On the other hand, temporary migration is not significantly re-
lated to domestic employment. Higher employment reduces domestic wages relative
to the level that permanent migrants are willing to accept. This suggests that the
reservation wage of permanent migrants is higher than that of temporary migrants.
This indicates that permanent migrants are positively selected from the local labor
force. Permanent migration is negatively related to destination labor force: emigra-
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tion decreases as the US labor force increases, as this creates excess labor supply at
prevailing wages and employment levels. Conversely, temporary migration is posi-
tively related to the Saudi labor force: controlling for Saudi wages and employment,
the increase in the quantity of labor demanded has to be filled with migrants at
lower wages. This suggests that temporary migrants are negatively selected in the
destination labor force. Despite this, temporary migration is positively related to
Saudi wages. Overseas Filipino workers are still attracted by higher wages in the
destination countries.
1.3 Returns to Migration
How much do overseas workers actually gain from working in the destination coun-
tries? The third part of this dissertation aims to determine the returns to migration
of Filipinos and to the education of Filipino migrants. Most existing migration
studies on the Philippines (e.g. Orbeta (2008); Alba and Sugui (2009)) focus on
the benefits and motives of remittances. Most existing studies on returns to mi-
gration compare wages of migrants across destinations (e.g. Tan (2005, 2006)) but
not between migrants and non-migrants. They also estimate returns to education
over all destinations, but do not compare returns across destinations and with the
Philippines. Clemens et al. (2009) compare wages of of Filipinos in the US and in
the Philippines. However, to my knowledge, there is still no study comparing wages
and returns to education of Filipinos in various destinations and the Philippines.
This is the research gap that this study seeks to fill.
This paper aims to determine the returns to migration and education of over-
seas Filipino workers. It develops an augmented human capital earnings function
relating wages to schooling, experience and its square; migration and its interactions
with the first three variables, while controlling for sex, civil status, origin region in
the Philippines, and occupation. The model is then modified to account for di↵erent
returns to migration and education by sex, by major destinations, and for each key
destination. Returns are estimated with domestic workers as reference. Data on
domestic workers are taken from the Labor Force Survey. Most data on overseas
workers are from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
However, these do not include the education of overseas Filipino workers. We derive
education data for overseas workers from the Survey of Overseas Filipinos (SOF)
using Two-Sample Two-Stage Least Squares regression. In the first stage, schooling
is fitted on age, civil status, region and interactions between each key destination
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country, sex and occupation using the SOF data. In the second stage, the aug-
mented human capital earnings function is estimated using predicted schooling for
the same set of explanatory variables in the POEA data.
Results show that overseas Filipino workers earn more than domestic workers.
However, returns to schooling is higher for local workers. Male overseas workers
generally earn more than their local counterparts, but their return to schooling
is lower. Female overseas workers earn more, but return to their schooling is not
significantly di↵erent from those of their domestic counterparts. Earnings of overseas
Filipino workers in top destinations as a group are surprisingly lower than those for
local workers. However, returns to schooling in major destinations are higher than
in the Philippines. Major destinations put a premium on human capital. In the rest
of the destinations, earnings are higher but returns to schooling are lower than in
the Philippines. Male overseas workers in major destinations earn less than their
local counterparts, but the return to their schooling is higher. On the other hand,
female overseas workers in top destinations earn more than their local counterparts,
and their return to schooling is higher. In the rest of the destinations, male overseas
workers earn less than male local workers, but their return to schooling is higher.
Female overseas workers earn more in other destinations than local female workers,
but the return to their schooling is lower.
Across key destinations, overseas Filipino workers in Australia, Italy, Japan,
Canada, China, Taiwan, USA, Kuwait, Bahrain, Malaysia and the UAE earn more
than domestic workers. However, returns to schooling in Bahrain, Canada, Malaysia,
and the United States are not significantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines.
Nevertheless, returns to schooling resembling those of developing countries like the
Philippines are already considered high for developed countries considering the styl-
ized fact of decreasing returns to income. Moreover, returns to schooling are lower
in Australia, China, Italy, Korea, Kuwait, Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan than in the
Philippines. Return to schooling is higher only in UAE. While earnings are lower
in Qatar than in the Philippines, return to schooling is higher. Earnings of Filipino
workers in Hong Kong, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and the U.K. are not sig-
nificantly di↵erent from those of local workers, but returns to schooling in Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, and Hong Kong are higher. However, the return to schooling in
the U.K. is not significantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines, and in Korea it
is even lower, and neither are returns to experience significantly di↵erent for these
two countries.
Earnings for male Filipino workers in Korea, Saudi, Arabia, Singapore and
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UAE are higher than those for their local counterparts. Moreover, the return to
schooling for male Filipino workers in Singapore is higher than that for male local
workers. Almost three-quarters of male workers in Singapore are either managers,
executives; professionals; or associate professionals. However, returns to schooling
in Korea, Saudi Arabia and UAE are lower than in the Philippines. Earnings and
returns to schooling of male Filipino workers in Australia, Bahrain, Canada, China,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia and the USA are not significantly di↵erent from those in
the Philippines. Returns to experience are higher in Canada, China, and Qatar,
but not significantly di↵erent in Australia, Bahrain, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and
USA. Earnings of male Filipino workers in Hong Kong, Kuwait, Qatar, Taiwan,
and the U.K. are lower than those of male local workers. Nevertheless, returns
to schooling for male Filipino workers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the U.K. are
higher than those for their local counterparts. However, the return to schooling for
male Filipino workers in Qatar is not significantly di↵erent from that for male local
workers.
Earnings for female Filipino workers are higher in Japan, Taiwan, U.K., Aus-
tralia, China, Hong Kong, Italy, Kuwait, and Malaysia. Most female Filipino work-
ers in Hong Kong and Italy, and over a third in Kuwait and Malaysia are laborers
and unskilled workers. However, returns to schooling for female Filipino workers
in Australia, China, Italy, and Malaysia are not significantly di↵erent from that in
the Philippines. Earnings of female Filipino workers in Korea are lower than in
the Philippines, but return to schooling is higher. On the other hand, earnings for
female Filipino workers in Bahrain, Canada, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE
and USA are not significantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines. Nevertheless,
returns to schooling for female Filipino workers are higher in Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, and UAE. This is related to the composition of Filipino labor in these
countries. In Saudi Arabia, over half of female Filipino workers are professionals. In
Singapore, three-quarters of female Filipino workers are either professionals, man-
agers and executives, or associate professionals and clerks. Returns to schooling for
female Filipino workers in Bahrain, Canada, and USA are not significantly di↵erent
from that in the Philippines. Interestingly, close to three-fourths of female Filipino
workers in the United States are even professionals. While the return to experience
in Kuwait is higher than that in the Philippines, returns to experience in Bahrain
and the USA are not significantly di↵erent.
There are no apparent gains to earnings and returns to schooling for the av-
erage Filipino worker in the U.K. and Korea; male Filipino workers in Australia,
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Bahrain, Canada, China, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and the USA; and female Filipino
workers in Bahrain, Canada, and USA. Moreover, few of these have higher returns
to experience. This begs the question: what motivates these workers to labor in
these countries? Are there gains in di↵erences in costs of living that are not cap-
tured by accounting for gains in purchasing power parity (PPP)? If a worker has
higher earnings abroad but also has greater spending for the same basket of goods,
there appears to be no income gain. However, if the same worker spends less abroad
and sends much of his income home as remittances, then exchange rate conversions
and di↵erences in cost of living may yield income gains. In fact, there are monetary
gains from the conversion of earnings to the the local currency, on top of the income
gains identified earlier. Taking the ratio of returns in US dollars to those in PPP
shows monetary gains for Filipino workers in Australia, Bahrain, Canada, China,
Italy, Kuwait, Japan, Malaysia, Taiwan, USA, and UAE. While there are no real
income gains in Korea and Saudi Arabia, there are exchange rate gains. There are
also gains in returns to schooling from exchange rate conversions for Filipino work-
ers in Hong Kong, Qatar, Singapore, China, Saudi Arabia, UAE, as well as other
destinations. For male Filipino workers, there are exchange rate gains to earnings
in Qatar, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and UAE, and to returns to schooling in
Saudi Arabia and Hong Kong. However, there remain no gains for male workers in
Australia, Bahrain, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and USA. For female Filipino workers,
there are exchange rate gains to earnings in Taiwan, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Japan, Italy, and U.K.; and to returns to schooling in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE.
However, there remain no gains for female Filipino workers in Bahrain, Canada, and
the U.S..
The first part of this dissertation compares returns to education across regions
in the Philippines in 2007-2010. That study finds that the return to schooling is
higher in the national capital region than in the rest of the regions in the country.
These estimates may be biased as they do not account for migration. If the more
able migrate from the periphery to the capital or abroad, the returns to education
in the peripheral regions maybe underestimated while those in the capital may
be overestimated. Comparing earnings and returns to schooling for domestic and
overseas workers by region for 2011 shows results similar to those of the first part of
this thesis. The average return to schooling for local workers in the national capital
region is higher than in most other regions. Average earnings for local workers
in the capital are also higher than those in most other regions. To address the
suspected bias in domestic returns to education across regions, I compare returns to
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education for overseas workers from di↵erent regions, controlling for sex, civil status,
occupation and destination country. Results show that earnings of overseas Filipino
workers from most regions are not significantly di↵erent from the earnings of those
from the national capital. Conversely, returns to schooling for overseas workers
from several regions are higher than the returns for those from the capital region,
while returns to schooling for those from the rest of the regions are not significantly
di↵erent. This confirms the hypothesis that the higher returns for domestic workers
in the capital are due to the migration of workers with higher ability.
With wage and education data contained in separate sources, estimating re-
turns to education relies on strong assumptions. An alternative approach is em-
ployed by separately relating earnings and destination to occupation using the
POEA dataset and occupation to schooling using the SOF dataset. The proba-
bility of working in a particular destination depends on the worker’s occupation.
Professionals and trade workers have the highest odds of working in Australia, ser-
vice workers in Canada, technicians in China, professionals in Italy, plant operators
in Korea, managers and executives, and services workers in Kuwait, technicians in
Japan, service workers in Malaysia, clerks in Qatar, trade workers and clerks in
Saudi Arabia, professionals and technicians in Singapore, service workers in Taiwan
and UAE, clerks and service wokrers in the UK and the US.
Consequently, earnings of professionals and trade workers in Australia are
3.5 times and 3.2 times higher than counterparts in the Philippines, respectively.
Service workers in Canada earn 3.3 times more, technicians in China earn 2.6 times
more, and professionals in Italy earn 3.6 times more, than in the Philippines. Plant
operators in Korea earn 1.9 times more, managers and executives earn 1.4 times
more and service workers earn 92 percent more in Kuwait, and technicians in Japan
earn 1.7 times more, than their counterparts in the Philippines. Service workers in
Malaysia earn 55 percent more, clerks in Qatar earn 1.4 times more, and clerks in
Saudi Arabia earn 51 percent more, than their local counterparts. Professionals and
technicians in Singapore earn 2.5 times more, service workers in Taiwan earn 3.9
times more, clerks earn 3.6 times more and service workers earn 2.6 times more in
the US, than in the Philippines.
Relating occupation to schooling shows that the likelihood of skilled employ-
ment increases with schooling in a few destinations. The odds of working as a
professional, service worker, and plant and machine operator in the US and as a
plant operator in Japan increases with schooling. On the other hand, the odds of
all skilled employment in Australia and most skilled employment in the UK do not
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rise with schooling. In most major destinations, schooling decreases the likelihood
of all or most skilled employment, contrary to expectation.
Chapter 2
Spying Out the Land: Accounting
for Ability in Returns to
Education in the Philippines
“But because my servant Caleb has a di↵erent spirit and follows me
wholeheartedly, I will bring him into the land he went to, and his
descendants will inherit it.” - Numbers 14:24
This study shows that standard estimates of returns to education capture the ef-
fects of labor characteristics and ability. It finds that accounting mainly for sector,
occupation and region reduces returns to education by three-fifths. Accounting for
ability using sibling fixed-e↵ects estimation further reduces returns to schooling by
almost half, yields no significant returns to primary and incomplete secondary edu-
cation, and yields increasing returns to higher education. Earnings and returns to
schooling are una↵ected by education quality when controlling for education division
fixed e↵ects. Returns to schooling and ability are higher in urban areas and regions
considered as economic centers suggesting that internal labor migrants are driven
by returns to education and ability.
2.1 Context and Objectives
The importance of human capital to earnings and economic growth is well known.
The literature on human capital is inspired by Schultz (1961) who attributed the
bulk of US national income growth to the improvement in human capital, and the
large unexplained growth in labor earnings to human capital investment. Conversely,
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he attributed slow capital absorption among poor countries to slow improvements in
human capital. Consistent with this, Balisacan and Hill (2003) identified the eroding
comparative advantage in, and quality of, education, together with low saving and
investment rates, and slow employment growth, among the proximate causes of the
slow growth in the Philippines for the period 1980-2000.
2.1.1 Economic Growth, 1950-2010
The economic performance of the Philippines over the past 50 years is shown in
Figure 2.1. Per capita income in the 1960s grew at an average of 1.7 percent.
This was followed in the 1970s by an average growth of 3 percent although this
was debt-driven growth (Balisacan and Hill, 2003). However, growth then fell to
less than 1 percent in the early 1980s, followed by a crash in 1984-1985 due to a
political crisis as a result of which per capita income decreased by 9.8 percent in
both years. The late 1980s saw a recovery with an average growth of 2 percent.
This was not sustained, however, as the economy faced negative shocks in the early
1990s with income declining by an average of 1.7 percent per year in the first three
years before recovering to an average of 2.7 percent per year in 1994-1997. Another
negative shock occurred in 1998, this time largely external in origin, with income
dropping by 2.7 percent. Average growth in the 1990s was just 0.6 percent. The
new millennium presents a new dawn to the Philippine economy as growth averaged
2.8 percent in the 2000s, much higher than in the previous two decades, although
not quite as high as in the 1970s. While the year-to-year fluctuations in economic
growth have been due to shocks to the economy, the underlying trends may be
attributed to the changing structure of the economy, in terms of sectoral output and
labor composition.
2.1.2 Human Capital
The human capital composition of the labor force has changed much over the last
60 years. The average years of schooling of the Philippine labor force rose from 2.8
years in 1950 to 9 years in 2010. In 1950, the biggest proportion (47 percent) of the
labor force had no schooling [Figure 2.2]. 31 percent had only incomplete primary
education while 10 percent had only complete primary education. Only 10 percent
had either incomplete or complete high school while only 2.5 percent had either
incomplete or complete tertiary education. Since 1955, the share of the labor force
with only incomplete primary education has declined while the share of those with
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Figure 2.1: Annual Growth of Philippine GDP per capita, 1961–2011
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higher education rose.
Figure 2.2: Shares of Philippine Labor Force by Highest Grade Completed, 1950–
2010
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Sh
ar
es
 (%
) 
Year 
No schooling Incomplete Primary Complete Primary Incomplete Secondary
Complete Secondary Incomplete Tertiary Complete Tertiary
Source of data: Barro and Lee (2010)
The share of the labor force with complete primary education rose to 23 per-
cent in 1975 and remained at this level until 1985. While this figure has declined
since then as the shares of labor with higher education rose, it surpassed the share
of labor force with incomplete primary education. The shares of the labor force
with incomplete and complete secondary education surpassed that with incomplete
primary education in the early 1990s and that with complete primary education in
early 2000s. The share of the labor force with incomplete tertiary education rose
to 8.1 percent in 1980 but declined thereafter. The share of the labor force with
complete tertiary education surpassed that with incomplete tertiary education in
the early 1980s and then rose steeply into the 1990s, surpassing the shares of the
labor force with incomplete and complete primary and secondary education in the
late 1990s. By 2010, 23 percent of the labor force had complete tertiary education,
21.3 percent had complete secondary education, 20.8 had incomplete secondary ed-
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ucation, 15.6 had complete primary education, 9.2 percent had incomplete primary
education, 6.1 percent had incomplete tertiary education, and 4.2 percent had no
schooling.
The fact that most of the labor force in the 1950s-1970s and the largest share of
the labor force in the 1980s-1990s had only primary education suggests that further
education proved too costly relative to the benefits for most and that there were
su cient benefits from primary education as confirmed in the following literature
review. On the other hand, the rising share of the labor force with post-primary
education and the fact that the share of the labor force with secondary education
surpassed that with only primary education in the late 1990s, suggest that there
was an increasing relative benefit from secondary education and tertiary education,
also evident in the literature. Moreover, while the especially poor economic perfor-
mance of the Philippines in the 1980s-1990s is associated with low human capital
composition of labor, the respectable performance in the 2000s is associated with
higher human capital.
Current enrolment rates determine the future human capital composition of
labor. Both gross and net primary enrolments have generally declined since the
1970s (Figure 2.3). Over the last decade or so, net primary enrolment fell from 96
percent in 1996 to 88 percent in 2009. This is lower than net primary enrolment
for Vietnam (98%), Laos (97%), Cambodia, Malaysia (2005) and Indonesia (96%)
(Figure 2.4). This will raise the proportion of labor force with either no schooling or
incomplete elementary education in the future. On the other hand, secondary and
tertiary enrolments have generally increased. Gross secondary enrolment rose from
49 percent in 1971 to 85 percent in 2009. Net secondary enrolment rose from 48
percent in 1998 to 62 percent in 2009. This is higher than net secondary enrolment
for Myanmar (51%), Laos (40%), Cambodia (35% in 2007) but lower than those
for Brunei (97% in 2009), Thailand (72%), Malaysia (68% in 2009), and Indonesia
(67%) (Figure 2.5). Gross tertiary enrolment rose from 18 percent in 1971 to 29
percent in 2008. The latest figure is higher than those for Indonesia (23%), Vietnam
(22%), Brunei and Laos (17%), Myanmar (11% in 2007) and Cambodia (8% in
2008) (Figure 2.6). However, it has been surpassed by Thailand (46% in 2010), and
Malaysia (40% in 2009). The rise in secondary and tertiary enrolment will on the
whole increase the human capital composition of labor and returns to education
in the future. This would also increase future returns to secondary and tertiary
education.
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Figure 2.3: Enrolment by educational level, 1971–2009
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Figure 2.4: Net Primary Enrolment Rates, South-East Asia, 1970–2010
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Figure 2.5: Net Secondary Enrolment Rates, South-East Asia, 1998–2010
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Figure 2.6: Gross Tertiary Enrolment, South-East Asia, 1971–2010
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
En
ro
lm
en
tr
at
e
(%
)
Year
Thailand
Malaysia
Philippines
Indonesia
Vietnam
Brunei
LaoPDR
Myanmar
Cambodia
World Development Indicators, The World Bank
22 CHAPTER 2. RETURNS TO EDUCATION
2.1.3 Sectoral Output, Employment and
Productivity
The structure of the economy has significantly changed over the last 50 years. The
share of agriculture to total output has been declining from its peak of 31 percent
in 1974 to a low of 12.3 percent in 2010 (Figure 2.7). The share of agricultural
employment has declined from 52 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in 2009 (Figure
2.8). Industry has also also not done well, with its share of output decreasing from
39 percent in 1983 to 30 percent in 2010 and its employment share decreasing slightly
from 15.4 percent in 1980 to 14.6 in 2009. Growth occurred in the service sector,
with its output share rising from a low of 34 percent in 1977 to 57 percent in 2011
and its employment share rising from 33 percent in 1980 to 50 percent in 2009.
Labor productivity reflects sectoral output and employment growth. The av-
erage product of labor in agriculture has been low ($1460 in 1980) and declining
($1300 in 2008) (Figure 2.9). While the average product of labor in industry de-
creased from around $8300 in the early 1980s to $5073 in 1996, it has rebounded
and reached $7728 in 2008. The average product of labor in services has steadily
increased from $2640 in 1985 to $3755 in 2008. Moreover, while the average product
of labor in services is lower than that in industry, the marginal product of labor
in services is not necessarily lower, assuming higher capital intensity in industry.
Wages and returns to education are expected to be higher in growing sectors of
the economy and lower in the declining sectors. Therefore, wages and returns to
education in agriculture are expected to be low and those in industry and services
higher.
Recent Philippine economic growth rates have been rising, driven by services
(i.e. telecommunications, finance and business process outsourcing) and consump-
tion (Bocchi, 2008). The growth in consumption appears to be driven by overseas
employment and remittances. On the other hand, the growth in services appears
to be related to higher returns to education in the sector (di Gropello et al., 2010).
Overseas employment also entails a high level of human capital as seen in the fact
that “most emigrating Filipinos are professionals”, i.e. 35.5 percent of emigrating
workers were professionals prior to migration.
2.1.4 Unemployment and Underemployment Rates
Apart from the sectoral distribution of output and labor, relative employment
rates/labor intensities can also indicate the competitiveness of labor across sec-
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Figure 2.7: Sectoral Shares to GDP, 1960–2011
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Figure 2.8: Sectoral Shares to Total Employment, 1980-2009
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Figure 2.9: Average Product of Labor (constant 2000 US$), 1980–2008
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tors. The lower the unemployment/underemployment rate in a sector, the higher
the relative demand for labor in that sector. Sectors with a high demand for labor
may provide a wage premium to attract labor. However, they would ensure max-
imum productivity from the wage premium they pay and make sure they hire the
most able workers. For this reason, unemployment rate would be negatively related
to ability across sectors. Over the past years, the unemployment rate for males
is slightly higher than that for females suggesting a lower wage premium. Across
sectors, the underemployment rate in 2011 is highest in agriculture (75.3 percent)
indicating high excess labor and therefore a low wage premium for ability. The
lower underemployment rate of 49.6 percent in services indicates less excess labor
and a higher wage premium. Industry has the lowest underemployment rate (38.7
percent) suggesting that it has the highest wage premium.
2.1.5 Research Objective and Questions
This study aims to determine the returns to education in the Philippines over the
past decade. Is the human capital composition of labor associated with returns to
education? How much of returns to education can be attributed to quality of edu-
cation? How do comparative growth, employment and productivity across regions
and sectors determine relative wages and returns to education? Are there wage pre-
miums to ability as relative unemployment / underemployment rates suggest? How
do these wage premiums vary across regions, sector, and occupations. This study
shows that standard estimates of returns to education are capturing the e↵ects of
labor characteristics and abilities. It provides unbiased estimates of returns to ed-
ucation by accounting for education quality and unobserved ability using sibling
fixed-e↵ect estimation. It also provides unbiased estimates of returns to education
by sex, marital status, region, sector, occupation, class of work, tenure and urbanity.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Returns to Education: Estimation Methods
Determining the profitability of human capital investment is similar to estimating
the rate of return on general investments. The rate of return is the discount rate
that equates the net present value of the benefit from that investment over another
activity to the net present value of the cost of that investment (Becker, 1964). There
are three methods of estimating returns to education (Psacharopoulos and Ng, 1994).
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The full-discounting method entails finding the discount rate, r, from the formula:
nX
t=m+1
(Yb   Ya)t
(1 + r)t
=
mX
t=1
(Ya + Cb)t(1 + r)
t
where (Yb Ya)t is the di↵erence in earnings between a person b with more education
and a person a with less education, Cb is the direct cost of schooling, and Ya is fore-
gone earnings. When only the private cost of schooling is considered, the resulting
discount rate is referred to as the private rate of return to education. The social rate
of return to education can be estimated by including the public costs of education.
While the full-discounting method is considered as the“most appropriate method of
estimating the returns to education” as it considers an individual’s earning history,
it has a high demand for data on earnings as well as costs (Psacharopoulos and
Ng, 1994). It requires su cient data on earnings by age for various education levels
as well as direct private and public costs of education. The short-cut method of
estimating returns to education is given by the following formula:
r =
(Yb   Ya)
m(Ya)
where (Yb   Ya), as earlier, is the di↵erence in earnings between a person b with
more education and a person a with less education, Ya is foregone earnings and m
is the di↵erence in the years of schooling between a and b (Psacharopoulos and Ng,
1994; Psacharopoulos, 1995). While this method is easy to use, it assumes constant
earnings across time. That is, it presents age-earnings profiles as flat; earnings vary
only by educational attainment but not by age or experience.
Another method is the human capital earnings function, due to Mincer (1974):
lnEt = lnE0 + rs+  1t   2t2
where Et is current earnings, E0 is initial earnings without schooling and work
experience (lnE0 is the intercept log wage), s is the number of years of schooling, t
is the number of years of work experience1, r is the return to each year of schooling,
 1 is the return to a year of work experience and   2 is the rate of decline in the
1Using age alone would lead to omitted variable bias which would underestimate the return to
schooling: lnEt = lnE0 + rs+  1(A  s  b)   2(A  s  b)2
lnEt =
⇥
lnE0    1(A  b)   2
  2Ab+ b2 ⇤+ [r    1    2 ( 2A+ s+ 2b)] s+  1A   2A2
Therefore, the return to schooling, r, is underestimated by  1 +  2 ( 2A+ s+ 2b).
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return to experience. While earnings are expected to increase with experience, the
rate of increase is expected to decline.
2.2.2 Estimation Issues
Earnings can be measured in annual, weekly or hourly terms, usually in logarithm.
However, returns to schooling may be higher for annual or weekly earnings as the
estimated return includes the e↵ect of time spent at work (Card, 1999; Chiswick,
1997).2 The use of hourly wages is thus preferred as the estimated returns are free
from the e↵ects of work e↵ort.
Chiswick (1997) argues that the coe cient of schooling is “not the rate of
return from schooling” but the mean percentage change in earnings per year of
schooling, which is the product of rate of return and the ratio of schooling investment
to potential earnings.3 The schooling coe cient can be interpreted as the rate of
return to schooling only if the cost of schooling equals potential earnings. Assuming
no direct costs, if the opportunity cost of schooling is less than potential earnings,
the schooling coe cient would underestimate the rate of return. Conversely, if
direct and foregone costs exceed potential earnings, the schooling coe cient would
overestimate the rate of return.
The earnings function can be extended by transforming the years of schooling
into a series of dummy variables representing levels of education (Psacharopoulos
and Ng, 1994).
lnYi = ↵ +  1PRIM i +  2SECi +  3UNIV i +  1EX i +  2EX
2
i + ei
This specification allows for non-linear returns to schooling and can show whether
returns to schooling are constant, increasing or decreasing across levels. Non-linear
returns can also be tested by relating the natural logarithm of earnings as a quadratic
function of schooling or by including a dummy variable for each year of schooling.
Implicit to the human capital earnings function is the idea that education en-
hances productivity. Contrary to this, Arrow (1973) argues that higher education
does not add to productivity but acts as a “screening device”, sorting individuals
by ability. Employers do not know the productivity of individuals and so use educa-
2Ea = EhW  H ; in logs: LnEa = LnEh +  LnW +  LnH where Ea is annual earnings, Eh is
hourly earnings, W is weeks worked, and H hours worked per week.
3b = rK, K = Ct/Et 1 where b is the schooling coe cient, r is the rate of return to schooling,
K is the ratio of schooling investment to potential earnings, and Ct is the sum of foregone earnings,
Cf , and direct costs, Cd. Social rate of return, r⇤, considers public cost of schooling, Cs, in K⇤.
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tional certification to convey expected productivity. Similarly, Spence (1973) argues
that education acts as an instrument for signaling ones ability. Employers o↵er
particular wages for the expected ability from any given level of education. These
wage o↵ers determine returns to education which in turn determine investment in
education. People will choose higher education if the signaled productivity of higher
education is greater than the costs.
However, Layard and Psacharopoulos (1974) argue that the hypothesis that
schooling raises earnings not because it raises productivity but because it certifies
ability is unverified, citing that returns to education for U.S. males who completed
high school and bachelor’s degree are no higher than those of drop-outs. This may be
due to failure of screening hypothesis models to account for sheepskin e↵ects (Riley,
1979) considering log wages as a linear function schooling, not allowing for returns
to education to rise disproportionately at completion years. To test for sheepskin
e↵ect, Hungerford and Solon (1987) specified a spline function with discontinuities
at 8, 12, and 16 years of schooling (i.e. used years of schooling with interaction
terms for completion years) and found substantial “sheepskin e↵ects” at each level.4
While their specification allows for discontinuities at completion years, they had no
data on actual degree attainment. Jaeger and Page (1996) argued that this leads to
biased estimates of sheepskin e↵ects as some individuals finish high school or college
earlier or later than the normal years of schooling or not finish even with those years
of schooling. With data on diplomas received, they estimated for sheepskin e↵ects
while controlling for years of schooling. They found sheepskin e↵ects over twice
bigger than when using years of schooling alone. The returns to receiving a high
school diploma (11%) and a bachelor’s degree (31%) are much larger than when
using years of schooling alone (3% and 11%, respectively).
2.2.3 Quality of Education
Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) argue that, despite countries’ e↵orts to bridge the
gap in educational attainment, disparities in incomes remain and schooling fails to
deliver the expected learning outcomes. They cite evidence suggesting that the qual-
ity of education, more than the quantity of education, a↵ects incomes and growth.
4The model is
lw = ↵+ 1S+ 2D8+ 3D8 ·(S 8)+ 4D12+ 4D12 ·(S 12)+ 5D16+ 6D17+ 7D18+ 1X+ 2X2
where lw is log wage, S is schooling, D8, D12, and D16 are dummy variables for S   8, S   12,
and S   16, respectively; D17 and D18 are dummies for S = 17 and S = 18, respectively; and X
is experience.
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In this regard, poor countries are more disadvantaged in education than earlier
thought. Further evidence shows that the quality of education greatly a↵ects earn-
ings, controlling for educational attainment. Quality is also positively related to
quantity. Moreover, the e↵ect of education quality appears to be greater for poorer
countries.
In the United States, returns to education di↵er significantly across individ-
uals from di↵erent states and of di↵erent cohorts (di↵erent dates of birth) (Card
and Krueger, 1992). Much of the di↵erence is due to variations in school quality.
Return to schooling among individuals is higher where schools have lower pupil-
teacher ratios and have higher teacher salaries. Return to schooling increases by 0.4
percentage-points as pupils per teacher decreases by 5. Return to schooling increases
by 0.1 percentage-points as teacher salaries increase by 10 percent. Murnane et al.
(2000) studied the e↵ect of cognitive skills on earnings. They find that a one-point
increase in high school math scores increases earnings by 1.5 to 2 percent among
males and 1.3 to 1.7 percent among females. Over fifty percent of the di↵erence in
earnings between black and white males is due to di↵erences in math scores. Ef-
fective school reforms can raise earnings by 3.5 percent. However, even accounting
for cognitive skills, the model explains less than a third of the variation in earnings.
This may be due to limitations in the measurement of skills, or the presence of other
relevant factors in the labor market.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2007) survey the studies on the e↵ect of education
quality on individual incomes and find that in the United States, an increase in
mathematics score by one standard deviation raises earnings by 12 percent. Citing
Altonji and Pierret (2001), they state that the e↵ect of achievement on earnings
increases with experience. They also cite studies finding significant returns to nu-
meracy and literacy in the UK and Canada. Surveying the evidence for developing
countries, they conclude that returns to education quality may be larger than those
for developed countries. They also find that educational attainment and school
quality are complementary. Citing Hanushek and Zhang (2009), they show that the
average returns to schooling for thirteen countries (mostly developed ones) decreases
from 6 percent to 4.9 percent when controlling for education quality.
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2.2.4 Omitted-ability bias
One problem in estimating returns to schooling is omitted-ability bias (Griliches,
1977). Assuming that the true equation is:
y = a+  S +  A+ u
where S is schooling and A is ability, omitting ability leads to an upward bias in
the returns to schooling,  :
E (bys) =   +  bAS =   +  
Cov(AS)
V ar(S)
.
The bias results from the exogenous positive e↵ect of ability on wages (  > 0) and the
positive relationship between schooling and ability (bAS), assuming no other omit-
ted variables. Griliches notes that there are two views on “ability”. One equates
“ability” to IQ, another considers it as an “unobserved latent variable that both
drives people to get relatively more schooling and earn more income”, and he vari-
ably describes it as “energy” and “motivation”. To deal with omitted-ability bias,
he suggests including a measure of “ability” such as IQ, or some other test score
as an additional variable, or using other variables (and other tests scores) as in-
struments.5 Using the National Longitudinal Survey for Young Men, Griliches finds
that including ability reduces the returns to education by only 0.3 to 0.9 percent
from 6.8 percent, depending on the measure of ability, a rather small contribution.
He notes that measures of ability are quite unreliable and presents an alternative.
As some unobservables are common among siblings, each can be an “instrument”
for another.
Using measures of cognitive skills from the International Adult Literacy Survey
for 13 OECD countries in 1994, 1996, and 1998, Hanushek and Zhang (2009) found
that controlling for ability reduced returns to education in all countries. This is
in part due to the positive e↵ect of cognitive skills on wages. As literacy scores
increased by one standard deviation, annual earnings rose by 24 percent in the US,
and by between 5 to 15 percent in the other countries.
5First stage: IQ = ↵ +   ⇤ Schooling +   ⇤ Test2 +   ⇤ X + ✏; Second stage: log (wage) =
↵+   ⇤ Schooling +   ⇤ IQ+   ⇤X + ✏.
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2.2.5 Measurement error
Another problem identified by Griliches (1977) is error in the measurement of school-
ing. Given the true wage equation:
y =  S⇤ +  A+ u
where S⇤ is the “true” unobserved schooling while observed schooling is S = S⇤+ e,
where e is the measurement error. Omitted ability and measurement error together
lead to the following estimate of returns to schooling:
E (bys) =   +  bAS      =   +   cov(A, S)
 2s
    
2
e
 2s
where   is the proportion of the variation in observed schooling due to measurement
error. Assuming   > 0, a positive variance in the measurement error leads to
a downward bias in the estimated returns to schooling. Including ability in the
equation yields the following estimate of  :
E (bys) =       /(1  r2AS)
increasing the negative bias due to measurement error. As more variables related
to schooling are included in the equation, the greater the bias due to measurement
error.
2.2.6 Endogeneity of schooling
A problem related to ability bias is the endogeneity of schooling (Griliches, 1977). In
maximizing wealth, which is essentially cumulated earnings which depend primarily
on schooling and ability, the individual equates the present value of marginal income
from additional schooling to the foregone income from spending a unit of time on
schooling.6 A uniform subsidy on the cost of schooling raises optimal schooling
uniformly.7 However, if more able persons obtain more human capital for additional
6The earnings function is Y = e S+ A+u. The marginal benefit equals the marginal costs to
schooling:
@Y
@S
=  y (S) = ry (S) , and   = r.
7A subsidy of TR reduces the cost of schooling:  Y = r(Y   TR), raising optimal schooling
to S⇤ = 1 
h
 log r  r + logTR   A
i
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schooling, optimal schooling rises with ability.8 Assuming shocks to expected income
and temporary changes in foregone income, optimal schooling will be negatively
a↵ected by unexplained variability in earnings, creating a downward bias in the
estimate to returns to schooling.9
Card (1993) notes that educational attainment is not randomly distributed
across the population but decided upon by individuals. As a result, return to
schooling may be over- or under-estimated. Card (2001) developed a model in which
individuals maximize lifetime utility which depends on consumption, schooling, and
work; subject to an intertemporal budget constraint that equates consumption to
earnings based on prior schooling plus earnings given current schooling less tuition
cost. The first order conditions identify the marginal benefit and marginal cost of
schooling, which, when equated, define optimal schooling. Di↵erences in school-
ing can therefore arise both from di↵erences in marginal benefits and di↵erences
in marginal costs of schooling. From the marginal benefit, Card derived a model
for log earnings with an individual-specific intercept and schooling coe cient. He
shows how individual heterogeneity in both the intercept and slope results in an
inconsistent and biased estimate of returns to education. If the distributions of the
individual-specific initial wages (with no schooling) and marginal returns to school-
ing are highly skewed/asymetric, schooling will be correlated with the error term in
an ordinary least squares estimation and returns to schooling will be overestimated.
People with greater returns to schooling have a motivation to obtain more educa-
tion, which results in an upward bias in the returns to schooling. Even when there
is no heterogeneity in the slope, OLS estimates still su↵er omitted variable bias due
to the correlation between ability and marginal cost of schooling. If marginal costs
are less for people who can earn more for any given schooling, returns to education
would be overestimated.
2.2.7 Instrumental variables
A standard solution to the endogeneity problem is Instrumental Variable regression
where an instrumental variable a↵ects education but not ability or the error term
8Greater ability reduces the cost of schooling:  Y = r(Y   TR   A) and can have a positive
net e↵ect on optimal schooling: S⇤ = 1 
h
 log r  r + log(TR+  A)   A
i
9Expected income is subject to future shocks: EY = Yp · eu; net foregone income is subject to
current shocks: FY = Yp · et   TR    A; permanent income is subject to unobserved factors µi:
Yp = e S+ A+µi ; and optimal schooling is negatively related to shocks to permanent and expected
income. S⇤ = 1 
h
 log r  r + log (TR+  A)   A  µi   log 1r (reti   beui)
i
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in the earnings function (Card, 1999, 2001). Griliches (1977) uses test scores on
“knowledge of the world of work”, IQ, and family background as instruments and
found that OLS underestimated returns to schooling. Unobserved ability or educa-
tion may be related to family background characteristics such as parents education.
Using data from the 1972-1996 General Social Survey, Card (1999) finds that com-
pleted education rises by 0.2 and 0.4 years for each additional year of schooling of
either parent or both parents, respectively. About 30 percent of the observed varia-
tion in education is due to parents’ education. However, it is unclear whether family
background characteristics are valid instruments for education. If unobserved ability
is correlated with schooling and family background, omitting family background will
overestimate returns to education. Even when controlling for family background or
using it as an instrument for education, return to education is still prone to upward
bias unless ability and family background are uncorrelated.
While Griliches (1977) focuses on demand-side instruments for schooling, Card
(2001) reviews the literature on the the supply-side determinants of schooling.
Among the instruments used in recent literature are institutional di↵erences in
schooling, school leaving age, tuition, and school proximity. While the use of instru-
ments is su cient to ensure consistent estimates of returns to schooling, stronger
assumptions are required in the case of heterogeneity, such as that instruments be
uncorrelated with individual abilities and the schooling residual (Card, 2001). How-
ever, this is violated when instruments represent institutional factors that a↵ect the
relationship between ability and schooling. For instance, Card (2001) finds di↵erent
correlation between schooling and IQ for men who grew up near a college and men
who did not.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) used quarter of birth (i.e. quarter of the year)
as an instrument for education. Quarter of birth determines when individuals start
schooling and compulsory schooling laws identify when they can leave school. Indi-
viduals born later in the year on average have more schooling than those born earlier
in the year and are more likely to graduate from high school. As post-secondary
education is not bound by compulsory schooling laws, the quarter of schooling does
not a↵ect educational attainment beyond high school. Individuals born later in the
year also have greater earnings. However, returns to schooling from instrumental
variable regression are not statistically di↵erent from the OLS estimates.
Card (1993) uses college proximity as an instrument for educational attain-
ment. Based on his finding that men who grew up near a college have higher educa-
tion and earnings, he argues that college proximity reduces the costs and raises the
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benefits of schooling especially among the poor. Various OLS regressions including
education, experience, race, region, family background (father and mother’s educa-
tion and their interaction), and family structure produce stable estimates of returns
to schooling. However, these are subject to bias as schooling may be related to the
disturbance in the earnings function for the reasons identified by Griliches (1977).
Instrumental variable estimation with college proximity as an instrument for school-
ing raises returns to schooling by 25-60 percent over ordinary least squares. This
suggests that returns to education are higher among the poor. Testing this indirect
e↵ect of college proximity on earnings via education against the direct e↵ect on
earnings, he concludes that college proximity has an exogenous e↵ect on schooling.
An alternative solution, which is a generalization of the instrumental variable
estimation, is the control function approach (Card, 1999). The residual of the re-
gression of schooling on the instrumental variable is included as a regressor in the
earnings function, leaving the relation between log earnings and schooling una↵ected
by the the unobserved heterogeneity. The control function approach makes certain
assumptions regarding the relationships between ability and observed variables and
includes terms that account for these (Card, 2001). Another alternative, the maxi-
mum likelihood approach, allows returns to schooling to vary flexibly with individual
ability.
2.2.8 Fixed-e↵ects estimation
As mentioned earlier, measures of ability can be unreliable (Griliches, 1977). If
unobserved ability is common among siblings, each can be an “instrument” for
another. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) estimate returns to education by relating
the wage di↵erential between twins to the di↵erence in their schooling, eliminating
the e↵ect of unobserved family attributes that would be correlated with schooling.
The econometric model is:
y1i = ↵Xi +  Z1i + µi + "1i (2.1)
y2i = ↵Xi +  Z2i + µi + "2i (2.2)
where y1i and y2i are the log wages for the twins, Xi are variables common to twins
such as age, race, family background; Z1i and Z2i are variables that di↵er between
twins such as education; µi is the unobserved component of wage common to twins;
"1i and "2i are the unobserved individual components. The twins’ education is
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related to unobserved family e↵ects:
µi =  Z1i +  Z2i +  Xi + !i (2.3)
where the coe cients   measure the “selection e↵ect”. Substituting 2.3 into 2.1 and
2.2 and collecting terms:
y1i = [↵ +  ]Xi + [  +  ]Z1i +  Z2i + "
0
1i (2.4)
y2i = [↵ +  ]Xi +  Z1i + [  +  ]Z2i + "
0
2i (2.5)
where "01i = !i+ "1i and "
0
2i = !i+ "2i.   > 0 if families with higher wages are more
likely to educate their children. Di↵erencing equations 2.1 and 2.2 or 2.4 and 2.5
yields:
y1i   y2i =  (Z1i   Z2i) + "1i   "2i. (2.6)
where the “fixed-e↵ects” estimator,  , measures the structural (or selection-corrected)
e↵ect of the observables on earnings. Di↵erencing eliminates the family e↵ect in
equations 2.1 and 2.2 and the selection e↵ect in equations 2.4 and 2.5.
While fixed-e↵ects estimation addresses omitted ability bias, it is subject to
bigger measurement error. Considering the schooling of sibling n as reported by
sibling m:
Smn = Sn + v
m
n
where Sn is the true schooling, vmn is measurement error. The OLS estimator is
downward biased by an amount equal to the proportion of the variance in reported
schooling due to the measurement error,  
2
v
 2v+ 
2
S
, called the reliability ratio:
E(b) =  (1   
2
v
 2v +  
2
S
)
The fixed-e↵ects estimator is:
E(b) =  (1   
2
v
( 2v +  
2
S)(1  ⇢s)
)
where ⇢s is the correlation between the schooling of twins. The downward bias
caused by measurement error is increased by the association between the twins’
schooling. To reduce the bias due to measurement error, average reported schooling
can be used as an instrument for self-reported schooling.
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Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994)’s results show an OLS estimate of 8.4 percent
and a fixed-e↵ects estimate of 9.2 percent. The higher fixed-e↵ects estimate sug-
gests a negative relationship between schooling and ability contrary to expectation.
Instrumental variable estimate range from 11.7 to 16.7 percent, up to almost twice
as much as the least squares estimate. This suggests substantial downward bias in
OLS and fixed-e↵ects estimates due to measurement error.
Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) relate the di↵erence earnings between
brothers, and fathers and sons, to the di↵erence in their schooling. As members
of the same family are more likely to share the same abilities and backgrounds
than unrelated individuals, the technique e↵ectively controls for unobserved family
e↵ects. The objective is to determine whether family attributes account for relation-
ship between wages and education. They use data from the National Longitudinal
Survey for 1978 and 1981 for brothers and sons, and 1966 for fathers. Their results
for brothers show an upward bias of 25% in OLS estimates of return to education
due to omitted family e↵ects, and for fathers and sons an upward bias of 30% due
to the omission. However, measurement error results in a downward bias of similar
magnitude, resulting in small net bias. Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) find fixed-
e↵ects estimates of returns to schooling for twins to be 30 percent lower than OLS
estimates. In South Africa, Hertz (2003) found fixed-e↵ects estimates to be 80.5%
lower than OLS estimates for husband-wife pairs, 70.6% for parent-child pairs, and
63.2% for sibling pairs.
2.2.9 Previous estimates for the Philippines
A review of previous studies on returns to education in the Philippines is given in
Table 2.1. Early studies found high returns to education in the Philippines in the
1980s-1990s (Table 2.2). Hossain and Psacharopoulos (1994) found the Mincerian
returns to schooling to be 11.9 percent in 1988. Gerochi (2002) found even higher
returns to schooling in 1995 at 14 percent. However, these figures are based on the
elaborate method and the basic Mincerian neither of which control for other factors,
thus leading to omitted-variable bias.
Nevertheless, these figures are comparable to those for some neighboring coun-
tries (Table 2.3). Returns to schooling were 12.4 percent in Thailand and 13.5 per-
cent in South Korea in 1986, and 13.1 percent in Singapore in 1998. These figures
are consistent with the global pattern of diminishing returns to income: returns
to education decrease as a country’s per capita income increases (Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos, 2002). Psacharopoulos and Patrinos estimate the average returns to
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Table 2.1: Previous Studies on Returns to Education in the Philippines
Author(s) Year Data Method Controls, IVs
Tan and Paqueo
(1989)
1985 FIES Elaborate
(Private,
Social),
Mincerian
Hossain and
Psacharopoulos
(1994)
1988 FIES,
DECS
Elaborate
(Private,
Social),
Mincerian
Maluccio (1998) 1974,
1983,
1994
Bicol Mul-
tipurpose
Survey
(panel)
Mincerian,
2SLS
Schooling > HS, Age
& Square, Male, Ru-
ral; IVs: Distance
to schools, father’s
& mother’s education,
own farmland
Gerochi (2002) 1988,
1990,
1995
LFS,
FAPE
Elaborate
(Private,
Social),
Mincerian
Schady (2000) 1998 APIS Discon-
tinuous
Spline
Function
Father’s & Mother’s
education, Province
di Gropello et al.
(2010)
1988-
2006
LFS, FIES Extended
Mincerian
Male
Luo and Terada
(2009)
2003-
2007
LFS Extended
Mincerian
Sex, Sector, Occupa-
tion, Region, Time
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Table 2.2: Mincerian Rates of Return to Education in the Philippines, Previous
Studies
Schooling Primary Secondary Tertiary Source
1985 8.1*** Tan and Paqueo
(1989)
1988 11.9*** 18.6*** 10.2*** 11.0*** Hossain and
Psacharopoulos
(1994)
1990 14.2*** Gerochi (2002)
1995 14.0***
1994 7.3*** (OLS) 2.3 2.3 12.2*** Maluccio (1998)
12.3*** (2SLS)
1998 12.6*** (Basic) 14.2*** 15.8*** 10.5*** Schady (2000)
11.0*** (+Prov.) 25.2 39.5* 32.0***
12.3*** (+Par.Ed) 1.9 6.9 4.6*
1988-
2006
8.0*** 10.0*** 18.0*** di Gropello et al.
(2010)
2003-
2007
2.0*** 7.3*** 15.3*** Luo and Terada
(2009)
note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
schooling for low and high income countries at 10.9 and 7.4 percent, respectively.
The world average return to a year of schooling is 10 percent. While diminishing
returns to income has become a stylized fact, there does not seem to be an explicit
justification. I pro↵er that the higher returns for developing countries are capturing
greater heterogeneity in education quality, while estimates for developed countries
may be “pure” returns assuming less heterogeneity in education quality and perhaps
better data.
Earlier studies on returns by education level show that in the Philippines,
primary education has the highest rate of return. Using the human-capital earnings
function, Hossain and Psacharopoulos (1994) found returns to primary education
at 18.6 percent against 10.2 for secondary and 11.0 for tertiary education in 1988.
They find similar estimates using the Elaborate Method (Table 2.2). Using the
Elaborate Method, Gerochi (2002) found returns to primary education at 24 percent,
compared to 14.3 percent for secondary and 15.8 for tertiary education in 1995. This
is consistent with Psacharopoulos (1993) and Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002)
who find that primary education has the highest rate of return across all regions.
The correspondingly high social returns to primary education (Table 2.4) have led
some (e.g. Hossain and Psacharopoulos (1994)) to argue for prioritizing primary
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Table 2.3: Rates of Return to Education in other countries in South-East Asia
Country Year Rate of Return Source
Indonesia 1981 Susenas - Con-
trols: experience and
its square, education-
experience, dummies
for various education
levels;
OLS: 15.0-17.0 Byron & Taka-
hashi (1989)
1995 SUPAS - Con-
trols: Region of birth,
cohort of birth
OLS: 7.0 Duflo (2000)
Singapore 1974 13.4 Psacharopoulos
(1994)
1998 Labor Force Sur-
vey - Controls: Expe-
rience and its square
OLS: 13.1 Sakellariou
(2001)
South Korea 1974 12 Ryoo, Nam and
Carnoy (1993)
1976 6.5 Patrinos (1995)
1979 14.1 Ryoo, Nam and
Carnoy (1993)
1980 11.1 Patrinos(1995)
1986 13.5 Ryoo, Nam and
Carnoy (1993)
Thailand 1971 10.4 Psacharopoulos
(1994)
1986 12.4 Patrinos (1995)
1989 11.5 Patrinos (1995)
Vietnam (South) 1964 16.8 Psacharopoulos
(1994)
Source: Psacharopoulos (1993); Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002)
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education. However, returns to primary education are based on the assumption that
there are no foregone incomes below the age of ten. This assumption is questionable
for poor countries like the Philippines where many early primary school age children
work instead of going to schooling or do both.
Table 2.4: Private and Social Returns to Education, previous studies
1985 1988 1990 1995
Private
Primary 18.2 18.3 27 24
Secondary 13.8 10.5 14.3 14.3
University 14 11.6 15.5 15.8
Social
Primary 11.9 13.3 15.1 15.5
Secondary 12.9 8.9 13.5 13.5
University 13.3 10.5 14.6 15.6
Source Tan and
Paqueo
(1989)
Hossain and
Psacharopoulos
(1994)
Gerochi
(2002)
Gerochi
(2002)
Controlling for age and its square, sex, and urbanity, Maluccio (1998) finds
return to schooling of 7.3 percent for the Bicol region in the Philippines in 1994.
However, when treating schooling as endogenous, using distance to schools, father’s
and mother’s education, own farmland as instruments, Maluccio finds a higher return
to education of 12.6 percent. However, his study is not representative as it is limited
to one poor region.
More recent studies find increasing returns to education in the Philippines from
the late 1990s (Table 2.2). Unlike earlier studies, these use the extended earnings
function, addressing non-linearities in returns to education. Schady (2000) found
returns to primary education at 9.4 percent, lower than those for secondary (10
percent) and tertiary (16.7 percent) education. Controlling separately for father’s
and mother’s education, and province, he finds returns to primary education as low
as 6.2 percent. Similarly, di Gropello et al. (2010) found lower returns to primary
education (6-8 percent), and rising returns to secondary (5-10 percent) and tertiary
(16-18 percent) education between 1988 and 2006, controlling for sex.
Why have returns to primary education decreased and that for higher edu-
cation increased? The former has been linked to rising enrolment and graduation
rates (Asian Development Bank, 2007). This could mean that the increase in supply
of labor with only primary education is driving down low-skill wages. The latter
has been attributed to the e↵ects of “globalization and skill-biased technological
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change” (di Gropello et al., 2010). Moreover, the rise in returns to secondary and
tertiary education accrues mostly to the service sector, especially in emerging in-
dustries where professionals earns 3-4 times more than unskilled workers, compared
to 2-2.5 times in traditional industries (Asian Development Bank, 2007).
Controlling for sex, major sectors, major occupations, and major regions, Luo
and Terada (2009) found even lower returns to primary education at 2 percent com-
pared to secondary (7.3 percent) and tertiary (15.3 percent) education for 2003-2007.
However, classifying the sample into only three sectors (agriculture, manufacturing
and service), three occupations (worker/laborer; o cials, managers, executives; and
professionals), and four regions (National Capital, other Luzon, Visayas, and Min-
danao) may not capture much of the variation in earnings across the sample.
Previous studies on returns to education in the Philippines have focused on
the quantity of education. However, while the Philippines fared better than some of
its neighbors in terms of enrollment, it fared poorly in terms of income per capita
and economic growth. This suggests that quantity of schooling does not su ciently
explain personal earnings and economic growth. Education quality may be as im-
portant as or more important than education quantity. Hanushek and Woessmann
(2007) show that the Philippines is on the bottom rung of international student
achievement test scores. This may explain poor economic growth in the 1980s-1990s.
Moreover, the high returns to schooling and to primary education documented in
the literature defy explanation. I argue that these are due to certain questionable
assumptions and are capturing the e↵ects of education quality and ability. Unlike
previous studies, this study aims to account for quality of education, unobserved
heterogeneity (i.e. ability bias) and the endogeneity of education (education and
wages are jointly determined by unobserved factors) in the estimation of returns to
education in the Philippines.
2.3 Model and Methodology
I begin by constructing age-earnings profiles for various education levels by regressing
wage on age for di↵erent levels of education, with no constant, and controlling for
year fixed e↵ects (to account for inflation, putting estimates in 2001 prices). We
then estimate returns to education using the short-cut method:
rp =
(Yp   Yn)
Sp(Yn)
; rs =
(Ys   Yp)
Ss(Yp)
; rc =
(Yc   Ys)
Sc(Ys)
; and rg =
(Yg   Yc)
Sg(Yc)
(2.7)
2.3. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 43
where Y is the average earnings across ages, S is the length of school cycle, and r
is the rate of return on investment - for the subscripted level of education: n for
no schooling, p for primary, s for secondary, c for college, and g for post-graduate
where Sp = 6, Ss = 4, Sc = 4, and Sg = 2 are assumed.
I then estimate returns on education using the full-discounting method with
the formula:
65X
t=12
(Yp   Yn)t
(1 + rp)
t 12 =
12X
t=6
(Yn)t(1 + rp)
t 6
65X
t=16
(Ys   Yp)t
(1 + rs)
t 16 =
16X
t=12
(Yp)t(1 + rs)
t 12
65X
t=20
(Yc   Ys)t
(1 + rc)
t 20 =
20X
t=16
(Ys)t(1 + rc)
t 16
65X
t=21
(Yg   Yc)t
(1 + rg)
t 21 =
22X
t=21
(Yc)t(1 + rg)
t 21
(2.8)
where Y is average earnings for persons with the subscripted education at a par-
ticular age t. The return on education is the rate of return that equates the net
present value of the income gain from a particular education to the net present value
of the cost of that education. For example, benefits to primary education accrue to
individuals at ages 12 to 65 while costs accrue at ages 6 to 11. As in the literature,
we assume foregone earnings as the only costs of education.
I then fit a basic human capital earnings function (Mincer, 1974) relating the
natural logarithm of wage on years of schooling (S), experience (T ), and experience
squared (T 2). Following this, we include control variables X in a step-wise manner,
namely time (year), sex, marital status, region, sector, occupation, class of work,
tenure, and urbanity:
ln(wage)it = ↵it +  1Sit +  1Tit +  2T
2
it +X  + eit (2.9)
where  1 is the return to each year of schooling. Including control variables is
expected to correct for omitted variable bias in returns to schooling as shown by
Griliches (1977). For example, if urban areas have higher wages and more schooling
relative to rural areas, omitting urbanity would overestimate the returns to school-
ing, and including this variable reduces returns to schooling. Similarly, if wages
and schooling are higher in the national capital region, omitting the variable region
would bias returns to schooling upward while including it would lower the returns.
I then estimate returns to schooling by year, sex, marital status, region, sector,
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occupation, class of work, tenure, and urbanity by interacting the human capital
earnings function (schooling, experience and experience squared) with dummies for
each characteristic (x) while controlling for other factors (X):
ln(wage)it = x
0
itK↵itK + S
0
itx
0
itK K + T
0
itx
0
itK 1K + T
0
itK
2x0it 2K +X  + eit
(2.10)
where xit = (1 xit2 xit3 ... xitK)0 is a variable withK categories and  K = ( 1  2 ...  k)0.
For example, for the variable sex, K = 2 (male and female). With a dummy variable
for male,  1 is the return to schooling for females and  1+ 2 is the return for males.
We then fit an extended human capital earnings function (Psacharopoulos,
1995) relating log wage to primary, secondary, and college and post-graduate edu-
cation attainment, experience and experience squared:
ln(wage)it = ↵it +  1Priit +  2Secit +  3Colit +  4PGrit
+  1tExpit +  2tExp
2
it + eit
(2.11)
where returns to primary, secondary, college and post-graduate education are as
follows:
rp =
 1
Sp
; rs =
 2    1
Ss
; rc =
 3    2
Sc
; rg =
 4    3
Sg
(2.12)
2.3.1 Accounting for education quality
To account for education quality, the basic model is interacted with a dummy vari-
able for the test cohort and augmented with a measure of education quality (NEAT
and NSAT scores) .
ln(wage)it = ↵1 + ↵2Cohortit +  1Schoolingit +  2Cohortit · Schoolingit
+  1Expit +  2Cohortit · Expit +  3Exp2it +  4Cohortit · Exp2it
+Division
0
it  + ⇡Qualityi,q +X
0
it it + eit
(2.13)
where Cohortit is a dummy for the test cohort, Divisionit is a dummy variable
for the division (province or key city), the lowest level at which the test scores
are available, and Qualityiq is the overall mean percentage score (MPS) in NEAT
or mean raw score (MRS) in NSAT for the division at time q, i.e. 1993-1999 for
primary and 1997-1999 for secondary.  1 is the return to quantity of schooling
for the non-cohort and  1 +  2 is the return for the test cohort. ⇡ is the return
to quality of primary or secondary education. Accounting for education quality is
expected to reduce returns to education as education quality is positively related to
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wages (⇡ > 0) and years of schooling. To account for education quality by subject,
the overall scores in NEAT/NSAT are then replaced with subject-specific average
test scores.
2.3.2 Accounting for ability
Controlling for observed heterogeneity in demographic and labor characteristics as
well as education quality is pretty straightforward as data are available. It is a
di↵erent matter to control for unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, it is suspected
that higher returns to education in urban areas are driven by the higher ability
of migrants from rural areas where the less able are left behind. However, the
unavailability of internal migration data especially at the individual level hinders
the testing of this hypothesis. This study is therefore significant as it accounts for
ability in returns to education at the national level as well as between urban and
rural areas, across regions and across demographic and labor characteristics.
To account for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. omitted ability), I use sibling
fixed-e↵ects estimation. This is done by performing the regression in deviations
from the mean (z¨hi) obtained by taking the sibling average for each variable (z¯h) for
each household h and subtracting this from the values (zhi) for di↵erent individuals
i:
ln(wage)hi   ¯ln(wage)h = ↵hi   ↵¯h +  1
 
Schhi   ¯Schh
 
+  1
 
Exphi   ¯Exph
 
+  2(Exp
2
hi   ¯Exp2h) +
⇣
X
0
hi   X¯ 0h
⌘
  + (ehi   e¯h)
¨ln(wage)hi =  1 ¨Schit +  1 ¨Expit +  2 ¨Exp
2
it + X¨it  + e¨i (2.14)
Assuming that unobserved individual characteristics ↵i are the same within house-
holds (siblings have very similar unobserved ability), ↵hi = ↵¯h, we eliminate the
unobserved fixed-e↵ects such as ability that would otherwise bias returns to edu-
cation upward. The fixed-e↵ects estimates are compared to the benchmark Pooled
OLS estimates where the individual e↵ect is assumed to be identical across indi-
viduals: ↵i = ↵. Fixed-e↵ects estimates of returns to education are expected to
be lower than OLS estimates as unobserved heterogeneity / ability bias would be
driving OLS estimates upward as in earlier studies. The di↵erence in the OLS and
fixed-e↵ects estimates for returns to schooling is considered as the returns to ability.
On the other hand, fixed e↵ects estimation is thought to increase the downward-bias
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due to measurement error:
E(b) =  (1   
2
v
( 2v +  
2
S)(1  ⇢s)
)
To mitigate measurement error due to the correlation of the schooling of siblings, I
employ fixed e↵ects instrumental variable estimation. I use the predicted schooling
between siblings from a regression of schooling on age and sex as an instrument for
own schooling. This is based on the assumption that siblings have the same optimal
level of schooling when controlling for individual level characteristics and that this
is unrelated to the deviation in individual schooling.
An alternative to the fixed-e↵ects model is the random e↵ects model. The
random e↵ects model assumes strict exogeneity (i.e. independence between ↵i and
Xi) and considers the individual e↵ect as part of the error term: vi = ↵i + ei. In
this case, ability is not the same between siblings but randomly distributed across
the population. In choosing between the within or fixed-e↵ects and random-e↵ects
results, I use the Hausman test to determine whether ↵i and Xi are correlated.
H = ( ˆW    ˆRE)0 (AV ar
⇣
 ˆW
⌘
  AV ar
⇣
 ˆRE
⌘
)
 1
( ˆW    ˆRE)
Under the null hypothesis of strict exogeneity, the fixed-e↵ects estimate,  ˆW , is
consistent and the random e↵ects estimate,  ˆRE, is e cient, and the test statistic
H will be relatively small. Under the alternative hypothesis,  ˆW is consistent but
 ˆRE is inconsistent, and the test statistic H will be significantly di↵erent from zero.
2.4 Data and Measurement
2.4.1 Labor Force Survey
The principal data source is the quarterly Labor Force Survey (LFS). Primarily
designed to provide statistics on employment, unemployment, and underemployment
at the national, regional, provincial and key city levels, the Labor Force Survey also
provides data on work hours and daily wage, highest grade completed, age, sex,
urbanity, region, sector, occupation, class of work, and tenure. It is the primary
source for wage data at the individual level.
The LFS sample is drawn from a population that covers all households and
their members, related or otherwise, except those in the “least accessible barangays”.
Since July 2003, the LFS has 17 domains corresponding to the administrative re-
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gions. The domains are further stratified by province, highly urbanized / indepen-
dent component cities, by housing type, farming intensity, and average municipal
income. The primary sampling unit (PSU) is the village or a combination of villages
having no less than 500 households, whose probability of selection is proportional to
its size. There are 2,835 PSUs, 330 of which are certain to be selected. The master
sample is divided into four sub-samples or independent replicates, each comprising
a quarter of the PSUs. Enumeration areas (EAs), each of about 150 households, are
then selected within the sample PSUs. Finally, housing units are selected where up
to three households are interviewed.
This study uses the July rounds of the LFS for 2001-2010. In pooling the data, I
first rename variables to make them consistent across years to allow pooling. Second,
I reclassify the 2001 and/or 2002 regions to match the classification for 2003-2010.
This entails breaking up Region IV into IV-A and IV-B according to province and
moving Aurora to Region III. It also entails moving Lanao del Norte to Region X;
South Cotabato and Saranggani to Region XII; Basilan to Region XV except Isabela
City which is retained in Region IX. The problem is that the labor force survey public
use files (PUFs) for 2001-2006 do not have unique household IDs; only those for
2007-2010 have unique household IDs. I generate unique household IDs for 2001-
2002 by grouping the observations by region, province, stratum, PSU, household
control number. For 2003-2004, I group the observations by region, stratum, PSU,
enumeration area, sample housing serial number, and household control number.
Finally, for 2005-2006, the observations are grouped by PSU, municipality, barangay,
enumeration area, sample housing serial number, and household control number. To
merge the education quality data, we need information on province and municipality.
The labor force survey public use files for 2001-2002 have data on provinces but not
municipalities while the PUFs for 2005-2006 have both data, but those for 2003-
2004 and 2007-2010 do not have data on provinces and municipalities. I extract
data on provinces from the PSU for 2003-2004 and 2007-2010. I extract data on
municipalities from the PSU for 2001-2004. Education quality data can be merged
at the provincial and city levels for 2001-2006 but only at the provincial level for
2007-2010. Using provincial scores for cities may underestimate education quality
in cities.
The pooled data set contains a total of 2,041,826 observations. However, we
are only concerned with the employed and those less than 65 years old composed
of 749,129 individuals. The sample distributions by employment status are given
in Table 2.5 for the entire sample, for males, and for females. The proportion of
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employed decreased from 2002 to 2004 and appears to have increased substantially
in 2005. However, the latter is due to a change in the definition of employment.
The proportion of employed is higher among males than among females. Among
the employed, only 44 percent have positive wages. This might exclude the self-
employed, employers in family-owned farm or business, and those who work without
pay in family-owned businesses. Table 2.6 shows the sample distribution by class
of work. Over three-tenths (31.3 percent) are self-employed, 13.4 percent work
without pay in family-owned farm or business, and4.4 percent are employers in
family-owned farm or business. Over a third (36.9 percent) of the sample work in
private establishments, 8.5 percent work in government / government corporation,
and 5.1 percent work in private households, and 0.4 percent work with pay in family-
owned farm or business.
Earnings are measured in terms of hourly wage, as annual or weekly wage would
yield returns to education that include the e↵ect of time spent at work. Hourly wage
is computed as basic pay per day divided by the normal number of hours worked
per day. Summary statistics are given in Table 2.7. The average wage rate grew
by an average of 10 percent per year over the decade. In most years, while the
standard deviation of the wage rate rose, it was generally below the mean except in
2006 and 2007 when the dispersion of the wage rate rose by three-fold and four-fold,
respectively, before normalizing in 2008.
The education system of the Philippines that applies to the data comprised
six years of elementary education starting around age 6, four years of secondary
education starting around age 12, and tertiary education starting around age 16.
The Philippine Constitution promotes the right to education and provides a system
of free public education at the primary and secondary levels, and mandates primary
education as compulsory. Starting in 2012, the Department of Education has im-
plemented the K-12 program, a new system with Kindergarten, six years of primary
education, four years of junior high school, and two years of senior high school.
The Labor Force Survey includes data on highest educational attainment but
not on years of schooling. Years of schooling can be inferred from highest grade
completed where No Grade is assigned 0, Incomplete Elementary = 3, Elementary
Graduate = 6, Incomplete High School = 8, High School Graduate = 10, College
Undergraduate = 12, College Graduate =14, and Completed Post-Graduate = 16.10
The assignment of years of schooling given the educational attainment may be sub-
10Post-graduate includes completion of a Masters degree and PhD. Returns to post-graduate
degrees can be sensitive to the number of years assumed.
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ject to measurement error especially for those with incomplete elementary, high
school or college education. For instance, incomplete elementary can mean at least
one year and at most five years of schooling. Returns to incomplete elementary can
be sensitive to the number of years assumed. Even assigning the median of three
years of schooling may bias estimates of returns to schooling if the distribution of
schooling is skewed. Measurement error is particularly a concern for those workers
who no longer attend school. However, it can be mitigated for those who attended
school during the reference period. For those with incomplete education currently
studying, years of schooling can be estimated as age minus six. To address mea-
surement error, I use fixed-e↵ects instrumental variable estimation as discussed in
the model.
The sample distribution by highest grade completed for 2001-2010 is given in
Table 2.8. As of 2010, less than 15 percent have at least college education, with
this share of workers increasing only slightly during the decade. Nevertheless, this
shows Over 85 percent have less than complete college education distributed as
follows: 13 percent have incomplete college education, 25 percent have complete
secondary education, 14 percent have incomplete secondary education, 16 percent
have complete primary education, 15 percent have incomplete primary education,
and 2 percent have no schooling.
Consistent with the literature, work experience is used rather than age, as using
age leads to omitted variable bias that would underestimate return to schooling.
Work experience is computed as age minus years of schooling minus six (6), the
normal age before the start of schooling. This assumes continuous work experience
after schooling and does not account for periods of unemployment and unpaid work.
Sex is recoded as a dummy variable where Male = 1 and Female = 0. Table
2.9 shows the sample distribution by sex. Over 6 out of 10 of those employed and
under 65 years old are males while almost 4 out of 10 are females. urban dummy is
created where Urban = 1 and Rural = 0. A variable Sector is created by combining
subsectors into major sectors.
The variable region is recoded to make the National Capital Region the refer-
ence. Table 2.10 shows the sample distribution by region from 2001 to 2010. Over
half of the sample live in Luzon: 10.3 percent in the National Capital Region, 9.7
percent in CaLaBaRZon, 8.1 percent in Central Luzon, 5.6 percent in Bicol, 5.3
percent in Ilocos, 4.9 in Cagayan Valley, 4.4 percent in MiMaRoPa, and 4.2 percent
in Cordillera. Less than one-fifth reside in Visayas: 7 percent in Western Visayas,
6.6 percent in Central Visayas, and 5.3 percent in Eastern Visayas. Almost three-
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tenths live in Mindanao: 5.9 percent in Northern Mindanao, 5.2 percent in Davao,
5.2 percent in SoCCSKarGen, 4.3 percent in Caraga, 4.2 percent in ARMM, and
4.1 percent in Zamboanga.
Table 2.11 shows the sample distribution by sector for 2001-2010. Over one-
third of the sample work in agriculture; 33 percent in agriculture and hunting and
4.5 percent in fishing. Almost 15 percent are engaged in industry: 8.5 percent
in manufacturing, 5.3 percent construction, 0.5 percent in mining and quarrying,
and 0.4 percent in electricity, gas and water. Almost half are engaged in services:
18.4 percent in wholesale and retail trade, 7.3 percent in transport, storage and
communications, 5 percent in public administration, defense, and social security,
4.8 percent in private households, 3.3 percent in education, 2.4 percent each in
hotel and restaurant and other social and personal services, 2.2 percent in real
estate and renting, 1.1 percent in health and social work, and 1 percent in financial
intermediation.
A variable occupation is created by combining various occupations into major
occupations. Table 2.12 shows the sample distribution by occupation from 2001 to
2010. Laborers and unskilled workers are the largest group comprising one third
of the sample, followed by farmers, fishermen, and forestry workers who make up
almost one-fifth. O cials, executives, managers and supervisors make up 12 percent
followed by service and sales workers (9.3 percent), and trades and related work (8.4
percent). Plant and machine operators and assemblers make up 6.9 percent, clerks
and professional each make up 4.5 percent, technicians and associate professionals
constitute 2.53 percent and those in special occupations comprise 0.4 percent.
Table 2.13 shows the sample distribution by tenure / nature of employment.
Over three-fourths of the workers in the sample have permanent job / business /
unpaid family work. Almost one-fifth are engaged in short-term /seasonal / casual
job / business / unpaid family work. 3 percent worked for di↵erent employer on day
to day or week to week basis.
Table 2.14 shows the sample distribution by urbanity. Over half of the sample
live in rural areas while a little less than half reside in urban areas.
To account for sibling fixed-e↵ects, I use the complete July round of the 2007-
2010 Labor Force Survey. I extract the sons and daughters from the sample, drop
households with less than two siblings, and rank the siblings by age. This yields a
pooled sample of 338,088 individuals over four years, 36,725 of whom have wages.
To allow fixed-e↵ects estimation, I use the household ID and year to generate the
panel variable and the sibling rank as the time variable.
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Table 2.5: Sample Distribution by Employment Status
Employment Status (%) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Total
Employed 50.04 49.95 50.41 44.52 60.46 60.17 59.51 60.26 60.12 59.84 54.78
Unemployed 3.96 4.01 3.92 3.27 4.53 4.79 4.48 4.23 4.41 4.01 4.11
Not in the labor force 46 46.04 45.67 52.22 35.02 35.05 36 35.51 35.47 36.15 41.1
Males
Employed 60.98 60.57 63 54.81 74.35 73.03 72.51 73.53 72.76 73.11 66.99
Unemployed 4.78 4.95 4.45 4.02 5.5 5.95 5.61 5.27 5.41 5.06 5.03
Not in the labor force 34.24 34.49 32.55 41.17 20.15 21.03 21.89 21.2 21.83 21.83 27.98
Females
Employed 39.11 39.45 37.65 33.98 46.5 47.25 46.35 46.94 47.53 46.45 42.51
Unemployed 3.14 3.09 3.38 2.49 3.54 3.62 3.35 3.18 3.41 2.95 3.19
Not in the labor force 57.75 57.45 58.96 63.52 49.95 49.13 50.3 49.88 49.05 50.6 54.3
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Table 2.6: Sample Distribution by Class of Work, by Year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Private household 4,017 3,967 4,803 3,406 3,281 3,742 3,659 3,724 4,240 3,580 38,419
5.41 5.47 5.92 4.33 4.27 4.99 5.14 5.16 5.75 4.87 5.13
Private establishment 25,549 25,689 29,648 29,625 27,588 27,793 26,522 27,040 28,965 27,748 276,167
34.39 35.4 36.53 37.63 35.89 37.09 37.26 37.46 39.28 37.77 36.87
Gov’t/gov’t corporatiion 6,985 6,757 6,427 6,166 6,077 5,961 6,071 6,184 6,438 6,539 63,605
9.4 9.31 7.92 7.83 7.9 7.95 8.53 8.57 8.73 8.9 8.49
Self employed 23,505 21,649 24,873 24,217 25,721 24,025 22,625 22,882 21,932 22,974 234,403
31.64 29.83 30.64 30.76 33.46 32.06 31.79 31.7 29.74 31.27 31.29
Employer in family farm/business 3,091 3,259 3,982 3,467 3,426 3,714 3,000 2,965 3,163 2,750 32,817
4.16 4.49 4.91 4.4 4.46 4.96 4.21 4.11 4.29 3.74 4.38
With pay in family farm/business 352 293 583 282 272 315 393 188 220 182 3,080
0.47 0.4 0.72 0.36 0.35 0.42 0.55 0.26 0.3 0.25 0.41
Without pay in family farm/business 10,795 10,962 10,851 11,554 10,511 9,393 8,905 9,192 8,782 9,693 100,638
14.53 15.1 13.37 14.68 13.67 12.53 12.51 12.74 11.91 13.19 13.43
Total 74,294 72,576 81,167 78,717 76,876 74,943 71,175 72,175 73,740 73,466 749,129
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 2.7: Wage mean and standard deviation by year
Year Mean Std.Dev.
2001 29.2 24.3
2002 30 25.8
2003 28.4 26.1
2004 29.4 26.1
2005 30.5 25.6
2006 32.9 76.3
2007 34.4 106.1
2008 35 32.1
2009 36.4 35
2010 38.9 33.5
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Table 2.8: Sample Distribution by Educational Attainment by Year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
No Schooling 1,710 1,569 1,918 2,046 1,895 1,490 1,540 1,523 1,472 1,439 16,602
2.3 2.16 2.36 2.6 2.47 1.99 2.16 2.11 2 1.96 2.22
Incomplete Elementary 12,222 11,514 15,559 15,344 12,921 12,763 11,934 11,583 11,869 11,253 126,962
16.45 15.86 19.17 19.49 16.81 17.03 16.77 16.05 16.1 15.32 16.95
Complete Elementary 13,492 13,162 14,646 13,981 14,004 12,541 11,640 11,983 11,765 11,461 128,675
18.16 18.14 18.04 17.76 18.22 16.73 16.35 16.6 15.95 15.6 17.18
Incomplete Secondary 10,182 10,431 11,648 11,221 10,902 11,045 10,257 10,171 10,448 10,091 106,396
13.71 14.37 14.35 14.25 14.18 14.74 14.41 14.09 14.17 13.74 14.2
Complete Secondary 16,734 16,152 17,586 17,331 17,562 17,542 16,785 18,091 18,369 18,603 174,755
22.52 22.26 21.67 22.02 22.84 23.41 23.58 25.07 24.91 25.32 23.33
Incomplete College 9,413 8,917 9,786 8,824 9,391 9,029 9,116 8,874 9,401 9,766 92,517
12.67 12.29 12.06 11.21 12.22 12.05 12.81 12.3 12.75 13.29 12.35
Complete College 10,323 10,607 9,892 9,800 10,057 10,394 9,791 9,801 10,246 10,716 101,627
13.89 14.62 12.19 12.45 13.08 13.87 13.76 13.58 13.89 14.59 13.57
Complete Master/PhD 218 224 132 170 144 139 112 149 170 137 1,595
0.29 0.31 0.16 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.21
Total 74,294 72,576 81,167 78,717 76,876 74,943 71,175 72,175 73,740 73,466 749,129
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 2.9: Sample distribution by Sex, by year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
MALE 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Female 28,896 28,755 29,756 30,011 29,231 28,623 27,378 27,836 28,956 28,116 287,558
38.89 39.62 36.66 38.13 38.02 38.19 38.47 38.57 39.27 38.27 38.39
Male 45,398 43,821 51,411 48,706 47,645 46,320 43,797 44,339 44,784 45,350 461,571
61.11 60.38 63.34 61.87 61.98 61.81 61.53 61.43 60.73 61.73 61.61
Total 74,294 72,576 81,167 78,717 76,876 74,943 71,175 72,175 73,740 73,466 749,129
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 2.10: Sample Distribution by Region, by Year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
National Capital 10.12 9.83 9.78 9.55 10.06 10.33 10.63 10.64 11.14 11.05 10.3
Ilocos 4.78 4.6 5.43 5.35 5.63 5.72 5.32 5.48 5.43 5.25 5.3
Cagayan Valley 4.15 4.16 4.96 5.28 4.89 4.95 5.09 5.03 5.04 4.9 4.85
Central Luzon 10.17 10.09 7.77 7.56 7.68 7.49 7.55 7.99 7.54 7.53 8.13
Bicol 5.06 5.07 5.79 5.76 6.06 5.69 5.58 5.83 5.58 5.35 5.58
Western Visayas 7.49 7.91 6.83 7.03 6.81 7.12 6.82 6.66 6.55 6.76 7
Central Visayas 5.57 5.67 6.29 6.58 7.16 7.09 6.7 6.87 6.68 6.99 6.56
Eastern Visayas 5.24 5.18 5.73 5.7 5.24 5.47 5.21 5.06 5.04 5.23 5.32
Zamboanga 3.34 3.91 4.46 4.26 4.04 4.13 4.06 4.24 4.48 4.14 4.11
Northern Mindanao 8.27 8.25 5.76 5.85 5.24 4.84 5.21 5.26 5.11 4.71 5.85
Davao 3.89 3.78 5.26 5.28 5.43 5.31 5.59 5.66 5.77 5.79 5.18
SoCCSKSarGen 4.76 3.95 5.39 5 5.14 5.07 5.37 5.16 5.17 5.31 5.04
Cordillera 3.98 3.95 4.07 4.11 4.28 4.12 4.51 4.27 4.44 4.65 4.23
ARMM 4.73 4.93 4.32 3.97 3.7 4.04 4.07 4.07 4.1 3.93 4.18
Caraga 3.77 3.62 4.45 4.82 4.39 4.26 4.33 4.3 4.2 4.46 4.27
CaLaBaRZon 10.63 10.69 9.44 9.22 9.75 9.85 9.55 9.15 9.35 9.5 9.71
MiMaRoPa 4.07 4.39 4.27 4.69 4.49 4.49 4.39 4.34 4.38 4.44 4.4
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Table 2.11: Sample Distribution by Sector, by Year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
INDUSTRY 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Agriculture, hunting 29.45 28.71 35.18 35.21 35.23 33.88 32.86 33.26 31.62 31.94 32.79
Fishing 4.35 4.18 4.86 4.7 4.78 4.53 4.38 4.28 4.4 4.39 4.49
Mining and quarrying 0.33 0.33 0.43 0.58 0.41 0.5 0.51 0.58 0.63 0.7 0.5
Manufacturing 9.81 9.73 8.8 8.52 8.61 8.47 8.25 7.71 7.58 7.54 8.51
Electricity, gas and water 0.45 0.39 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.42 0.43 0.4 0.38 0.38
Construction 5.48 5.4 5.33 4.94 5.02 4.85 5.33 5.23 5.52 5.53 5.26
Wholesale and retail 19.61 19.98 16.87 17.86 17.89 18.86 18.32 18.34 18.14 18.55 18.42
Hotels and restaurant 2.34 2.4 2.27 2.23 2.39 2.36 2.43 2.62 2.78 2.66 2.44
Transport, storage and comm. 7.51 7.75 7.23 7.19 7.1 7.06 7.69 7.08 7.32 7.19 7.31
Financial intermediation 1.03 1.11 0.9 0.96 0.98 0.94 1 0.98 0.99 1.07 0.99
Real estate, renting 1.75 1.89 1.97 1.84 1.9 2.18 2.26 2.45 2.72 2.82 2.17
Public admin., defense 5.5 5.58 4.55 4.47 4.7 4.75 4.93 5.31 5.27 5.37 5.03
Education 3.75 3.7 2.95 3.29 3.15 3.05 3.34 3.21 3.39 3.51 3.33
Health and social work 1.2 1.18 1.11 1.08 1.1 1.02 1.01 1.05 1.16 1.22 1.11
Other social services 3.06 3.12 2.5 2.2 2.03 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.33 2.24 2.44
Private households 4.39 4.53 4.72 4.59 4.36 4.94 4.98 5.16 5.75 4.87 4.82
Extra-territorial org. 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
58
C
H
A
P
T
E
R
2.
R
E
T
U
R
N
S
T
O
E
D
U
C
A
T
IO
N
Table 2.12: Sample Distribution by Occupation, by Year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
O cials, executives, managers 7,670 8,169 7,973 8,480 8,600 9,274 8,273 9,124 9,731 9,670 86,964
10.32 11.26 9.82 10.77 11.19 12.37 11.62 12.64 13.2 13.16 11.61
Professionals 3,856 3,759 3,309 3,441 3,318 3,093 3,085 3,157 3,324 3,458 33,800
5.19 5.18 4.08 4.37 4.32 4.13 4.33 4.37 4.51 4.71 4.51
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 1,985 2,194 2,129 2,004 1,814 1,936 1,869 1,789 1,871 1,862 19,453
2.67 3.02 2.62 2.55 2.36 2.58 2.63 2.48 2.54 2.53 2.6
Clerks 3,500 3,451 3,552 3,073 3,193 3,138 3,292 3,304 3,525 3,861 33,889
4.71 4.76 4.38 3.9 4.15 4.19 4.63 4.58 4.78 5.26 4.52
Service and Sales Workers 7,106 7,025 7,184 6,695 6,618 6,671 6,652 6,908 7,334 7,258 69,451
9.56 9.68 8.85 8.51 8.61 8.9 9.35 9.57 9.95 9.88 9.27
Farmers, Fishermen, F 14,694 13,070 18,167 15,038 15,504 14,718 13,468 13,216 12,423 12,847 143,145
19.78 18.01 22.38 19.1 20.17 19.64 18.92 18.31 16.85 17.49 19.11
Trades and Related Workers 7,602 7,045 7,247 6,412 6,257 5,861 5,838 5,529 5,526 5,566 62,883
10.23 9.71 8.93 8.15 8.14 7.82 8.2 7.66 7.49 7.58 8.39
Plant & machine Operators 5,860 5,563 5,899 5,472 5,563 5,238 5,096 4,461 4,337 4,367 51,856
7.89 7.67 7.27 6.95 7.24 6.99 7.16 6.18 5.88 5.94 6.92
Laborers and Unskilled workers 21,640 21,985 25,320 27,786 25,687 24,692 23,311 24,337 25,346 24,297 244,401
29.13 30.29 31.19 35.3 33.41 32.95 32.75 33.72 34.37 33.07 32.62
Special Occupation 381 315 387 316 322 322 291 350 323 280 3,287
0.51 0.43 0.48 0.4 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.44 0.38 0.44
Total 74,294 72,576 81,167 78,717 76,876 74,943 71,175 72,175 73,740 73,466 749,129
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 2.13: Sample Distribution by Tenure, by Year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Permanent 58,296 56,778 57,063 61,415 62,376 56,427 54,176 57,019 57,433 59,197 580,180
78.47 78.23 70.3 78.02 81.14 75.29 76.12 79 77.89 80.58 77.45
Short-term 13,501 13,456 20,613 14,806 12,242 15,784 14,573 13,030 14,083 12,651 144,739
18.17 18.54 25.4 18.81 15.92 21.06 20.47 18.05 19.1 17.22 19.32
Di↵erent Employer 2,497 2,342 3,491 2,496 2,258 2,732 2,426 2,126 2,224 1,618 24,210
3.36 3.23 4.3 3.17 2.94 3.65 3.41 2.95 3.02 2.2 3.23
Total 74,294 72,576 81,167 78,717 76,876 74,943 71,175 72,175 73,740 73,466 749,129
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 2.14: Sample Distribution by Urbanity, by Year (Frequency / Column Percentage)
URBAN 2001 2002 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total
Rural 30,581 30,704 40,084 40,648 40,757 40,788 223,562
41.16 42.31 56.32 56.32 55.27 55.52 51.11
Urban 43,713 41,872 31,091 31,527 32,983 32,678 213,864
58.84 57.69 43.68 43.68 44.73 44.48 48.89
Total 74,294 72,576 71,175 72,175 73,740 73,466 437,426
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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2.4.2 NEAT 1993–2000, NSAT 1997–1999
Education quality is measured in terms of student achievement test scores. Student
achievement test scores include the National Elementary Achievement Test (NEAT)
and the National Secondary Achievement Test (NSAT). The NEAT is “designed to
assess abilities and skills of Grade VI pupils in all public and private elementary
schools in five (5) subject areas: English, Filipino, Science, HEKASI (Geography,
History and Arts) and Mathematics.” The NSAT “aims to assess the abilities and
skills of fourth year students to determine their knowledge and capabilities in five
(5) subject areas: English, Filipino, Science, Mathematics and Araling Panlipunan
(Social Studies).” National and division (province and key city) level NEAT mean
percentage scores are available for 1993-2000. National and regional level NSAT
mean percentage scores are available for 1994-1999 while division level data are only
available in mean raw scores for 1997 and 1999.
Average performance in the National Elementary Achievement Test (NEAT)
across education divisions for 1993-2000 is shown in Table 2.15. Overall performance
shows a general improvement over time, but with notable declines in 1996 and 1998-
1999. Performance in Math rose sharply between 1994 and 1998 but fell more
abruptly in 1999 before recovering in 2000. Progress in Science follows the overall
trend but is more pronounced and is generally higher than the overall performance.
Performance in English also follows the overall trend but is lower throughout the
period. Progress in Geography, History and Arts largely trails the overall trend but
became counter-cyclical to the overall trend in 1998-2000.
Average performance in the National Secondary Achievement Test (NSAT)
across regions for 1994-1999 is shown in Table 2.16. Again, there is an over-all
improvement over time but with a notable decline in 1998 during the Asian crisis
suggesting that an economic crunch adversely a↵ects education outcomes. Perfor-
mance in Math closely resembles the overall trend but fell below the overall trend in
1998-1999. Progress in Science follows the overall trend but is lower throughout the
period. Performance in English is counter-cyclical to the overall trend in 1994-1997
and pro-cyclical in 1998-1999. Progress in Filipino is the highest throughout the
period and follows the overall trend in 1994-1997 but moved opposite the overall
trend in 1998-1999. Average division level performance in NSAT for 1997 and 1999
is shown in Table 2.17. Overall performance improved from 1997 to 1999. This
improvement is solely due to progress in Filipino. Unlike the regional averages, av-
erage division level scores in Math, Science, and English decreased between 1997
and 1999.
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Table 2.15: National Elementary Achievement Test: Summary Statistics, Overall
and by Subject, by Year
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall 1993 138 42.0 4.4 33.4 54.4
Overall 1994 152 44.4 5.7 33.9 71.0
Overall 1995 152 47.6 5.5 35.5 63.6
Overall 1996 153 45.9 5.6 34.4 64.8
Overall 1997 153 51.1 7.3 38.6 73.9
Overall 1998 153 50.8 7.5 35.5 72.0
Overall 1999 153 49.6 7.1 36.9 74.8
Overall 2000 153 51.3 8.2 35.9 74.9
Math 1993 138 41.7 4.2 32.6 56.3
Math 1994 152 41.7 5.4 33.1 69.0
Math 1995 152 45.7 5.2 35.5 65.0
Math 1996 153 48.8 6.2 36.2 74.3
Math 1997 153 51.9 8.0 39.1 79.3
Math 1998 153 53.1 7.6 38.2 74.5
Math 1999 153 46.0 9.5 32.7 77.8
Math 2000 153 49.2 11.0 31.6 78.2
Science 1993 138 40.9 4.5 32.2 55.1
Science 1994 152 47.0 6.0 35.0 74.0
Science 1995 152 51.4 6.2 36.8 67.2
Science 1996 153 47.6 5.9 35.1 63.3
Science 1997 153 53.1 6.9 40.5 72.6
Science 1998 153 50.9 7.9 33.2 72.2
Science 1999 153 49.3 6.9 37.3 73.1
Science 2000 153 49.7 7.3 36.2 70.8
English 1993 138 39.5 5.2 30.4 56.2
English 1994 152 42.8 6.4 31.5 75.8
English 1995 152 45.0 6.3 31.9 68.0
English 1996 153 44.3 6.4 31.9 63.9
English 1997 153 49.6 8.0 35.8 75.2
English 1998 153 47.6 8.3 33.5 73.0
English 1999 153 47.1 8.1 33.2 75.6
English 2000 153 47.5 8.4 32.2 73.1
Geog., Hist, Arts 1993 138 45.9 5.1 35.4 58.8
Geog., Hist, Arts 1994 152 46.0 6.0 35.4 65.3
Geog., Hist, Arts 1995 152 48.4 5.4 36.7 62.7
Geog., Hist, Arts 1996 153 43.1 4.9 33.0 66.3
Geog., Hist, Arts 1997 153 49.7 6.9 37.0 73.2
Geog., Hist, Arts 1998 153 51.5 6.7 34.2 70.5
Geog., Hist, Arts 1999 153 55.3 6.8 42.0 75.2
Geog., Hist, Arts 2000 153 53.4 8.3 38.1 76.0
Filipino 1999 153 50.4 6.2 38.7 72.3
Filipino 2000 153 56.9 6.9 41.3 76.2
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Table 2.16: National Secondary Achievement Test, Regional-level Summary Statis-
tics, Overall/Total and by Subject
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total 1994 16 38.4 2.8 34.7 43.4
Total 1995 16 44.5 2.8 40.7 49.3
Total 1996 16 45.2 3.1 40.9 50.5
Total 1997 16 48.2 3.1 42.3 53.2
Total 1998 16 45.3 3.5 38.7 51.5
Total 1999 16 53.9 3.5 48.6 62.7
Math 1994 16 38.4 3.8 33.2 49.5
Math 1995 16 45.8 3.5 39.4 53.2
Math 1996 16 45.8 3.6 39.8 54.4
Math 1997 16 49.8 3.7 42.9 55.7
Math 1998 16 43.9 4.1 35.8 49.6
Math 1999 16 50.7 4.5 44.5 63.1
Science 1994 16 34.7 2.1 32.0 38.4
Science 1995 16 39.9 2.6 36.3 45.6
Science 1996 16 40.2 2.5 36.0 44.8
Science 1997 16 45.4 3.2 40.0 50.4
Science 1998 16 42.3 3.0 37.5 48.0
Science 1999 16 46.6 3.4 42.0 56.1
English 1994 16 40.4 2.9 36.5 45.3
English 1995 16 43.1 3.4 38.5 50.7
English 1996 16 47.6 3.4 42.1 53.8
English 1997 16 46.7 3.1 41.0 52.4
English 1998 16 43.9 3.6 37.2 49.7
English 1999 16 50.5 3.7 44.8 60.0
Filipino 1994 16 43.4 5.2 37.2 54.1
Filipino 1995 16 57.2 4.2 51.7 64.6
Filipino 1996 16 51.0 3.9 46.2 59.7
Filipino 1997 16 54.9 5.0 48.0 65.1
Filipino 1998 16 59.2 5.4 48.6 69.4
Filipino 1999 16 64.2 4.6 55.2 72.8
Social Studies 1999 16 57.5 4.1 51.4 65.1
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Table 2.17: National Secondary Achievement Test, Division-level Summary Statis-
tics, Overall/Total and by Subject
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall 1997 152 122.9 13.6 92.2 174.7
Overall 1999 152 129.1 14.1 99.8 172.4
Math 1997 152 37.9 4.9 27.7 55.1
Math 1999 152 30.6 4.5 23.2 45.4
Science 1997 152 34.6 4.1 24.6 51.2
Science 1999 152 28.3 3.8 21.5 42.4
English 1997 152 33.3 3.8 26.3 47.1
English 1999 152 30.7 3.9 23.7 43.0
Filipino 1997 152 17.0 1.9 12.4 22.9
Filipino 1999 152 39.5 3.4 28.6 46.2
Vocational 1997 152 34.7 3.3 23.3 42.1
Social Studies 1999 152 35.2 3.4 25.1 42.8
To match the education quality data with labor outcomes, I merge the division
level test scores and the individual level labor data. To identify the test cohort in
the labor force survey, I deduct the test year from the survey year and add 12 years
(the expected age at grade 6 when NEAT is taken, plus or minus one). So for LFS
2010, for example, the relevant age cohort for the 1993 NEAT is 28-30 [=(2010-
1993+ 12)+/-1]. Only those who completed at least elementary school are included
in the test cohort. NSAT data are available for 1997 and 1999. The examinees
are graduating high school students whose expected age is 16 years (plus or minus
one). So for LFS 2010, for example, the relevant age cohort for the 1997 NSAT
is 30-32 [=(2010-1997+16)+/-1]. Only those who completed at least high school
are included in the test cohort. The NEAT and NSAT test cohorts are generally
younger than the non-cohort. Since the data on test scores are at the division level of
the Department of Educations administrative system, I merge it with the LFS data
at the corresponding province and city levels. While the assignment of education
quality data is subject to measurement error as the actual age when the tests are
taken may be di↵erent from the expected age, allowing for some deviation around
the expected age should identify most of the relevant test cohorts, if not all, from
the non-cohorts. However, this does not preclude measurement error arising from
the assignment of test scores to workers who migrated from di↵erent provinces or
cities.
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2.5 Regression Analysis
Table 2.18 and Figure 2.10 show the age-earnings profile for the Philippines for
2001-2010.11 Table 2.19 shows returns to education by level using various methods.
Using the short-cut method, returns to education are 4.8 percent at the primary
level, 9 percent at the secondary level, 28.2 percent at college level, and 16 to 32
percent at post-graduate level (depending on whether 2 or 1 year(s) of post-graduate
cycle is assumed). Using the full-discounting method, returns to education decreases
in all levels, to 2.7 for primary education, 6 percent for secondary education, 27.8
percent for college, and 14 to 28 percent for post-graduate. An extended human
capital earnings function using age puts returns to primary education at 4.6 percent,
secondary education at 6.6 percent, college education at 19.9 percent and post-
graduate education at 20.5 percent. As expected, using age underestimates returns
to education. Using experience increases returns to primary education to 4.3 percent,
to secondary education to 7.7 percent, to college education to 21.2 percent, although
decreasing returns to graduate education to 19.9 percent.
The basic Mincerian yields a high rate of return to schooling. Table 2.20 shows
the regression results of the human capital earnings function with various controls.
Controlling only for time (year), return to schooling stands at 11.8 percent, with
the model explaining only a little over a third of the variation in earnings. The
relatively high rate of return is comparable with earlier estimates (e.g. Hossain and
Psacharopoulos (1994)) and consistent with the global pattern of diminishing returns
to income: returns to education decrease as a country’s per capita income increases
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). Given the Philippines’ low per capita income
($1411 in 2011), it is not surprising that its rate of return is high relative to the
average for high income countries (7.4 percent). It is even higher than the average
for low income countries (10.9 percent). However, the higher returns for developing
countries may be capturing greater heterogeneity in education quality. These are
grossly overestimated by the omission of important variables.
Much of the returns to schooling is capturing the e↵ects of other variables.
It is underestimated by the omission of the variable sex, but overestimated by the
omission of marital status, region, sector, occupation, class, tenure, and urbanity.
Omitting sex underestimates return to schooling because while males have higher
wages than females, males have less schooling. Omitting marital status somewhat
overestimates return to schooling as married, widowed, and separted individuals
11This is derived by regressing wage on age dummies controlling for year dummies (to account
for inflation, e↵ectively putting wages at 2001 prices).
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Table 2.18: Age-Earnings Profiles, 2001-2010 (Pesos/Hour)
Age NoSch Primary Secondary College PostGrad
6 12.2
7 9.6
8 41.3
9 15.7
10 12.6
11 15.9
12 12.8 17.9
13 12.1 17.1
14 9.2 14.2
15 17.3 11.5
16 10.7 13.4 10.9
17 12.7 12.9 12
18 11.3 13 14.2
19 12.3 13.6 16.1 25.1
20 11.7 14.8 17.4 27.9
21 14.1 16.3 18.7 30.3 41.8
22 13.3 16.3 19.5 32.7 5.9
23 14.4 16.9 21 37 36.7
24 13.1 17.4 21.6 36.1 39
25 14.5 17.9 22.3 37.1 37.8
26 13 18.7 23 38.4 51.5
27 16.5 18.9 23.7 42.8 52
28 15.3 19.6 24.3 41.5 66
29 14.7 19 25.5 43 63.6
30 15.2 19.8 24.7 46.6 76.4
31 13.1 19.4 25.2 45.3 56.7
32 13.6 19.5 26 48.8 69.8
33 15.6 19.5 25.4 49.3 63.8
34 14.9 20.7 26.4 50.6 56.5
35 14.2 20 26.1 51.5 53.9
36 17 20.2 25.9 53.4 77.5
37 15.5 20.1 26.3 54.7 78
38 13.8 21.1 26.8 54.7 73.7
39 17.2 20.7 26.5 54.7 68.9
40 14.8 20.5 26.7 55.3 76
41 14.3 21.3 27.8 57.2 99.3
42 16.8 20.6 27.1 57.4 85.6
43 14.9 20.7 27.8 60 87.7
44 14.7 21.1 27.5 61.9 77.8
45 13.7 20.4 27.5 60.1 81.5
46 17 25.5 28.4 60.8 71
47 14.5 20 28.7 61.7 86.9
48 14.8 21.5 29.3 63 81.4
49 15.5 21.6 30.9 64.7 86.4
50 13.2 21.7 28.9 66.3 71.2
51 17.5 21.6 32 75.6 84.6
52 14.5 20.3 28.2 67.3 95.3
53 15.3 21 29.4 70.8 85.4
54 15.1 21.8 35.3 65.1 89.4
55 15 22.2 31.3 61.8 84.6
56 15.9 21.2 31.8 67.9 78.9
57 28.7 22.3 29.1 69.9 89.8
58 16.4 21.1 33 68 75.5
59 13.9 22.4 31.6 69.2 93.5
60 11.9 20.9 30.7 73 112.4
61 16.4 21.9 31.1 70.2 123.3
62 13.6 19.7 30.6 74.6 88.8
63 18.1 20 35.6 72.3 72.2
64 15.3 20.4 32.2 74.9 109.9
65 13 20.6 30.3 75 61.7
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Figure 2.10: Age-Earnings Profiles, 2001-2010
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Table 2.19: Returns to Education, 2001-2010 (various methods)
Extended Human Capital Earnings Function
Level Short-cut Elaborate Using Age Using Experience Incomplete Complete
Elementary 4.8% 2.7% 4.2% 4.3% 3.5% 5.9%
Secondary 9.0% 6.0% 6.3% 7.7% 5.6% 9.8%
College 28.2% 27.8% 19.6% 21.2% 15.1% 27.3%
Post-graduate 16.0% 14.0% 22.3% 19.9% 19.9%
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generally have more schooling and earn more than the reference single individuals.
Omitting region overestimates return to education as most regions have lower wages
and less schooling than the national capital region. Omitting sector overestimates
return to education as most sectors have higher wages and more schooling relative to
agriculture, hunting and forestry. Omitting occupation overestimates returns to ed-
ucation as most occupations have lower wages and less schooling than the reference
occupation: o cials of government and special interest organizations, corporate ex-
ecutives, managers, managing proprietors and supervisors. Omitting class of work
somewhat overestimates return to education as it is driven by higher wages among
workers in private establishments, government agencies and corporations, and paid
workers in family-owned businesses relative to those working in private households.
Omitting tenure overestimates return to education as short-term and workers with
various employers earn less and have less schooling than permanent workers. Omit-
ting urbanity overestimates return to education as urban workers earn more wages
and have more schooling relative to their rural counterparts.
Accounting for sex, marital status, household position, region, sector, occupa-
tion, class of work, tenure, and urbanity raises the explanatory power of the model
from about a third to over half the variation in earnings. Including sex (Table 2.20
column 2) raises the return to schooling by 0.6 percentage points and explanatory
power of the model by 2 percentage points. Including marital status (column 3)
reduces return to schooling by 0.23 percentage points and raises the explanatory
power of the model by 0.4 percentage points. Including region (column 4) reduces
return to schooling by 0.7 percentage points and raises the explanatory power of
the model by 3.9 percentage points. Including sector (column 5) reduces return
to schooling by 4.1 percentage points and increases the explanatory power of the
model by almost 10 percentage points. Including occupation (column 6) reduces
return to schooling by 2.6 percentage points and increases the explanatory power of
the model by 5.4 percentage points. Including class (column 7) reduces return to
schooling by 0.1 percentage point and raises the explanatory power of the model by
0.2 percentage points.
Returns to schooling was unchanged in the early part of the decade and rose
only in the middle to latter part of the decade. Table 2.21 shows the human capital
earnings function by year (2001 as reference). It shows that returns to schooling
stood at 4.4 percent in 2001 and remained at this level until 2004. It rose by over
0.6 percentage points in 2005 and 2006, by over 0.2 percentage points in 2007 and
2008, and by over 0.5 percentage points in 2009 and 2010. The general upward
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trend is associated with the rising human capital composition of labor mentioned in
section 2.4.
Returns to schooling are higher for females and lower for males. Table 2.22
shows the human capital earnings function by sex (female as reference). It shows
an average return to schooling for females of 5.4 percent. Returns to schooling for
males are 1.1 percentage points lower.
Returns to schooling are higher for singles and lower for married, widowed,
divorced or separated individuals. Table 2.23 shows the human capital earnings
function by marital status (single as reference). The return to schooling for single
individuals is 4.8 percent. Returns to schooling for married, widowed, divorced or
separated individuals are lower than that for singles.
Returns to schooling are highest in economic centers across the three main
islands of the country. This may be capturing the higher ability of migrants from
other regions. The rates of return to education are highest in the National Capital
Region, Central Visayas and Northern Mindanao. Table 2.24 shows the human
capital earnings function by region (national capital region as reference). It shows
that wages are lower in most regions compared to the national capital, controlling for
schooling. Only the wages in Central Luzon and CaLaBaRZon are not significantly
di↵erent from that in the capital. Returns to schooling are also lower in most
regions relative to the capital, except Central Visayas. The return to schooling in
the national capital region is 5.9 percent while those in other regions are between 0.5
to 2.6 percentage points lower. Within Luzon, returns are highest in the national
capital region. In Visayas, returns are highest in Central Visayas; while in Mindanao,
returns are highest in Northern Mindanao. The foregoing regions are economic
centers in their respective islands suggesting that the returns to education may be
capturing higher ability among migrants from other regions.
Returns to schooling are highest in services, followed by industry and low-
est in agriculture. Table 2.25 shows the human capital earnings function by sector
(agriculture, hunting and forestry as reference). Relative to the reference, returns to
schooling are higher in most other sectors except fishing where returns are the same,
and construction and private households where returns are lower. Within the ser-
vices sector, returns are highest (over 8 percent) in financial intermediation; public
administration, defense and social security; extra-territorial organizations and hotel
and restaurants. Returns are lowest (under 4 percent) in private households and
other social and personal services. Within industry, returns are highest in electric-
ity, gas and water, followed by manufacturing and mining and quarrying; returns
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are lowest in construction. In agriculture, returns are equally low in agriculture,
hunting and forestry and in fishing.
Table 2.26 shows the regression results of the human capital earnings function
by occupation. Returns to schooling are highest for o cials in government, exec-
utives and managers at 13.6 percent, followed by special occupations (11 percent).
Returns are also relatively high for technicians and associate professionals (9.6 per-
cent), clerks (9.3 percent) and service and sales workers (9.1 percent). Returns
to schooling are lowest for farmers, fishermen and forestry workers (1.9 percent),
followed by laborers and unskilled workers (2.4 percent). Returns are also compara-
tively low for trades and related workers 3.4 percent), plant and machine operators
and assemblers(4.5 percent), and ironically professionals (5 percent).
Across classes of work, returns are highest for employers in family farm or busi-
ness and lowest among workers in private households. Table 2.27 shows the results
by class. Return to schooling for workers in private households is only 1.8 percent
while that for employers in family farm or business is 114 percent. Returns are
also relatively high for the self-employed (17.9 percent) and workers in government
or government corporations (8.9 percent). Returns are relatively low for workers
with pay in family farm or business (3.6 percent) and private establishments (4.6
percent).
Permanent workers have higher returns to schooling than short-term workers
and workers with various employers. Table 2.28 shows returns to schooling by tenure
of employment. The return to schooling for permanent workers is 5.5 percent while
those for short-term workers and workers with various employers only have half as
much.
Returns to schooling in urban areas are higher than in rural areas. Table 2.29
shows returns to schooling by urbanity. The return to schooling for workers in urban
areas is 5.2 percent while that for workers in rural areas is only 3.9 percent.
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Table 2.20: Human Capital Earnings Function, with Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Coef./S.E Coef./S.E Coef./S.E Coef./S.E Coef./S.E Coef./S.E Coef./S.E Coef./S.E Coef./S.E
Schooling 0.1180*** 0.1237*** 0.1214*** 0.1143*** 0.0733*** 0.0474*** 0.0467*** 0.0465*** 0.0462***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Experience 0.0359*** 0.0328*** 0.0260*** 0.0258*** 0.0189*** 0.0160*** 0.0155*** 0.0149*** 0.0149***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Experience2 -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 1.5520*** 1.3834*** 1.4203*** 1.7240*** 2.1427*** 3.0138*** 2.9421*** 2.9519*** 2.8909***
(0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0171)
Controls:
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sex Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital Status Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Class Yes Yes Yes
Tenure Yes Yes
Urban Yes
Adjusted R2 0.3412 0.3613 0.3649 0.4036 0.5015 0.5558 0.5573 0.5578 0.5579
Observations 346616 346616 346510 346510 346510 346510 346510 346510 204871
Robust Standard Error in parenthesis. Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.21: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Year
Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant 3.0109*** 0.0162
2002 -0.0045 0.0155
2003 0.0447** 0.0153
2004 0.0515*** 0.0152
2005 -0.0596*** 0.0154
2006 -0.0399* 0.0162
2007 0.0719*** 0.0163
2008 0.1370*** 0.0159
2009 0.1076*** 0.0158
2010 0.1997*** 0.0158
Schooling 0.0439*** 0.0008
2002 ⇥ Schooling 0.0009 0.0011
2003 ⇥ Schooling -0.0018 0.0011
2004 ⇥ Schooling 0.0005 0.0010
2005 ⇥ Schooling 0.0064*** 0.0011
2006 ⇥ Schooling 0.0061*** 0.0011
2007 ⇥ Schooling 0.0027* 0.0011
2008 ⇥ Schooling 0.0023* 0.0011
2009 ⇥ Schooling 0.0056*** 0.0011
2010 ⇥ Schooling 0.0051*** 0.0011
Experience 0.0115*** 0.0007
2002 ⇥ Experience 0.0012 0.0010
2003 ⇥ Experience 0.0004 0.0010
2004 ⇥ Experience -0.0001 0.0010
2005 ⇥ Experience 0.0068*** 0.0010
2006 ⇥ Experience 0.0073*** 0.0011
2007 ⇥ Experience 0.0049*** 0.0011
2008 ⇥ Experience 0.0046*** 0.0011
2009 ⇥ Experience 0.0068*** 0.0011
2010 ⇥ Experience 0.0036*** 0.0011
Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
2002 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0000 0.0000
2003 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0000 0.0000
2004 ⇥ Experience2 0.0000 0.0000
2005 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
2006 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
2007 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
2008 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
2009 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
2010 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001* 0.0000
Adjusted R2 0.5582
Observations 346510
Controls: Sex, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.22: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Sex
Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant 2.8529*** 0.0143
Male 0.2944*** 0.0085
Schooling 0.0544*** 0.0006
Male ⇥ Schooling -0.0114*** 0.0006
Experience 0.0144*** 0.0004
Male ⇥ Experience 0.0000 0.0005
Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
Male ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001*** 0.0000
Adjusted R2 0.5585
Observations 346510
Controls: Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.23: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Marital Status
Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant 2.9207*** 0.0137
Married 0.1414*** 0.0087
Widowed 0.1212** 0.0443
Divorce/Separate 0.1345*** 0.0403
Schooling 0.0481*** 0.0005
Married ⇥ Schooling -0.0021*** 0.0006
Widowed ⇥ Schooling -0.0056*** 0.0016
Divorce/Separate ⇥ Schooling -0.0004 0.0021
Experience 0.0180*** 0.0005
Married ⇥ Experience -0.0037*** 0.0006
Widowed ⇥ Experience -0.0056* 0.0026
Divorce/Separate ⇥ Experience -0.0080** 0.0028
Experience2 -0.0003*** 0.0000
Married ⇥ Experience2 0.0001*** 0.0000
Widowed ⇥ Experience2 0.0002*** 0.0000
Divorce/Separate ⇥ Experience2 0.0002** 0.0001
Adjusted R2 0.5579
Observations 346510
Controls: Sex, Year, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.24: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Region
Coe cient Robust S.E.
Constant 2.8654*** 0.0177
Ilocos -0.1720*** 0.0197
Cagayan Valley -0.2819*** 0.0180
Central Luzon -0.0320 0.0166
Bicol -0.3426*** 0.0212
Western Visayas -0.4512*** 0.0178
Central Visayas -0.4156*** 0.0189
Eastern Visayas -0.3124*** 0.0213
Zamboanga -0.2037*** 0.0210
Northern Mindanao -0.4228*** 0.0192
Davao -0.3436*** 0.0203
SoCCSKSarGen -0.3525*** 0.0210
Cordillera -0.1562*** 0.0227
ARMM -0.2747*** 0.0367
Caraga -0.3243*** 0.0227
CaLaBaRZon -0.0248 0.0171
MiMaRoPa -0.1724*** 0.0210
Schooling 0.0585*** 0.0009
Ilocos ⇥ Schooling -0.0192*** 0.0015
Cagayan Valley ⇥ Schooling -0.0150*** 0.0013
Central Luzon ⇥ Schooling -0.0189*** 0.0012
Bicol ⇥ Schooling -0.0124*** 0.0015
Western Visayas ⇥ Schooling -0.0078*** 0.0013
Central Visayas ⇥ Schooling -0.0011 0.0013
Eastern Visayas ⇥ Schooling -0.0167*** 0.0014
Zamboanga ⇥ Schooling -0.0167*** 0.0014
Northern Mindanao ⇥ Schooling -0.0045** 0.0014
Davao ⇥ Schooling -0.0121*** 0.0014
SoCCSKSarGen ⇥ Schooling -0.0132*** 0.0015
Cordillera ⇥ Schooling -0.0134*** 0.0016
ARMM ⇥ Schooling -0.0172*** 0.0022
Caraga ⇥ Schooling -0.0251*** 0.0015
CaLaBaRZon ⇥ Schooling -0.0134*** 0.0012
MiMaRoPa ⇥ Schooling -0.0257*** 0.0015
Adjusted R2 0.5594
Observations 346510
Results for interactions of region and experience and experience squared omitted.
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.25: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Sector
Coe cient Robust S.E.
Constant 3.1648*** 0.0136
Fishing -0.0885** 0.0343
Mining and quarrying -0.0245 0.0524
Manufacturing -0.1886*** 0.0143
Electricity, gas and water -0.4918*** 0.0536
Construction 0.2774*** 0.0105
Wholesale and retail trade -0.5063*** 0.0163
Hotels and restaurants -0.5347*** 0.0284
Transport, storage and communications -0.2809*** 0.0196
Financial intermediation -0.8098*** 0.0595
Real estate, renting and business -0.3321*** 0.0315
Public admin., defence; social security -0.7797*** 0.0238
Education -0.4252*** 0.0400
Health and social work -0.4204*** 0.0559
Other social and personal services 0.0343 0.0338
Private households -0.4687*** 0.0183
Extra-territorial organizations -0.5702 0.5473
Schooling 0.0254*** 0.0006
Fishing ⇥ Schooling 0.0008 0.0028
Mining and quarrying ⇥ Schooling 0.0141*** 0.0034
Manufacturing ⇥ Schooling 0.0310*** 0.0011
Electricity, gas and water ⇥ Schooling 0.0506*** 0.0036
Construction ⇥ Schooling -0.0063*** 0.0009
Wholesale and retail trade ⇥ Schooling 0.0425*** 0.0013
Hotels and restaurants ⇥ Schooling 0.0561*** 0.0022
Transport, storage and communications ⇥ Schooling 0.0400*** 0.0014
Financial intermediation ⇥ Schooling 0.0817*** 0.0042
Real estate, renting and business ⇥ Schooling 0.0458*** 0.0022
Public admin., defence; social security ⇥ Schooling 0.0729*** 0.0017
Education ⇥ Schooling 0.0408*** 0.0029
Health and social work ⇥ Schooling 0.0345*** 0.0040
Other social and personal services ⇥ Schooling 0.0095*** 0.0023
Private households ⇥ Schooling -0.0060*** 0.0015
Extra-territorial organizations ⇥ Schooling 0.0666* 0.0335
Adjusted R2 0.5703
Observations 346510
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.26: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Occupation
Coe cient Robust S.E.
Constant 1.7167*** 0.0444
Professionals 1.1800*** 0.0948
Technicians and Associate Professionals 0.3604*** 0.0611
Clerks 0.2728*** 0.0488
Service and Sales Workers -0.0059 0.0457
Farmers, Fishermen, Forestry 0.7539*** 0.0561
Trades and Related Workers 0.7292*** 0.0446
Plant & machine Operators & Assemblers 0.7971*** 0.0457
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 0.6616*** 0.0438
Special Occupation 0.0368 0.0848
Schooling 0.1361*** 0.0029
Professionals ⇥ Schooling -0.0860*** 0.0067
Technicians and Associate Professionals ⇥ Schooling -0.0397*** 0.0043
Clerks ⇥ Schooling -0.0435*** 0.0034
Service and Sales Workers ⇥ Schooling -0.0454*** 0.0032
Farmers, Fishermen, Forestry ⇥ Schooling -0.1171*** 0.0040
Trades and Related Workers ⇥ Schooling -0.1017*** 0.0030
Plant & machine Operators & Assemblers ⇥ Schooling -0.0915*** 0.0032
Laborers and Unskilled Workers ⇥ Schooling -0.1124*** 0.0030
Special Occupation ⇥ Schooling -0.0263*** 0.0059
Experience 0.0189*** 0.0019
Professionals ⇥ Experience 0.0019 0.0021
Technicians and Associate Professionals ⇥ Experience -0.0101*** 0.0026
Clerks ⇥ Experience -0.0103*** 0.0021
Service and Sales Workers ⇥ Experience 0.0026 0.0021
Farmers, Fishermen, Forestry ⇥ Experience -0.0103*** 0.0031
Trades and Related Workers ⇥ Experience -0.0050* 0.0020
Plant & machine Operators & Assemblers ⇥ Experience -0.0148*** 0.0021
Laborers and Unskilled Workers ⇥ Experience -0.0055** 0.0019
Special Occupation ⇥ Experience 0.0104* 0.0048
Experience2 -0.0002*** 0.0000
Professionals ⇥ Experience2 -0.0000 0.0000
Technicians and Associate Professionals ⇥ Experience2 0.0002*** 0.0001
Clerks ⇥ Experience2 0.0002*** 0.0000
Service and Sales Workers ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001 0.0000
Farmers, Fishermen, Forestry ⇥ Experience2 0.0001 0.0001
Trades and Related Workers ⇥ Experience2 0.0000 0.0000
Plant & machine Operators & Assemblers ⇥ Experience2 0.0002*** 0.0000
Laborers and Unskilled Workers ⇥ Experience2 0.0001 0.0000
Special Occupation ⇥ Experience2 -0.0002 0.0001
Adjusted R2 0.5702
Observations 346510
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.27: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Class
Coe cient Robust S.E.
Constant 2.9996*** 0.0180
Private establishment 0.0895*** 0.0169
Gov’t/gov’t corporation -0.3974*** 0.0238
Self employed 3.9139 3.0350
Employer in family farm or business -11.4907*** 0.0472
With pay in family farm or business 0.0056 0.0520
Without pay in family farm or business 0.2629*** 0.0119
Schooling 0.0180*** 0.0013
Private establishment ⇥ Schooling 0.0279*** 0.0013
Gov’t/gov’t corporation ⇥ Schooling 0.0710*** 0.0018
Self employed ⇥ Schooling 0.1607*** 0.0255
Employer in family farm or business ⇥ Schooling 1.1189*** 0.0040
With pay in family farm or business ⇥ Schooling 0.0182*** 0.0038
Without pay in family farm or business ⇥ Schooling 0.0000 .
Experience 0.0239*** 0.0008
Private establishment ⇥ Experience -0.0125*** 0.0009
Gov’t/gov’t corporation ⇥ Experience -0.0053*** 0.0012
Self employed ⇥ Experience -0.4958 0.2965
Employer in family farm or business ⇥ Experience 0.0136*** 0.0006
With pay in family farm or business ⇥ Experience -0.0047 0.0036
Without pay in family farm or business ⇥ Experience 0.0000 .
Experience2 -0.0003*** 0.0000
Private establishment ⇥ Experience2 0.0001*** 0.0000
Gov’t/gov’t corporation ⇥ Experience2 0.0000 0.0000
Self employed ⇥ Experience2 0.0110 0.0065
Employer in family farm or business ⇥ Experience2 0.0000 .
With pay in family farm or business ⇥ Experience2 -0.0000 0.0001
Without pay in family farm or business ⇥ Experience2 0.0000 .
Adjusted R2 0.5647
Observations 346510
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.28: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Tenure
Coe cient Robust S.E.
Constant 2.8057*** 0.0134
Short-term 0.3261*** 0.0094
Di↵erent Employer 0.3014*** 0.0133
Schooling 0.0552*** 0.0005
Short-term ⇥ Schooling -0.0278*** 0.0007
Di↵erent Employer ⇥ Schooling -0.0286*** 0.0012
Experience 0.0175*** 0.0003
Short-term ⇥ Experience -0.0110*** 0.0006
Di↵erent Employer ⇥ Experience -0.0062*** 0.0009
Experience2 -0.0002*** 0.0000
Short-term ⇥ Experience2 0.0001*** 0.0000
Di↵erent Employer ⇥ Experience2 0.0001*** 0.0000
Adjusted R2 0.5607
Observations 346510
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.29: Human Capital Earnings Function, by Urbanity
Coe cient Robust S.E.
Constant 2.9322*** 0.0176
Urban -0.0343*** 0.0100
Schooling 0.0389*** 0.0006
Urban ⇥ Schooling 0.0134*** 0.0007
Experience 0.0155*** 0.0005
Urban ⇥ Experience -0.0014* 0.0006
Experience2 -0.0002*** 0.0000
Urban ⇥ Experience2 0.0001*** 0.0000
Adjusted R2 0.5587
Observations 204871
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.30: Human Capital Earnings Function with Primary Education Quality
(1) (2) (3)
Coe cient Robust S.E. Coe cient Robust S.E. Coe cient Robust S.E.
Schooling 0.0456*** 0.0004 0.0443*** 0.0004 0.0443*** 0.0013
Experience 0.0148*** 0.0003 0.0151*** 0.0004 0.0151*** 0.0007
Experience2 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000
NEAT Cohort -0.1891*** 0.0125 -0.1891*** 0.0377
NEAT Cohort ⇥ Schooling 0.0167*** 0.0009 0.0167*** 0.0028
NEAT Cohort ⇥ Experience 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0029
NEAT Cohort ⇥ Experience2 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
NEAT Score 0.0003 0.0022
Constant 2.6829*** 0.0164 2.6985*** 0.0166 2.6851*** 0.1336
Adjusted R2 0.5630 0.5635 0.5635
Observations 346510 346510 346510
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Division, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model 3 Robust Standard Errors adjusted for 85 clusters at the Division level.
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Table 2.31: Human Capital Earnings Function with Secondary Education Quality
(1) (2)
Coe cient Robust S.E. Coe cient Robust S.E.
NSAT Score 0.0011 0.0007
Schooling 0.0450*** 0.0014 0.0450*** 0.0014
Experience 0.0157*** 0.0005 0.0157*** 0.0005
Experience2 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0002*** 0.0000
NSAT Cohort -0.3421*** 0.0386 -0.3422*** 0.0387
NSAT Cohort ⇥ Schooling 0.0292*** 0.0024 0.0292*** 0.0024
NSAT Cohort ⇥ Experience 0.0060 0.0049 0.0061 0.0049
NSAT Cohort ⇥ Experience2 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0004
Constant 2.6787*** 0.0330 2.4882*** 0.1307
Adjusted R2 0.5635 0.5635
Observations 346510 346510
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Division, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Model 2 Robust Standard Errors adjusted
for 85 clusters at the Division level.
2.5.1 Accounting for Education Quality
Accounting for primary education quality does not a↵ect returns to schooling. Table
2.30 shows the regression results of including the quality of primary education.
The benchmark model (column 1) estimates the human capital earnings function
controlling for division (province and key city) fixed e↵ects, year, sex, marital status,
sector, occupation, class and tenure (robust standard errors are clustered at the
division level). Compared to the model including only regional fixed e↵ects (Table
2.20, column 8), this model reduces returns to schooling further to 4.56 percent.
Column 2 disaggregates the human capital earnings function by cohort and non-
cohort and yields return to schooling for the test cohort 1.7 percentage points higher
than the reference return of 4.4 percent for the non-cohort. The higher return to the
test cohorts may simply be due to their being younger than the non-cohorts. This is
confirmed by the low and insignificant returns to their experience while non-cohorts
have higher and significant returns to experience. Including NEAT score (column 3)
does not change return to schooling and this measure of primary education quality
does not a↵ect earnings either. Division level test scores have no e↵ect on earnings
and returns to schooling apart from that already accounted for by division level
fixed e↵ects. For robustness check, I replace the overall NEAT score with individual
subject scores. Only Math scores are significant but returns to schooling are virtually
una↵ected.
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Accounting for secondary education quality also does not a↵ect returns to
schooling. Table 2.31 shows the results of including the quality of secondary edu-
cation. Disaggregating the human capital earnings function by NSAT cohort and
non-cohort shows that returns to schooling are higher for NSAT cohorts by 2.9 per-
centage points, although wages are lower among cohorts. Including NSAT score
(column 2) does not a↵ect returns to schooling and the quality of secondary edu-
cation is also insignificant to earnings. For robustness check, I replace the overall
NSAT score with individual subject scores. Only English and Filipino scores are
significant but returns to schooling are also unchanged.
2.5.2 Accounting for Ability
Accounting for ability substantially reduces returns to schooling. Table 2.32 shows
estimates of returns to schooling for 2007-2010 using OLS, fixed-e↵ects and fixed
e↵ects instrumental variable estimation, controlling for year, sex, marital status,
division, sector, occupation, class and tenure (fixed e↵ects robust standard errors
adjusted for clusters at the family level). The OLS estimate is 5.6 percent, higher
than the estimate for the entire decade 2001-2010 (Table 2.30, column 1) due to in-
creasing returns over time. On the other hand, fixed e↵ects estimation substantially
reduces returns to schooling to 3.1 percent. This indicates that almost half of what
is hitherto known as returns to schooling is due to ability and other unobserved
e↵ects common between siblings. In other words, much of what employers pay for
each additional year of schooling of their employees is due not so much for its pro-
ductive content but for the ability it signals. This is much higher than that found in
the US (25-30%, (Ashenfelter and Zimmerman, 1997; Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998))
although less than that found in South Africa (76%, (Hertz, 2003)). It confirms the
large unobserved heterogeneity I proferred earlier for developing countries.
However, as fixed e↵ects estimation is argued to increase the bias due to mea-
surement error, I also use fixed e↵ects instrumental variable estimation using pre-
dicted schooling between siblings as an instrument for own schooling. The fixed
e↵ects instrumental variable estimated return to schooling is significant at 1 per-
cent and only slightly higher than the fixed e↵ects estimate, indicating negligible
measurement error bias.
Accounting for ability increasingly reduces returns to schooling as the educa-
tion level rises. Table 2.33 shows estimates by level of education. Least squares
estimates show generally rising returns to education. Although returns decline from
incomplete to complete elementary, they continually rise from 2 percent for com-
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Table 2.32: Human Capital Earnings Function, Fixed E↵ects estimation
Least Squares Fixed E↵ects FE IV
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Schooling 0.0556*** 0.0019 0.0314*** 0.0047 0.0315*** 0.0047
Experience 0.0239*** 0.0016 0.0153*** 0.0037 0.0154*** 0.0036
Experience2 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0003* 0.0001 -0.0003* 0.0001
Constant 2.5389*** 0.2103 3.3760*** 0.3244 3.3751*** 0.3896
Adjusted R2 0.5634 0.1973
Observations 16501 16501 16501
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Division, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors
adjusted for clusters at the family level.
plete elementary to 24 percent for post-graduate. Random e↵ects estimates are
slightly less (i.e. by 2-6 percent) than least squares estimates for complete elemen-
tary until complete college and substantially less only for incomplete elementary
(by 21 percent) and post-graduate (by 24 percent). Fixed e↵ects estimates, on the
other hand, are substantially lower than least squares estimates, and show no sig-
nificant returns to primary education. Returns to incomplete secondary education
are only significant at the 10 percent level, and compared to no schooling only stand
at 0.3 percent. This suggests that those with primary education and incomplete
secondary education are paid not for the productive content of their education but
for the ability they signal. Nevertheless, returns to schooling remain positive, at 2.8
percent for complete secondary, 5.3 percent for incomplete college, 8.1 percent for
college and 3.6 percent for post-graduate. This means that schooling has productive
content only starting with secondary education completion. However, returns to
schooling are substantially lower than the OLS estimates by 44 percent for complete
secondary, 50 percent for incomplete college, by 34 percent for complete college, and
by 85 percent for post-graduate. This means that much of the additional earnings
normally attributed to schooling are due innate ability. While most of the income
di↵erential for college graduates is due to their education, most of those for college
undergraduates and post-graduates can be attributed to their ability. In general,
returns to ability increase as the education level increases. This is consistent with
the signaling theory of education where higher education signals higher ability.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling more for males than for
females. Table 2.34 shows the human capital earnings function by sex. OLS estima-
tion puts return to schooling for females at 7.8 percent while that for males is 5.1
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percent lower. Random e↵ects estimates are 3 percent lower for females and 2 per-
cent lower for males. On the other hand, fixed e↵ects estimates are 43 percent lower
for females and 46 percent lower for males. While standard estimates of returns to
schooling are higher for females than males, much more of these are due to ability
for males.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling across years by over half.
Table 2.35 shows the human capital earnings function by year. OLS estimation
puts return to schooling in 2007 at 5.9 percent with no significant change over the
next three years. The random e↵ects estimate for 2007 is 3 percent lower. On the
other hand, the fixed e↵ects estimate for 2007 is 55 percent lower with no significant
change in the next three years.
Accounting for sibling fixed e↵ects reduces returns to schooling across marital
status by almost half. Table 2.36 shows the human capital earnings function by
marital status. OLS estimation puts return to schooling for single individuals at
5.9 percent. The return to married workers are 10 percent lower while those for
widowed and divorced/separated are not significantly di↵erent from those of singles.
The random e↵ects estimate of return to schooling for single individuals is 2 percent
lower than the OLS estimate and returns to married, widowed, divorced/separated
individuals are not significantly di↵erent to those of singles. The fixed e↵ects esti-
mate for singles is 48 percent lower than the OLS estimate and returns to married,
widowed, divorced/separated individuals are not significantly di↵erent to those of
singles.
Table 2.37 shows the human capital earnings function by region. OLS esti-
mates of return to schooling are highest in regions considered as economic hubs,
particularly the National Capital Region (NCR) (7.2 percent), Central Visayas (8.4
percent), Central Luzon (6.6 percent), CaLaBaRZon (6.6 percent), and Northern
Mindanao (6.3 percent). Least squares estimates of returns to schooling are low-
est for peripheral regions, namely MiMaRoPa (3.4 percent), Caraga (3.6 percent),
ARMM (4.1 percent), Eastern Visayas (4.1 percent), Cagayan Valley (4.5 percent),
and Ilocos (4.8 percent). Moderate returns to schooling accrue to intermediate re-
gions, namely Western Visayas and Northern Mindanao (6.2 percent), SoCCSKSar-
Gen (5.4 percent), Bicol (5.1 percent) and Zamboanga (4.9 percent). Random e↵ects
estimates are up to 5 percent lower than least squares estimates for most regions
but higher for Zamboanga, Eastern Visayas, CaLaBaRZon, Davao, and Northern
Mindanao.
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity reduces returns to schooling across
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regions by almost four-tenths on average. The absolute reductions for regions con-
sidered as economic hubs (National Capital Region, Central Luzon, CaLaBaRZon,
Central Visayas, and Davao), considered as returns to ability, average 2.6 percent
while for the rest of the regions, the reduction averages only 1.8 percent. These in-
dicate that the higher standard estimates of return to schooling in economic centers
is driven by higher ability. As many of the workers in the capital are migrants from
the other regions, this confirms the hypothesis that the high returns to education in
cities / the capital is driven by the higher ability of migrants.
Fixed e↵ects estimates of returns to schooling for most peripheral regions are
lower than OLS estimates by 44–66 percent and lower than fixed e↵ects estimates for
economic centers. Returns to schooling are lowest for peripheral regions, between
1.5 to 2.2 percent. However, returns to ability are higher than returns to schooling.
Table 2.38 shows the returns to schooling by sector. OLS estimates show
returns to schooling are lowest in agriculture, only 2.6 percent. Returns to schooling
in sector vary from 2.6 percent in construction, 4.9 percent in mining and quarrying,
7.4 percent in manufacturing, to 9 percent in electricity, gas and water. Returns to
schooling in most services are high, from 8.5 percent in wholesale and retail trade, 8.9
percent in transport, storage and communications, 9 percent in real estate, renting
and business, 9.1 percent in public administration, defense and social security, 9.8
percent in financial intermediation, to 10 percent in hotels and restaurants. Returns
to schooling are lowest in private households (5.2 percent) and health and social
work (5.6 percent), followed by other social and personal services (6.4 percent) and
education (7.5 percent). Random e↵ects estimates are generally slightly lower than
OLS estimates.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling across sectors by over half
on average. Fixed e↵ects estimates are between 21 and 88 percent lower than OLS
estimates. Returns to schooling remain lowest in agriculture and construction (both
at 1.2 percent), are not significantly di↵erent in health and social work, other social
and personal services, and even in education and financial intermediation. Returns
to schooling remain higher in electricity, gas and water; public administration, de-
fense and social security, hotel and restaurants; real estate, renting and business;
wholesale and retail trade; and transport, storage and communications. Sectors
with lowest returns to schooling have the highest relative reduction in returns to
schooling (from OLS to fixed e↵ects estimates). This means that returns to ability
are relatively higher than returns to education in these sectors. On the other hand,
returns to ability are lower than returns to schooling when return to schooling is
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high.
Table 2.39 shows returns to schooling by occupation. OLS estimates show
highest returns to o cials, CEOs, managers and supervisors at 16.6 percent, fol-
lowed by service and sales workers, clerks, technicians and associate professionals,
and workers in special occupations. Returns are lowest for farmers, fishermen and
forestry workers (1.7 percent), and ironically, professionals (2.9 percent). In the
middle are returns to trades and related workers (5.7 percent), plant and machine
operators (6 percent) and assemblers and laborers and unskilled workers (3.4 per-
cent). Random e↵ects estimates are generally slightly lower than OLS estimates, as
usual.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling across occupations by two-
thirds on average. Fixed e↵ects estimates of returns to schooling are lower by at
least 22 percent. However, the relative sizes across occupations are generally the
same. Returns remain highest for o cials, CEOs, managers and supervisors at 11.4
percent. This followed by special occupations with 7.6 percent, service and sales
workers (6 percent), clerks (5.7 percent) and technicians and associate professionals
(5.1 percent). Returns to schooling are lowest for plant and machine operators
and assemblers (1.4 percent) and laborers and unskilled workers (1.7 percent). The
reduction in returns to schooling are highest for professionals and farmers, fishermen
and forestry workers, indicating highest relative returns to ability. Returns to ability
(the di↵erence between OLS and fixed e↵ects estimates) are lower than returns to
schooling where the latter are relatively high. When returns to schooling are low,
returns to ability are higher.
Table 2.40 shows returns to schooling by class. OLS estimates range from 3
percent for workers with pay in family farm or business, to 5.1 percent for work-
ers in private households and in private establishments, to 8 percent for workers
in government or government corporations. Random e↵ects estimates are slightly
lower for the first and slightly higher for the last three. Fixed e↵ects estimates
are 12 percent lower on average than least squares estimates. Returns to workers
in private households and private establishments decreased by over one-fourth (27
percent) while returns to workers in government agencies and corporations dropped
by 17 percent. On the other hand, returns to paid workers in family-owned farm
or business increased by less than one-fourth (23 percent). This suggests negative
selection: the less able siblings tend to family farm or business rather than pursue
independent careers.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling by tenure by 47 percent on
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average. Table 2.41 shows estimates by tenure / nature of employment. The fixed
e↵ects estimate of return to permanent workers is 44 percent lower than the least
squares estimate. Return to short-term workers are 50 percent lower while that for
workers with various employers are 48 percent lower.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling by urbanity by an average
of 46 percent. Table 2.42 shows returns to schooling estimates by urbanity. Fixed
e↵ects estimates for rural areas are 49 percent lower than least squares estimates
while estimates for urban areas are 42 percent lower. Returns to schooling remain
higher for urban areas at 3.7 percent compared to 2.6 percent in rural areas. While
the relative reduction is higher for rural areas, the absolute reduction is higher for
urban areas confirming the hypothesis that rural to urban migrants are positively
selected.
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Table 2.33: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Education
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E.
Incomplete Elementary 0.1390*** 0.0339 0.0387 0.0449 0.1103*** 0.0322
Complete Elementary 0.1999*** 0.0342 0.0858 0.0475 0.1739*** 0.0328
Incomplete Secondary 0.2618*** 0.0341 0.1081* 0.0474 0.2318*** 0.0327
Complete Secondary 0.3617*** 0.0341 0.1643*** 0.0482 0.3283*** 0.0328
Incomplete College 0.5770*** 0.0348 0.2710*** 0.0499 0.5341*** 0.0335
Complete College 0.8199*** 0.0354 0.4325*** 0.0519 0.7733*** 0.0343
Complete Master/PhD 1.3015*** 0.1176 0.5043*** 0.1356 1.1398*** 0.1135
Experience 0.0227*** 0.0011 0.0239*** 0.0019 0.0237*** 0.0012
Experience2 -0.0005*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0000
Constant 2.5217*** 0.1393 2.3821*** 0.2899 2.4498*** 0.1576
Adjusted R2 0.5714 0.2415
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Division, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.34: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Sex
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Male 0.4681*** 0.0297 0.4350*** 0.0295 0.2970*** 0.0426
Schooling 0.0783*** 0.0022 0.0758*** 0.0023 0.0446*** 0.0035
Experience 0.0312*** 0.0020 0.0312*** 0.0019 0.0279*** 0.0030
Experience2 -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001
Male ⇥ Schooling -0.0276*** 0.0022 -0.0259*** 0.0022 -0.0181*** 0.0032
Male ⇥ Experience -0.0104*** 0.0023 -0.0094*** 0.0023 -0.0070* 0.0034
Male ⇥ Experience2 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Constant 2.6646*** 0.1311 2.5869*** 0.1535 2.1397*** 0.2932
Adjusted R2 0.5546 0.2383
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors
adjusted for clusters at the family level.
Table 2.35: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Year
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Constant (2007) 2.9344*** 0.1349 2.8459*** 0.1580 2.3215*** 0.2982
2008 0.0936** 0.0318 0.0848* 0.0341 0.0000 .
2009 0.0746* 0.0321 0.0630 0.0343 0.0000 .
2010 0.1456*** 0.0317 0.1317*** 0.0342 0.0000 .
Schooling 0.0586*** 0.0019 0.0567*** 0.0020 0.0263*** 0.0043
2008 ⇥ Schooling -0.0023 0.0022 -0.0015 0.0024 0.0070 0.0063
2009 ⇥ Schooling -0.0012 0.0023 -0.0004 0.0025 0.0025 0.0061
2010 ⇥ Schooling -0.0012 0.0022 0.0004 0.0025 0.0081 0.0060
Experience 0.0232*** 0.0024 0.0236*** 0.0024 0.0179*** 0.0036
2008 ⇥ Experience 0.0004 0.0032 0.0003 0.0033 0.0051 0.0053
2009 ⇥ Experience 0.0036 0.0032 0.0045 0.0033 0.0106* 0.0053
2010 ⇥ Experience 0.0047 0.0031 0.0045 0.0031 0.0085 0.0049
Experience2 -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0003** 0.0001
2008 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002
2009 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004* 0.0002
2010 ⇥ Experience2 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002
Adjusted R2 0.5521 0.2356
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Sex, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors
adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.36: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Marital Status
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant 2.9227*** 0.1336 2.8273*** 0.1562 2.3228*** 0.2960
Married 0.1752*** 0.0421 0.1382*** 0.0407 0.0169 0.0622
Widowed 0.0297 0.2643 0.0469 0.2690 -0.4044 0.4258
Divorce/Separate 0.2667* 0.1103 0.2207* 0.1064 0.0868 0.1481
Schooling 0.0585*** 0.0013 0.0571*** 0.0013 0.0305*** 0.0023
Married ⇥ Schooling -0.0060* 0.0026 -0.0046 0.0025 0.0003 0.0039
Widowed ⇥ Schooling -0.0024 0.0134 0.0021 0.0143 0.0379 0.0245
Divorce/Separate ⇥ Schooling -0.0123 0.0074 -0.0094 0.0072 -0.0013 0.0097
Experience 0.0272*** 0.0013 0.0273*** 0.0013 0.0241*** 0.0020
Married ⇥ Experience -0.0096* 0.0039 -0.0070 0.0038 0.0013 0.0055
Widowed ⇥ Experience -0.0067 0.0164 -0.0075 0.0155 0.0134 0.0208
Divorce/Separate ⇥ Experience -0.0163* 0.0072 -0.0179** 0.0067 -0.0202* 0.0092
Experience2 -0.0005*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0001
Married ⇥ Experience2 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002
Widowed ⇥ Experience2 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0004
Divorce/Separate ⇥ Experience2 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0002 0.0005** 0.0002
Adjusted R2 0.5523 0.2362
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Sex, Year, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.37: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Region
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant 2.8145*** 0.1407 2.7144*** 0.1626 2.3005*** 0.2997
Schooling (NCR) 0.0723*** 0.0032 0.0712*** 0.0034 0.0442*** 0.0075
Ilocos ⇥ Schooling -0.0244*** 0.0047 -0.0257*** 0.0049 -0.0279** 0.0096
Cagayan Valley ⇥ Schooling -0.0269*** 0.0046 -0.0275*** 0.0049 -0.0225* 0.0103
Central Luzon ⇥ Schooling -0.0061 0.0039 -0.0084* 0.0043 -0.0146 0.0096
Bicol ⇥ Schooling -0.0217*** 0.0048 -0.0204*** 0.0050 -0.0127 0.0129
Western Visayas ⇥ Schooling -0.0107** 0.0041 -0.0114* 0.0045 -0.0197 0.0107
Central Visayas ⇥ Schooling 0.0120** 0.0043 0.0104* 0.0047 0.0030 0.0120
Eastern Visayas ⇥ Schooling -0.0314*** 0.0048 -0.0292*** 0.0052 0.0031 0.0151
Zamboanga ⇥ Schooling -0.0233*** 0.0045 -0.0217*** 0.0048 -0.0156 0.0110
Northern Mindanao ⇥ Schooling -0.0107* 0.0047 -0.0087 0.0051 -0.0066 0.0133
Davao ⇥ Schooling -0.0093* 0.0047 -0.0081 0.0049 -0.0059 0.0117
SoCCSKSarGen ⇥ Schooling -0.0188*** 0.0050 -0.0194*** 0.0054 -0.0258* 0.0120
Cordillera ⇥ Schooling -0.0232*** 0.0056 -0.0236*** 0.0059 -0.0208 0.0124
ARMM ⇥ Schooling -0.0315*** 0.0083 -0.0318*** 0.0088 -0.0262* 0.0131
Caraga ⇥ Schooling -0.0368*** 0.0050 -0.0366*** 0.0054 -0.0295* 0.0150
CaLaBaRZon ⇥ Schooling -0.0062 0.0040 -0.0052 0.0043 -0.0036 0.0103
MiMaRoPa ⇥ Schooling -0.0380*** 0.0058 -0.0383*** 0.0063 -0.0251* 0.0124
Adjusted R2 0.5568 0.2401
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Experience and Experience Squared by Region, Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.38: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Sector
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E.
Schooling (Agriculture, hunting and forestry) 0.0263*** 0.0019 0.0256*** 0.0020 0.0115*** 0.0032
Fishing ⇥ Schooling 0.0005 0.0086 0.0025 0.0090 0.0111 0.0158
Mining and quarrying ⇥ Schooling 0.0225** 0.0082 0.0188* 0.0085 -0.0188 0.0153
Manufacturing ⇥ Schooling 0.0472*** 0.0036 0.0453*** 0.0038 0.0291*** 0.0064
Electricity, gas and water ⇥ Schooling 0.0637*** 0.0120 0.0674*** 0.0134 0.0592* 0.0259
Construction ⇥ Schooling -0.0025 0.0027 -0.0003 0.0029 -0.0006 0.0055
Wholesale and retail trade ⇥ Schooling 0.0591*** 0.0035 0.0570*** 0.0036 0.0358*** 0.0060
Hotels and restaurants ⇥ Schooling 0.0734*** 0.0056 0.0701*** 0.0057 0.0521*** 0.0086
Transport, storage and communications ⇥ Schooling 0.0623*** 0.0047 0.0585*** 0.0048 0.0314*** 0.0084
Financial intermediation ⇥ Schooling 0.0716*** 0.0116 0.0629*** 0.0120 0.0281 0.0228
Real estate, renting and business ⇥ Schooling 0.0637*** 0.0074 0.0608*** 0.0074 0.0383** 0.0118
Public admin., defence; social security ⇥ Schooling 0.0648*** 0.0070 0.0656*** 0.0073 0.0599*** 0.0125
Education ⇥ Schooling 0.0483*** 0.0117 0.0480*** 0.0128 0.0389 0.0210
Health and social work ⇥ Schooling 0.0294** 0.0107 0.0298** 0.0112 0.0226 0.0227
Other social and personal services ⇥ Schooling 0.0375*** 0.0092 0.0329*** 0.0092 0.0026 0.0135
Private households ⇥ Schooling 0.0261*** 0.0056 0.0278*** 0.0058 0.0262** 0.0090
Extra-territorial organizations ⇥ Schooling 0.0000 . 0.0000 . 0.0000 .
Constant 3.1836*** 0.1387 3.0917*** 0.1627 2.5325*** 0.3086
Adjusted R2 0.5632 0.2489
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Experience and experience squared by Sector, Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.39: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Occupation
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant (Gov’t o cials, executives and managers) 1.4969*** 0.2947 1.4789*** 0.2994 1.0944* 0.4454
Professionals 1.7306*** 0.4454 1.6584*** 0.4282 1.8431** 0.6248
Technicians and Associate Professionals 0.7196* 0.2990 0.6652* 0.2897 0.8347* 0.3747
Clerks 0.5635* 0.2712 0.5717* 0.2619 0.7249* 0.3358
Service and Sales Workers 0.1716 0.2651 0.1996 0.2568 0.4606 0.3317
Farmers, Fishermen, Forestry 0.9595** 0.3093 0.9373** 0.2993 1.1703** 0.4250
Trades and Related Workers 0.8036** 0.2655 0.8012** 0.2579 0.8778** 0.3356
Plant & machine Operators & Assemblers 0.9793*** 0.2706 0.9831*** 0.2637 1.2648*** 0.3471
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 0.9562*** 0.2626 0.9445*** 0.2543 1.0223** 0.3285
Special Occupation 0.9247* 0.3904 0.7821* 0.3837 0.4776 0.4885
Schooling 0.1663*** 0.0186 0.1594*** 0.0180 0.1139*** 0.0227
Professionals ⇥ Schooling -0.1376*** 0.0318 -0.1292*** 0.0305 -0.1279** 0.0443
Technicians and Associate Professionals ⇥ Schooling -0.0689** 0.0212 -0.0635** 0.0205 -0.0629* 0.0261
Clerks ⇥ Schooling -0.0641*** 0.0193 -0.0619*** 0.0186 -0.0569* 0.0234
Service and Sales Workers ⇥ Schooling -0.0614** 0.0189 -0.0595** 0.0182 -0.0539* 0.0231
Farmers, Fishermen, Forestry ⇥ Schooling -0.1489*** 0.0220 -0.1388*** 0.0217 -0.1235*** 0.0317
Trades and Related Workers ⇥ Schooling -0.1097*** 0.0189 -0.1053*** 0.0183 -0.0859*** 0.0235
Plant & machine Operators & Assemblers ⇥ Schooling -0.1060*** 0.0194 -0.1026*** 0.0188 -0.1001*** 0.0243
Laborers and Unskilled Workers ⇥ Schooling -0.1326*** 0.0187 -0.1260*** 0.0181 -0.0966*** 0.0229
Special Occupation ⇥ Schooling -0.0699** 0.0269 -0.0612* 0.0265 -0.0384 0.0346
Adjusted R2 0.5647 0.2481
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Experience and experience squared by Occupation, Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.40: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Class
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant (Private households) 2.8583*** 0.1446 2.7326*** 0.1667 2.1317*** 0.3107
Private establishment 0.4454** 0.1428 0.5549*** 0.1650 0.9843** 0.3087
Gov’t/gov’t corporation 0.2842 0.1573 0.3646* 0.1783 0.6046 0.3311
With pay in family farm or business 0.8630*** 0.1915 0.9294*** 0.2120 0.7632 0.4081
Schooling 0.0507*** 0.0052 0.0522*** 0.0053 0.0372*** 0.0083
Private establishment ⇥ Schooling 0.0069 0.0053 0.0037 0.0055 -0.0086 0.0085
Gov’t/gov’t corporation ⇥ Schooling 0.0291*** 0.0071 0.0291*** 0.0072 0.0292* 0.0118
With pay in family farm or business ⇥ Schooling -0.0204* 0.0100 -0.0244* 0.0105 -0.0145 0.0202
Experience 0.0433*** 0.0052 0.0439*** 0.0052 0.0406*** 0.0076
Private establishment ⇥ Experience -0.0196*** 0.0053 -0.0197*** 0.0053 -0.0192* 0.0077
Gov’t/gov’t corporation ⇥ Experience -0.0145* 0.0067 -0.0147* 0.0066 -0.0066 0.0103
With pay in family farm or business ⇥ Experience -0.0498*** 0.0119 -0.0457*** 0.0117 -0.0213 0.0168
Experience2 -0.0009*** 0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0002 -0.0008*** 0.0002
Private establishment ⇥ Experience2 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002
Gov’t/gov’t corporation ⇥ Experience2 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003
With pay in family farm or business ⇥ Experience2 0.0010*** 0.0003 0.0010*** 0.0003 0.0006 0.0005
Adjusted R2 0.5534 0.2388
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.41: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Tenure
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E. Coef. Robust S.E.
Constant (Permanent) 2.7786*** 0.1363 2.6838*** 0.1597 2.2156*** 0.3031
Short-term 0.2606*** 0.0262 0.2536*** 0.0277 0.1910*** 0.0524
Di↵erent Employer 0.3979*** 0.0418 0.4031*** 0.0431 0.3641*** 0.0829
Schooling 0.0682*** 0.0014 0.0668*** 0.0015 0.0380*** 0.0027
Short-term ⇥ Schooling -0.0252*** 0.0019 -0.0243*** 0.0020 -0.0166*** 0.0038
Di↵erent Employer ⇥ Schooling -0.0388*** 0.0035 -0.0376*** 0.0037 -0.0226*** 0.0065
Experience 0.0282*** 0.0015 0.0289*** 0.0015 0.0276*** 0.0024
Short-term ⇥ Experience -0.0090*** 0.0024 -0.0084*** 0.0024 -0.0081* 0.0039
Di↵erent Employer ⇥ Experience -0.0134*** 0.0038 -0.0144*** 0.0038 -0.0137* 0.0057
Experience2 -0.0005*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001
Short-term ⇥ Experience2 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Di↵erent Employer ⇥ Experience2 0.0003** 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0004* 0.0002
Adjusted R2 0.5551 0.2377
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors adjusted for clusters at the family level.
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Table 2.42: Fixed E↵ects estimation, by Urbanity
Least Squares Random E↵ects Fixed E↵ects
Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E. Coef. R.S.E.
Constant 2.8633*** 0.1335 2.7673*** 0.1567 2.2977*** 0.3009
Urban 0.0152 0.0246 0.0099 0.0262 0.0000 .
Schooling 0.0505*** 0.0014 0.0489*** 0.0015 0.0259*** 0.0029
Urban ⇥ Schooling 0.0139*** 0.0018 0.0147*** 0.0019 0.0112* 0.0045
Experience 0.0294*** 0.0017 0.0292*** 0.0017 0.0235*** 0.0027
Urban ⇥ Experience -0.0092*** 0.0022 -0.0078*** 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0037
Experience2 -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0006*** 0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0001
Urban ⇥ Experience2 0.0002** 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
Adjusted R2 0.5568 0.2363
Observations 36706 36706 36706
Controls: Sex, Year, Marital Status, Region, Sector, Occupation, Class, Tenure.
Legend: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Fixed-E↵ects Robust Standard Errors
adjusted for clusters at the family level.
2.6 Summary
Previous estimates of returns to schooling in the Philippines have been high as
expected for a low-income country without justification for this stylized diminishing
returns to income. These high returns actually overestimate returns to education
due to the omission of important variables. They are capturing the heterogeneity
in returns across sex, marital status, region, sector, occupation, class, tenure and
urbanity. Controlling for these factors reduces returns to schooling by three-fifths
and raises the explanatory power of the model from a third to over half of the
variation in earnings with sector, occupation, and region accounting for most of the
variation.
Notwithstanding these corrections, the average returns conceal large variations
across demographic and labor characteristics. Returns are higher for females than
males, and higher for singles than married, widowed, divorced or separated indi-
viduals. Across regions, returns are higher in economic centers as these may be
capturing higher ability of migrant labor. Similarly, returns are higher in urban
areas than in rural areas. Across sectors, returns are highest in services, followed
by industry, and lowest in agriculture. Across occupations, returns are highest for
o cials in government, executives and managers and lowest for farmers, fishermen
and forestry workers. Across classes of work, returns are highest for employers in
family-owned farm or business and lowest for workers in private households. Returns
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by employment tenure are higher for permanent workers than short-term workers
and workers with various employers.
Controlling for education division (province and city) fixed e↵ects reduces av-
erage returns a bit more and raises the explanatory power of the model further.
However, education quality as measured by provincial and city level average pri-
mary and secondary achievement test scores is insignificant to earnings and does
not a↵ect returns to quantity of education.
Accounting for sibling fixed-e↵ects further reduces returns to schooling by al-
most half, suggesting that most of what were hitherto known as returns to education
are actually returns to ability. This confirms the idea of wage premiums for ability
on top of returns to education. Moreover, there are no significant returns to pri-
mary education and barely significant returns to incomplete secondary education.
Standard estimates for returns to primary and incomplete secondary education turn
out to be returns to ability. This means that workers with only basic education are
paid not so much for the productive content of their education but for the innate
ability that allowed them to pursue primary or secondary education. This suggests
that basic education plays a signaling rather than a productivity enhancing role.
Truly significant returns to education accrue only starting from secondary educa-
tion completion, through college, up to post-graduate education. Moreover, returns
to ability generally rise as education level increases, consistent with the signaling
theory of education where higher education signals higher ability.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling across years by over half. It
also reduces returns to schooling across sexes by almost half but more for males. Ac-
counting for sibling fixed e↵ects reduces returns to schooling across marital status,
equalizing returns to singles, married, widowed, divorce or separated individuals.
The greater reduction for singles suggest higher ability for younger cohorts. Ac-
counting for ability reduces returns to schooling across regions by almost four-tenths
on average. The reductions are highest in economic centers confirming the hypoth-
esis that standard estimates of returns to schooling are driven by higher ability of
migrant labor. Moreover, returns to schooling by urbanity decreased by 46 percent
on average, with the higher absolute reduction in urban areas confirming positive se-
lection. In light of the foregoing, we can conclude that migration is driven by higher
returns to schooling in urban and economic centers and that migrants comprise the
more able workers. As international migration is considered an alternative to in-
ternal migration, we can infer that higher returns to schooling are likewise driving
overseas Filipino employment and that international migrants have greater ability
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than non-migrants. Returns to migration and education of overseas Filipino workers
will be subject of the third study in this thesis.
Accounting for ability reduces returns to schooling across sectors by over half
on average; the higher the least squares estimate, the higher the reduction confirming
that ability is driving standard returns to schooling. Accounting for ability reduces
returns to schooling across occupations by two-thirds on average. The reductions
are highest for professionals and farmers, fishermen and forestry workers, indicating
highest relative returns to ability. Returns to schooling by class are 12 percent lower
on average, decreasing for workers in private households, private establishments and
government agencies and corporations. However, returns to workers in family-owned
farm or business increased suggesting negative selection. Returns to schooling by
tenure decreased by 47 percent on average, decreasing for permanent and short-term
workers as well as workers with various employers.
Chapter 3
Bricks without Straw:
Determinants of Permanent and
Temporary Migration of Filipinos
“Therefore, say to the Israelites: ‘I am the Lord, and I will bring you
out from under the yoke of the Egyptians, I will free you from being
slaves to them, and I will redeem you with an outstretched arm and
with mighty acts of judgement...’” - Exodus 6:6
This study develops a demand and supply model of migration to estimate the im-
pacts of proximate and underlying factors on both permanent and temporary migra-
tion from the Philippines using a Vector Auto-Regressive model. Results show that
permanent migration is positively related to destination wages but also to domestic
wages and employment indicating that they are positively selected from the local
labor force. Permanent migration is negatively related to local demand for labor
proxied by GDP per capita but also to local labor supply; positively related to des-
tination demand for labor and negatively related to destination labor supply (both
lagged two periods). Temporary migration is also positively related to destination
and Philippine wages, negatively related to local labor demand and supply, and pos-
itively related to destination labor demand. However, temporary migration is also
positively related to destination labor supply indicating that they are negatively
selected in the destination labor force.
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3.1 Context and Objectives
3.1.1 Stock of Filipino Migrants
The Philippines is among the top emigration countries. The United Nations defines
migrants broadly as persons who changed their country of residence (Ozden et al.,
2011). Various criteria are applied across destination countries in defining migrants,
but mainly whether a person is ‘foreign-born’ or a ‘foreign citizen’. The Philippines
ranks ninth among the top source countries of international migrants [Table 3.1].
The World Bank’s Bilateral Migration Matrix 2010 shows that the migrant stock
from the Philippines totaled 4.3 million in 2010, comprising 2 percent of migrants
world-wide. The Philippines is also the fourth largest remittance-receiving coun-
try in 2010, with USD 21.3 Billion in remittances (World Bank, 2011). In 2009,
remittances amounted to 12 percent of GDP.
Table 3.1: Top 10 Sources of Migrants Worldwide
Source Country Migrant Stock Share (%)
Mexico 11,859,236 5.5
India 11,360,823 5.3
Russian Federation 11,034,681 5.1
China 8,344,726 3.9
Ukraine 6,525,145 3.0
Bangladesh 5,384,875 2.5
Pakistan 4,678,730 2.2
United Kingdom 4,666,172 2.2
Philippines 4,275,612 2.0
Turkey 4,261,786 2.0
World Total 215,763,573
Source: World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix 2010
The stock of Filipino migrants grew 30-fold in the past 50 years.Table 3.2 shows
the stock of Filipino migrants over time. In 1960, the stock of migrants from the
Philippines was only 155,651. This grew by over 2.5 times to 400,889 in 1970 and
again by almost 2.5 times to 980,831 in 1980. It further doubled to over 2 million
in 1990 and rose by 1.5 times more to over 3 million in 2000. The Filipino migrant
stock grew by almost 20 times between 1960 and 2000 while the global migrant stock
grew by only 1.8 times. By 2010, there were 4.3 million Filipino migrants worldwide.
The migrant stock also grew relative to the population from 0.6 percent in 1960 to
4.6 percent in 2010. The emigration rate increased from 6 per thousand people in
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1960 to 11 per thousand in 1970. It continued to rise to 20 per thousand in 1980
and to 32 per thousand in 1990. It further rose to 38 per thousand in 2000 and
stood at 44 per thousand in 2010.
Table 3.2: Filipino Migrant Stock, 1960-2010
Migrant Stock Annual Growth (%) Emigration Rate
1960 155,651 - 5.9
1970 400,889 25.8 11.1
1980 980,831 24.5 20.3
1990 2,048,870 20.9 32.0
2000 3,083,240 15.0 38.2
2010 4,275,612 13.9 43.8
Source: World Bank Bilateral Migration Database 1960-2000, Bilateral Migration
Matrix 2010
The recent growth of migrant stock remains high. The Philippine government’s
stock estimate of overseas Filipinos is over twice as much as the World Bank data.
The Commission on Filipinos Overseas puts the stock of overseas Filipinos at 9.45
million in 2010, almost 2.2 times that of the World Bank. The discrepancy lies in
the fact that while the World Bank data only count the Philippine-born or Filipino
citizens, the Commission counts all those of Filipino ancestry (International Orga-
nization for Migration, 2013). The Philippine government includes in its definition
of overseas Filipino workers (migrant workers), their dependents abroad and other
Filipino nationals.1
Table 3.3 gives the stock estimates of overseas Filipinos from the Philippine
government for 1997-2011. The annual stock of overseas Filipinos grew from almost
7 million in 1997 to about 7.8 million in 2003 with an annual average growth rate
of 1.9 percent. The stock fell by 8 percent in 2004 and further by 2.3 percent back
to 7 million in 2005. However, it has since rebounded growing by an average of
5.7 percent to 8.6 million in 2009. It further grew by 10.4 percent per year to 10.5
million in 2011. While emigration rate has decreased from 88 per thousand in 1998
to 86 per thousand in 2003 and further to 75 per thousand in 2005, it has rebounded
since, reaching 85 per thousand in 2009, and rising steeply to 99 in 2011. These
trends beg the question why has emigration fallen in the earlier period and sharply
in the mid-2000s? And, what caused the resurgence in emigration in recent years?
1RA 8042: Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 as amended by RA 10022
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Table 3.3: Stock of Overseas Filipinos, 1997-2011
YEAR PERMANENT TEMPORARY IRREGULAR TOTAL Emig.
Stock Share Growth Stock Share Growth Stock Share Growth Stock Growth Rate
1997 2,153,967 30.9 2,940,082 42.2 1,880,016 27.0 6,974,065 87.4
1998 2,333,843 32.4 8.4 2,961,254 41.1 0.7 1,913,941 26.5 1.8 7,209,038 3.4 88.3
1999 2,482,470 34.0 6.4 2,981,529 40.9 0.7 1,828,990 25.1 -4.4 7,292,989 1.2 87.5
2000 2,551,549 34.6 2.8 2,991,125 40.5 0.3 1,840,448 24.9 0.6 7,383,122 1.2 86.8
2001 2,736,528 36.9 7.2 3,049,622 41.1 2.0 1,625,936 21.9 -11.7 7,412,086 0.4 85.5
2002 2,807,356 37.0 2.6 3,167,978 41.8 3.9 1,607,170 21.2 -1.2 7,582,504 2.3 85.6
2003 2,865,412 36.9 2.1 3,385,001 43.6 6.9 1,512,765 19.5 -5.9 7,763,178 2.4 85.9
2004 3,204,326 44.9 11.8 2,899,620 40.6 -14.3 1,039,191 14.5 -31.3 7,143,137 -8.0 78.2
2005 3,407,967 48.8 6.4 2,943,151 42.2 1.5 626,389 9.0 -39.7 6,977,507 -2.3 75.2
2006 3,568,388 49.0 4.7 3,093,921 42.5 5.1 621,713 8.5 -0.7 7,284,022 4.4 77.0
2007 3,693,015 47.6 3.5 3,413,079 44.0 10.3 648,169 8.4 4.3 7,754,263 6.5 80.2
2008 3,907,842 47.7 5.8 3,626,259 44.3 6.2 653,609 8.0 0.8 8,187,710 5.6 83.1
2009 4,056,940 47.3 3.8 3,864,068 45.0 6.6 658,370 7.7 0.7 8,579,378 4.8 85.4
2010 4,423,680 46.8 9.0 4,324,388 45.7 11.9 704,916 7.5 7.1 9,452,984 10.2 91.9
2011 4,867,645 46.6 10.0 4,513,171 43.2 4.4 1,074,972 10.3 52.5 10,455,788 10.6 99.1
Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas
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3.1.2 Shares of Filipino Migrant Stock
Permanent migrants have the largest share. Table 3.3 also shows the shares of
Filipino migrant stock. In 1997, the largest proportion (42.2 percent) of overseas
Filipinos were temporary, followed by permanent migrants (30.9 percent); irregular
migrants comprised 27 percent.2 While the share of temporary migrants has not
changed much (43.2 percent in 2011), the share of permanent migrants steadily rose
in 1997-2001 before rising abruptly in the mid-2000s to 49 percent. While it has
declined since, it stood at 46.6 percent in 2011. This share may be lower if foreign-
born and foreign citizens with Filipino ancestry are excluded. Corollary to this, the
share of irregular migrants steadily decreased in 1997-2003, and more sharply in
2004-2005 to 9 percent, and continued its descent through to 2010 to 7.5 percent,
before rising to 10.3 percent in 2011.
As of 2011, ten destination countries accounted for 87.5 percent of Filipino
migrants (Figure 3.1). The United States alone is host to a third (33.4 percent) of
all Filipino migrants, followed by Saudi Arabia (15.1 percent), Canada (8.2 percent),
and UAE (6.6 percent). Malaysia hosts 5.5 percent of Filipino migrants, Australia
3.7 percent, and Qatar 3.3 percent. Japan is host to 2.2 percent, United Kingdom
2.1 percent, Italy, Singapore and Kuwait 1.8 percent each, and finally Hong Kong
1.7 percent.
The shares of migrants by status in each of the 10 major destination countries
are shown in Figure 3.2. Most of the Filipinos in the United States (89 percent),
Canada (87 percent), Australia (85 percent), United Kingdom (73 percent), and
Japan (70 percent) are permanent migrants. On the other hand, most of the Fil-
ipinos in Saudi Arabia (99 percent), UAE (97 percent), Kuwait and Qatar (96
percent each), and Hong Kong (90 percent) are temporary migrants. Most Filipinos
in Malaysia (79 percent) are irregular migrants.
There are no long-term data on migrant shares by country, but based on the
dominant shares of top destinations in 2010 and the growth of migration in these
countries over time, it can be inferred that while the share of permanent migrants
dominated in the 1960s-1980s, this has decreased. With the growing shares of the
Middle-East, the share of temporary migrants grew from the 1960s to 1990. While
this has decreased in the 1990s to 2000, it has risen again in the 2000s. While the
2“Permanent: Immigrants or legal permanent residents abroad whose stay does not depend
on work contracts. Temporary: persons whose stay overseas is employment related, and who are
expected to return at the end of their work contracts. Irregular: those not properly documented or
without valid residence or work permits, or who are overstaying in a foreign country.” (Commission
on Filipinos Overseas)
102 CHAPTER 3. DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION
Figure 3.1: Share of Filipino Migrants by Destination Country, 2011
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Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
share of irregular migrants, mostly to Malaysia, has increased in the 1960s to 1980s,
it has declined in the 1990s but picked up slightly in the 2000s.
3.1.3 Permanent Migrants
The Commission on Filipinos Overseas documents Filipino emigrants through its
Pre-Departure Registration and Orientation Seminars. From 1981 to 2012, the
total number of registered migrants was over 1.9 million with annual departures
averaging over 60 thousand [Table 3.4]. Almost two-thirds (64%) moved to the
United States.3 Two-fifths were males while three-fifths were females. 51 percent
were single, 45 percent were married, the rest were either widowed, separated or
divorced. About 4 out of 5 were in the labor force/economically active. However,
3The Philippines-US is among the top emigration corridors in 2010, with 1.7 million migrants
(World Bank, 2011). This corridor ranks 11th with the former Soviet Union included and 7th
without.
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Figure 3.2: Migrants by Status, Top 10 Destination Countries
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only 28.5 percent of emigrants were employed prior to migration. A quarter were
students, a fifth were housewives, 8 percent were minors (below 8 years old) and
4 percent were retirees. In 1988, only 31.4 had completed college; 47.5 percent of
emigrants had at least some college education. In 2012, 34.8 percent had completed
college; 53 percent had at least some college education.
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Table 3.4: Registered Filipino Emigrants by Major Country of Destination: 1981-2012
YEAR USA Canada Japan Australia Italy New Zealand Germany UK South Korea Spain Others Total
1981 40,307 5,226 254 2,752 4 12 45 88 14 8 157 48,867
1982 44,438 4,898 310 2,931 8 25 263 682 7 35 356 53,953
1983 34,794 3,946 140 2,608 11 41 282 346 2 18 293 42,481
1984 34,682 2,463 137 2,915 19 55 346 364 6 57 507 41,551
1985 38,653 2,097 126 3,458 10 52 213 276 6 34 344 45,269
1986 40,650 3,206 53 4,374 4 37 88 658 11 257 49,338
1987 40,813 5,757 6 8,983 9 45 58 436 28 215 56,350
1988 41,378 6,602 62 9,319 32 11 83 256 1 56 220 58,020
1989 39,524 8,040 1,271 5,943 109 55 135 248 4 120 296 55,745
1990 43,781 8,400 3,569 5,847 160 50 334 291 4 94 619 63,149
1991 43,824 7,211 3,946 5,715 130 91 522 286 14 57 668 62,464
1992 46,691 7,454 4,048 4,104 105 128 593 205 14 77 735 64,154
1993 44,903 11,627 4,527 3,083 123 237 780 159 25 108 818 66,390
1994 40,515 14,302 4,225 3,224 99 287 784 174 18 86 817 64,531
1995 34,614 11,288 4,883 2,966 71 579 661 151 31 68 930 56,242
1996 41,312 10,050 4,510 2,002 72 1,005 542 150 237 40 993 60,913
1997 37,002 8,215 4,171 2,124 50 405 566 195 277 25 1,029 54,059
1998 24,886 5,651 3,810 2,189 96 253 560 193 256 39 1,076 39,009
1999 24,123 6,712 4,219 2,597 125 186 550 225 422 345 1,003 40,507
2000 31,324 8,245 6,468 2,298 371 261 552 174 110 336 892 51,031
2001 31,287 9,737 6,021 1,965 823 284 507 176 62 411 781 52,054
2002 36,557 8,795 5,734 2,603 982 624 518 271 55 451 1,130 57,720
2003 33,916 9,521 5,929 2,223 662 382 445 225 77 586 1,171 55,137
2004 42,350 10,108 5,993 2,647 859 131 393 309 289 579 1,266 64,924
2005 40,280 13,598 7,062 3,027 1,250 394 367 478 480 685 1,407 69,028
2006 49,522 13,230 9,742 3,735 954 1,973 457 556 281 898 1,619 82,967
2007 46,420 14,572 8,806 3,467 1,490 1,639 424 654 576 933 1,618 80,599
2008 34,201 16,443 7,682 3,657 2,405 1,252 489 552 1,482 907 1,730 70,800
2009 40,598 19,967 5,278 3,850 2,734 1,725 518 646 1,458 970 1,974 79,718
2010 42,007 27,302 3,766 3,062 3,319 1,114 510 817 1,565 693 1,920 86,075
2011 38,463 26,203 3,965 3,957 3,632 1,185 590 749 1,618 871 2,177 83,410
2012 39,124 24,354 4,759 4,259 3,818 1,170 553 881 1,632 808 2,282 83,640
Total 1,242,939 335,220 125,472 117,884 24,536 15,688 13,728 11,871 11,023 10,434 31,300 1,940,095
Share (%) 64.07 17.28 6.47 6.08 1.26 0.81 0.71 0.61 0.57 0.54 1.61 100
Source: Commission on Filipinos Overseas
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Permanent migration is becoming more di cult. Filipino migrants to the
OECD, particularly in the U.S., Canada, and Australia are positively selected in
terms of education. The share of Filipino migrants with higher educational attain-
ment in key OECD destination countries (U.S.A., U.K., Australia, Canada, France,
and Germany) have increased over time [Table 3.5]. The proportion of highly ed-
ucated migrants (i.e. those with tertiary education) has risen from 51.5 percent in
1975 to 72.2 percent in 2000. In the U.S., the proportion of highly educated mi-
grants rose from 51 percent in 1975 to 73 percent in 2000. In Canada, the proportion
of Filipino migrants with high education rose from 71 percent in 1975 to over 81
percent in 2000. In Australia, most (86 percent) Filipino migrants in 1975 had low
education (i.e. had only primary education). However, since 1980, most migrants
had high education although this dropped from 84 percent in 1980 to 66 percent in
2000.
This follows policy changes in the destination countries that focus on skills.
Mayda and Patel (2004) reviewed policy changes in OECD countries. They noted
that US immigration policy is skill-based, although it also accommodates family re-
unification. Canada’s immigration policy is also focused “towards admitting skilled
workers”. Australia’s immigration policy has also shifted
from encouraging foreign immigration for manufacturing to that based
on family migration for relatives, skill-based migration driven by sector-
specific demand, and humanitarian and refugee admission. Migration
policy during the 1980s focused on building a knowledge-based economy
to meet the challenges of globalization. As a result, immigration policies
have been designed to encourage immigration of highly skilled workers in
order to develop high value-added sectors such as banking and insurance,
as well as on building a knowledge-based economy
(Mayda and Patel, 2004, p. 2).
Some Filipinos migrate as spouses or partners of foreign nationals. Between
1989 and 2012, there were 434,137 marriage migrants. This is equivalent to 28 per-
cent of registered emigrants for the same period. However, it is not clear whether
these are included among the registered migrants. This proportion increased in the
1990s but decreased in the 2000s. The U.S. is also the most popular destination
among marriage migrants hosting 42 percent, followed by Japan (27%), Australia
(8%), Canada (4%) and Germany (3%). In 1991, only 50 percent of marriage mi-
grants have at least some college education. By 2012, 64 percent had at least some
college education.
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3.1.4 Temporary Migrants: Overseas Filipino Workers
Most of the growth in migration is due to temporary migration. 55 percent of the
change in total migration is due to temporary migration. A third (32.5%) of the
growth is due to permanent migration while the remainder (11.4%) is due to irreg-
ular migration. Interestingly, temporary migration is counter-cyclical (negatively
related) to permanent migration. As the growth of permanent migration decreased
in the early 2000s, the growth of temporary migration increased. With the surge in
permanent migration in 2004 came a drop in temporary migration. As growth in
permanent migration again decreased from the mid-2000s, there was a resurgence
in temporary migration. On the other hand, while irregular migration is not signifi-
cantly related to permanent migration, it does move pro-cyclically (positively) with
temporary migration.
In policy, “the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to
sustain economic growth and achieve national development.”4 However, it encour-
ages the deployment of Filipino workers overseas to countries where their rights are
protected. In this regard, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration is
mandated to regulate the recruitment and deployment of overseas workers (tempo-
rary migrants).
Rehired OFW are the largest and fastest growing. Table 3.6 shows the de-
ployment of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs)5 by type from 1984-2012. From just
350,982 in 1984, the number of overseas Filipino workers rose to 1.8 million in 2012.
In relation to the labor force, the share of deployed overseas Filipino workers has
grown from 1.7 percent in 1984 to 3.8 percent in 2010. In 1984, 85.6 percent of the
overseas workers were land based while 14.4 percent were sea based. The share of
sea based workers grew sharply in the late 1980s, declined in the early 1990s, and
rebounded in the mid-1990s. It has remained around 25 percent throughout the
next decade until it decreased to 21 percent in 2008. While it rose subsequently,
it fell again to 20.4 in 2012. While most of the land based workers were rehires
(55.6 percent in 1984, rising to 68 percent in 2012), the number of new hires have
grown from over 133 thousand in 1984 to almost 459 thousand in 2012. That is
over 50,000 more than the growth in domestic employment of 408,000 from 2011 to
4RA 8042: Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
5Overseas Filipino workers deployed are define as “recruited Filipino worker who has actually
left for overseas job with the pre-condition that employment/travel documentation papers are
processed by POEA and his/her departure is actually recorded at the Labor Assistance Center
at Ninoy Aquino International Airport.” (Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics as cited in
International Organization for Migration (2013)).
3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 107
2012. Already, local job creation is below the annual target of 1 million new jobs in
2011-2016.6 There are 14 times more temporary migrants leaving than permanent
migrants, although close to half are rehires. Nevertheless, there are over four times
more newly hired temporary workers leaving than permanent migrants.
3.1.5 Research Questions and Objectives
The Philippines remains in the growth phase of its migration life cycle. What is
driving these rising emigration rates? Is population growth making people face lo-
cal resource scarcities that drive them to live elsewhere? Is economic development
resulting in structural transformation that is driving people o↵ the farms into in-
dustry, services and abroad? Are migrant networks making it easier to migrate by
lowering costs? What accounts for the rising importance of temporary migration?
Is permanent migration becoming more di cult that workers settle for temporary
migration? Are higher qualifications for permanent migration unachievable to in-
creasing number of workers? I try to answer these questions in turn.
This paper aims to study the determinants of migration among Filipinos. It
contains six sections including this introduction. Section 3.2 reviews the interna-
tional literature on factors a↵ecting migration. Section 3.3 develops a model based
on the best variables identified in the literature. Section 3.4 describes the data
sources and provides a descriptive analysis of the dependent vis-a-vis the indepen-
dent variables. Section 3.5 discusses the regression results. The final section recaps
the findings and provides a conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Wage di↵erential
Migration is an investment in human capital (Sjaastad, 1962). Accordingly, the
return on investment for migration is dependent on the additional earnings relative to
the monetary and opportunity costs of migration. Migration is primarily a response
to wage di↵erences and a movement to areas with higher pay. Workers migrated
from rural to urban areas if urban wages exceeded rural wages and the probability
of urban employment is high (Harris and Todaro, 1970). Similarly, the emigration
6Department of Labor and Employment, 2011. The Philippine Labor and Employment Plan
2011-2016: Inclusive Growth through Decent and Productive Work
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Table 3.5: Share of Filipino immigrants to OECD6 by Educational Attainment
Low Medium High
1975 21.4 27.0 51.5
1980 19.4 19.9 60.7
1985 17.5 18.5 63.9
1990 13.2 18.3 68.2
1995 15.8 13.0 71.0
2000 9.4 18.3 72.2
Source of data: Schi↵ and Sjoblom (nd)
Table 3.6: Deployed Overseas Filipino Workers by Type: 1984 - 2012
Year New Hires Rehires Land-based Sea-based Total
1984 133,494 166,884 300,378 50,604 350,982
1985 160,815 159,679 320,494 52,290 372,784
1986 170,705 152,812 323,517 54,697 378,214
1987 211,962 170,267 382,229 67,042 449,271
1988 182,142 202,975 385,117 85,913 471,030
1989 170,433 184,913 355,346 103,280 458,626
1990 217,942 116,941 334,883 111,212 446,095
1991 301,317 187,943 489,260 125,759 615,019
1992 291,219 258,436 549,655 136,806 686,461
1993 274,305 276,567 550,872 145,758 696,630
1994 268,711 296,515 565,226 154,376 719,602
1995 219,018 269,603 488,621 165,401 654,022
1996 206,731 277,922 484,653 175,469 660,122
1997 222,139 337,088 559,227 188,469 747,696
1998 223,589 414,754 638,343 193,300 831,643
1999 237,714 402,617 640,331 196,689 837,020
2000 253,418 389,886 643,304 198,324 841,628
2001 271,085 391,563 662,648 204,951 867,599
2002 288,677 393,638 682,315 209,593 891,908
2003 279,565 372,373 651,938 216,031 867,969
2004 284,912 419,674 704,586 229,002 933,588
2005 289,981 450,651 740,632 247,983 988,615
2006 317,680 470,390 788,070 274,497 1,062,567
2007 313,260 497,810 811,070 266,553 1,077,623
2008 376,973 597,426 974,399 261,614 1,236,013
2009 349,715 742,447 1,092,162 330,424 1,422,586
2010 341,966 781,710 1,123,676 347,150 1,470,826
2011 437,720 881,007 1,318,727 369,104 1,687,831
2012 458,575 976,591 1,435,166 366,865 1,802,031
Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
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rate increases with earnings in the destination country, and decreases as earnings in
the home country and migration costs increase (Borjas, 1987).
3.2.2 Population growth
Wages depend on population growth and labor supply. Malthus (1798) noted that
while food production only grew arithmetically, population rose in geometric rates
and unless regulated would bring about wide-spread poverty. Lewis (1954) observed
that unlimited supplies of labor in agriculture kept rural wages at subsistence level.
Development took place as excess labor moved to urban areas for industrial em-
ployment at wages higher than subsistence rates to cover the costs of moving, the
di↵erence in living costs and work experience. Easterlin (1961) analyzed the role of
population growth in the context of European emigration before World War I. He
used the rate of natural increase twenty years earlier as a proxy for the growth in
working age population. The hypothesis is that earlier population growth especially
with the decline in infant mortality would have increased the labor force which in
turn would increase emigration. Easterlin found a positive correlation between the
rank orders of emigration rates and population growth. However, the responsive-
ness of emigration to population growth was higher for Southern and Eastern Europe
(excluding Russia) compared to Northern and Western Europe. He suggested that
this may be due to the di↵erence in incomes between these two groups, with South-
ern and Eastern Europe generally poorer. Moe (1970) argued that the use of the
rate of natural increase as a proxy is mis-specified as it gives more weight to the
older non-migrant population. He modelled migration from Norway to the U.S. in
1740-1940 as a function of the Norwegian population aged 20-25 in the previous
year, controlling for the income ratio between the two countries over the past few
years and the rates of unemployment in the two countries. With a significant cohort
e↵ect, he concluded that emigration was related to the long swings in demographic
composition.
For many European countries, emigration rates between the mid-19th century
to the mid-20th century increased before decreasing. Describing migration from
Sweden to America in 1851-1960, Akerman (1976) depicted migration as having a
“growth curve”, where a small volume of emigration (introductory phase) was fol-
lowed by a big upsurge (growth phase) and then levelled o↵ (saturation phase) before
decreasing (regression phase). He related this pattern to demographic conditions
where a rare surge in birth rates translated to a considerable increase in subsequent
labor force. He also described emigration as a process of innovation initiated by
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information agents, followed by highly selective streams of migrant families, neigh-
bors and contingents. At its peak, emigration matched the size of internal migration
with a less selective character. It then waned with economic convergence and im-
provements in transportation and communication. However, this characterization
was more of a theoretical description and fell short of an empirical evidence.
Modeling emigration on a quadratic trend for nine European countries (Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway,
and Sweden) from 1890 to 1913, Hatton and Williamson (1994) and Hatton and
Williamson (1998) found support for an “inverted U” emigration pattern for most
countries over the period. Emigration rates for most of these countries rose earlier in
the period, before declining in the latter part. However, the relationship appeared
to be significant only for five countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and
Sweden). The insignificance of an inverted U emigration pattern for Belgium, Great
Britain, Ireland, and Netherlands was attributed to the fact that the di↵erent coun-
tries went through the emigration phases at di↵erent periods. Accounting for the
peak emigration decade, Hatton and Williamson (1994) and Hatton and Williamson
(1998) found a strong inverted U emigration pattern.
3.2.3 Economic conditions
Wages also depend on overall economic conditions relating to the demand for labor.
Much of the early literature on migration focused on migration from Europe to the
United States, and on the relative importance of economic conditions in the origin
and destination countries, or ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of migration. Jerome (1926)
argued that migration from Europe to the US between 1870 and 1913 was dominated
by economic conditions in the U.S.. Migration was high when economic conditions
were good in the U.S. and bad in the origin country, but also when economic con-
ditions were equally good in both countries. On the other hand, when conditions
were equally bad, migration was low. Using composite indices of economic activity
from nine indicators for the United States (including wholesale prices, commercial
failures, coal production, iron production, railway mileage, bank clearings, employ-
ment and imports), five for the United Kingdom (wholesale prices, exports, coal
and iron production, and trade union unemployment), four for Germany (wholesale
prices, exports, coal and iron production), and two for Italy (imports and exports),
Jerome found the economic cycles for the United States, United Kingdom, Ger-
many and Italy to behave similarly. With the co-movement of US and European
economic cycles, and of immigration and the US economic cycle, he concluded that
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increases in emigration to the United States corresponded with economic growth in
the European countries.
Pull factors or economic conditions in the United States were not always dom-
inant. Earlier push factors in European countries led to pull factors in later pe-
riods in the U.S.. Thomas (1973) agreed that immigration lagged behind railway
construction in 1870-1913 and coal production in 1886-1913. However, he argued
that immigration preceded economic development in the U.S. in 1849-62, before the
structural change in 1863-1870. Before the Civil War, immigration preceded rail-
way construction. Railway expansion followed the flow of migration as rails would
not have been built without the influx of labor. Various factors in the origin coun-
tries pushed migration, including the famine in Ireland and evictions by English
landlords, crop failures in Germany, population pressures and innovations in trans-
Atlantic travel. Capital exports from Britain also accompanied emigration, spurring
investments in railway development in the U.S. Moreover, railway construction was
supported by British exports especially of iron and steel. Building construction in
the U.S. also corresponded with emigration. Emigration from Britain was inversely
related to incomes, wages, and employment in Britain. After a structural change
around 1970, British emigration, foreign investment, and exports lagged behind rail-
way and building construction in the U.S.. Elsewhere, emigrations were driven by
high birth rates as in Sweden, Ireland and Italy, and economic conditions as in Italy.
These support the idea of emigration as a ‘safety valve’.
3.2.4 Economic development and the migration hump
Contrary to the view that poverty in the origin drives migration, an alternative view
considers economic development as the reason for rural-to-urban and international
migration (Massey, 1988). Economic development entailed substitution of capital for
labor and consolidation of agricultural land raising agricultural underemployment
and compelling the export of labor to urban areas. Moreover, the concentration of
capital in urban areas created rural-urban wage disparities driving migration from
rural to urban areas. Some farmers and rural workers migrated to other coun-
tries, similarly motivated by wage di↵erentials net of migration costs. Economic
development also entailed a reduction in transportation and communication costs,
promoting emigration, with the development of road networks and railway systems,
postal services, telephone, radio, and television networks.
Emigration is also determined by the extent of economic linkages between
origin and destination countries (Massey, 1988). Economic cycles of highly linked
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economies tend to be inversely related. The US recession in 1975-82 corresponded
with Mexico’s oil boom. Highly connected economies also have good transportation
and communication links. Finally, closely linked economies allow active labor re-
cruitment from the poorer to the richer economy. Economic development therefore
reduces migration costs by linking origin and destination countries.
The growth curve has been attributed to origin country incomes, or more
broadly economic development in origin countries. While emigration is expected to
decrease with origin country income, it has been observed to first rise before declin-
ing with income. The common notion is that people migrate from poor countries
to developed countries and that the only way to control this is to promote develop-
ment in origin countries. Migration is thought to stop when standards of living are
equalized among countries. Massey (1988) argued that while this may be true in
the long run, development may increase rather than reduce migration in the short
run as economic and social changes make emigration more possible. He cited the
case of Europe in the nineteenth to early twentieth century when mass emigrations
corresponded with industrialization. This spurred development in the U.S., linking
their business cycles. Emigration rose with declining economic activity in Europe
and with economic boom in the United States.
In the 19th century, migration from Europe mostly to the United States rose
substantially (Hatton and Williamson, 1994). Early migrants were mostly farmers
or rural workers and their families. With industrialization, migrants increasingly
came from urban areas and non-farm occupations. Later migrants were generally
young adults, mostly single males with neither the burden of dependents nor the
skills for productive work. Nevertheless, they were able to adapt to the emerging
working conditions and benefit from the move. Migrating alone kept costs low, aided
further by the help of relatives and friends in the destination. The primary reason
for moving was economic - most were escaping from poverty.
Similarly, emigration fromMexico to the United States was due not to Mexico’s
poor economic performance but its rapid growth (Massey, 1988). The first wave of
substantial emigration from Mexico followed the consolidation of agricultural lands
and mechanization in agriculture. It was also encouraged by development in South-
western U.S., which created a need for Mexican workers. The railway system reduced
transportation costs and allowed the recruitment of Mexican workers into the U.S.
The second wave of migration was driven by declining agricultural productivity due
to droughts and encouraged by labor demand in the U.S. following World War II,
filled through the Bracero Program. The third wave was pushed by rapid mecha-
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nization in agriculture and fuelled by migrant networks that were established during
the Bracero program. Emigration sped up again after 1982 with Mexico facing an
economic crisis. To promote development in Mexico, Massey (1988) argued that it
was better to allow Mexican migrants into the U.S. as Mexican emigration may have
already peaked or was near its peak anyway.
While the United States Commission for the Study of International Migra-
tion and Cooperative Development (1990) believed that economic progress through
free trade was the only way to mitigate unauthorized migration into the United
States (paving the way for the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)), it
cautioned that economic progress may stimulate migration in the short to medium
term. Martin (1993) called this temporary rise in migration with economic progress
a “migration ‘hump’”. He argued that NAFTA was likely to create a temporary mi-
gration hump but also less long-term immigration from Mexico. This assumed that
short-term migration does not have a cumulative e↵ect on subsequent migration,
and a decrease in wage disparities that reduces long-term migration. The conclu-
sion of a migration hump was based on the assumption that migration and trade
are complementary in the short-term, but substitutes in the long-term, and that
the length and size of the hump are small (Martin and Taylor, 1996). However, if
migration and trade were substitutes in both the short run and the long run, there
will be a “migration trough” instead, with migration decreasing throughout. On
the other hand, if migration and trade were complements, it would be a “migration
plateau” with a permanent increase in migration.
Asians did not migrate to the U.S. in the 19th to early 20th century as
much as Europeans did, due to policy barriers and poverty constraint (Hatton and
Williamson, 2009). Mass migrations happened only after 1965. Emigration from the
third world showed the same life cycle, decreasing for Middle East and North Africa
after 1980-84, for East Asia and South Asia after 1990-94, although rising again for
the latter in 2000-04. Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa was still rising. Between
1970 and 2004, emigration had an inverse U shape for 26 Latin American countries,
and 36 Middle East and North African and Asian countries, and a positive linear
trend for 38 Sub-Saharan African countries. The size of the population 0-14 years
old 15 years before had a significant positive e↵ect. The ratio of US-origin country
GDP per capita had a positive e↵ect. The ratio of US-origin country education had
a negative e↵ect. Origin country education had a positive e↵ect, suggesting higher
returns to education in the US. Poverty had a negative e↵ect but this is o↵set by the
size of the migrant stock, suggesting the“importance of family reunification in US
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immigration policy”. In general, the rise in emigration was due to the increasing size
of young adults, increasing education, and in Latin America and Africa, increasing
wage gap. The eventual decline in Latin America and Asia was due to the declining
size of young adults, slowing educational progress, and decreasing migrant stocks.
Some authors argue that migration is decreasing throughout instead of having
a hump. Using cross-country data for 1995-2000, Lucas (2005) found a significant
negative relationship between net out-migration and GDP per capita. Fitting a
regression line by income groups, he found that among the poorest countries, emi-
gration rates in fact decreased as income increases leading him to deny the existence
of a migration hump. However, apart from the poorest countries, his graph shows
a migration hump with net migration rising with income in the second quartile and
then decreasing in the third and fourth quartile. Also, the scatterplot may well fit
a quadratic on income.
Others observed that emigration continued to rise with development. While
Turkey experienced rapid economic growth in the 1980s, substantial emigration pres-
sure persisted after a decade due to limited employment opportunities and declining
real incomes (Martin, 1993). Concerned that Turkey had not developed su ciently
to avoid a substantial migration hump, the European Community turned down
Turkey’s membership application. However, there may not have been a migration
hump even if Turkey entered the European Community given the high unemploy-
ment rates in the EC by the 1980s and the tightened immigration policy. On the
other hand, increasing unemployment and underemployment in Turkey would have
pushed unskilled workers to create jobs for themselves in the Community.
3.2.5 Cost of Migration
While earlier studies focused on the relative importance of push and pull factors,
more recent studies explore the importance of barriers to migration. These include
monetary as well as opportunity costs of migration. Tomaske (1971) agreed with
Easterlin (1961) on the importance of income but contradicted the notion that
emigration was a vent for surplus labor. He found that while a simple regression of
emigration rate on lagged population growth showed a positive e↵ect of population
growth, accounting for the ratio of home-to-U.S. income per capita and migrant stock
made population growth insignificant. However, the ratio of home-to-U.S. income
per capita, without accounting for migrant stock, was insignificant. This is due to
the e↵ects of the income ratio and migrant stock cancelling out. This underlines
the importance of information on opportunities from relatives and friends who have
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migrated earlier. Otherwise, information costs would restrict migration. As Letouz
et al. (2009) suggested, migration occurs only if origin income is su cient to cover
costs and if utility from destination income exceeds that from origin income and
migration cost. However, as origin income increases, destination income must be
even bigger to induce migration.
Reductions in migration costs promote migration in the face of decreasing
income di↵erentials. Emigration creates social and economic changes that further
fuels migration, a process called “cumulative causation” (Massey, 1988). It depends
on three mechanism: network formation, agrarian transformation, and income re-
distribution. Migrant networks of relatives, friends and community members in
destination countries enhance the likelihood of migration as they reduce the costs of
migration, including for travel and settlement, employment information, opportu-
nity costs and psychological costs. Income from foreign employment can be used to
purchase land at home, making land ownership and economic power more concen-
trated. Remittances to migrants’ families can create a feeling of relative deprivation
among those of non-migrants, motivating them to migrate as well.
The debate on the determinants of migration has shifted from push versus
pull to income gain versus costs. For instance, Baines (1994) compared the rela-
tive income and the information hypotheses. The relative youth of emigrants has
been considered as evidence in favor of the relative income hypothesis, as lifetime
earnings di↵erentials were higher among younger workers. Both the relative income
and information hypotheses relied on assumptions about the e↵ects of economic
development. The relative income hypothesis assumed that migration fills excess
labor demand in the destination country. The information hypothesis assumed that
improvements in trade and communications facilitated migration. However, their
long-run predictions were di↵erent. The relative income hypothesis argued that em-
igration rates will decline as the income gap decreases. The information hypothesis
argued that emigration may not fall as information decreases the costs and risks
of migration. While di↵erences in income were falling between Europe and desti-
nation countries, they were still high in the face of migration. However, not many
more people migrated from Europe between 1815 and 1930, perhaps due to high
transactions costs. It may be that information was not readily available. On the
other hand, decreasing transportation costs in the late 19th to early 20th century
appears to have eased migration. This is suggested as the reason behind higher
return migration rates among southern and eastern Europeans during this period
than northern and western Europeans in any period. The decrease in transport
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costs may have created a new purpose for migration, of augmenting family income
with remittances.
This has led to the “new economics of labor migration”. The decision to
migrate is made not only by the migrant but also his non-migrant family (Stark
and Bloom, 1985). Migration costs and returns are shared among family members
with an implicit agreement as to their distribution. Returns to migration for the
family include remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985) presents three motivations of
remittances. The first is ‘pure altruism’ where the migrant’s utility is enhanced
not only by his consumption but by that of his family in the home country. The
second is ‘pure self-interest’ where the migrant sends remittance in view of gaining
an inheritance, or to ensure that his business interests or property are cared for,
or to promote his social standing upon his return. The third is ‘tempered altruism
or enlightened self-interest’ where the migration of some members is a household
strategy to spread risk. Remittances are a contractual obligation of the migrant to
the sending household. It includes repayment of the household’s investment on the
migrant’s education.
The ease of migration due to lower transportation costs have allowed workers to
migrate only temporarily without having to bring the entire family and abdicate all
property and interests in the origin country. However, it required migrants to send
remittances to support their family and maintain their interests. Lower transport
costs may well have raised migration, in part due to higher temporary migration
which would have otherwise been impossible.
3.2.6 Temporary Migration
The relationship between migration and remittances creates a distinction between
permanent migration and temporary migration. Microeconomic theories of migra-
tion can encompass both permanent and temporary migration (Budnik, 2011). For
example, temporary migration might be chosen if experience in the destination coun-
try raises earnings and employment prospects at the origin country. Temporary
migration is consistent with the social cost of migrating and the preference for the
home country. Motivations for temporary migration are also consistent with the
‘new economics of labor migration’. Relative deprivation drive individuals to mi-
grate but they return when they have obtained enough wealth. Capital constraint
induces migration but the accumulation of savings allows return to home country
for entrepreneurial activity. Risk sharing motivates migration but insu cient com-
pensation for risk induces return. Remittances are made to a migrant’s family and
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in view of the his return.
While existing theories can subsume temporary migration, various studies in-
dicate that the behavior of temporary migrants di↵er in several respects from those
of permanent migrants (Budnik, 2011). For instance, temporary migrants save more
and remit more of their savings. Their motivation to save also encourages them to
participate more actively and successfully in the host country labor market. On the
other hand, temporary migrants are less likely to invest in human capital specific to
the host country.
Similarly, Dustmann and Gorlach (2015) review the literature on the determi-
nants of return migration and cites preference for consumption in the origin country
and greater purchasing power of destination currency in origin country. Temporary
migration is also seen as a faster way of accumulating human capital while return
migration provides higher returns in origin country to human capital obtained in
the destination country. Return migration is also a means of addressing financial
constraint and provides higher returns to self-employment in the origin country.
3.2.7 Distortions
Migration may not respond to economic growth if immigration is controlled. Wilkin-
son (1970) analyzed European emigration to the United States in 1870-1914 econo-
metrically using the levels of output in the U.S. and the origin country and the
di↵erence in real wages as explanatory variables. Output was used over employment
as the latter was considered to be endogenous. He augmented this basic model with
labor supply variables namely lagged emigration rates, changes in the U.S. labor
force, and U.S. immigration rates. He used autoregressive distributed lag models
on top of the OLS. He found that U.S. output had a positive e↵ect on emigration
from Denmark, Sweden, Russia and Italy, but with a one-year lag for the first two,
and no e↵ect on emigration in Germany and the United Kingdom. However, con-
trolling for labor supply variables, the e↵ect of U.S. output disappeared except for
Sweden. The absence of e↵ect may be due to holding U.S. immigration rates fixed
or to an inelastic labor supply. He concluded that pull factors seem to have little
e↵ect. On the other hand, origin country income had a significant negative e↵ect on
emigration for Denmark, Germany, Russia, Sweden and Italy even when controlling
for labor supply variables. Where data were available, the wage di↵erential had a
significant positive e↵ect on emigration. Lagged emigration rate had a significant,
but surprisingly, negative e↵ect on current emigration rates for Denmark, United
Kingdom and Sweden.
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Migration may also be constrained by minimum wages. Puzzled with the ab-
sence of either a pull or push e↵ect for the UK in Wilkinson (1970), Gallaway and
Vedder (1971) modelled migration from UK to US (in di↵erences) on unemployment
in the UK, economic conditions in the US as a proxy for unemployment, wages in the
UK and US (in di↵erences), emigrations to alternative destinations Australia, South
Africa and Canada, and dummies for cyclical shocks. They found unemployment in
the UK and economic conditions in the US to be significant, wages in the UK to be
weakly significant, and wages in the US not to be significant. The insignificance of
wages may be due to market distortions such as minimum wages. Emigrations to
other destinations were not significant but economic shocks were significant. Con-
sidering only the significant variables in a step-wise regression, they found that US
economic conditions had the strongest influence, followed by UK unemployment,
UK wages and cyclical shocks. They argued that ‘pull’ factors were more impor-
tant, accounting for 40 percent of the variation in emigration from the UK to the
US, but that ‘push’ factors were significant as well.
Migration can decrease with greater labor supply in the origin country if
employment increases. Modeling labor demands in the U.S. and origin countries
(Sweden, United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany) as functions of their respective
wages, output, and labor supplies (native labor force less (plus) net migration in
the origin (destination) country), Williamson (1974) derived a reduced form equa-
tion relating migration on the labor force and outputs in the origin and destination
countries. Interestingly, the reduced form equation did not include wage variables as
including these apparently misspecified the model, especially when lagged popula-
tion growth was included. Wage would be capturing the e↵ect of lagged population
growth on migration. A higher coe cient on U.S. output relative to that of the
origin country meant stronger pull e↵ects. This can be due to relatively lower wage
elasticities in the U.S., higher output elasticities in the U.S. and higher capacity
growth in the U.S.
The theoretical model was modified in the econometric estimation to account
for immigration to the US from other countries and the e↵ect of changes in em-
ployment conditions. The significance and direction of pull factors are consistent
across four countries. Despite low explanatory power and significance, Williamson
found that migration in all four countries was directly related to U.S. output and
negatively related to U.S. labor force, as expected. The direction of push factors is
less consistent. Migration was negatively related to outputs in Denmark and Sweden
and positively related to labor force in these countries, also as expected. However,
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the coe cients for output and labor force in UK and Germany had the wrong signs.
This can be explained by the fact that an increase in origin labor supply holding
income fixed would increase employment, thereby decreasing migration. The under-
lying coe cients confirm a positive e↵ect of U.S. output on U.S. labor demand and
a positive e↵ect of wage di↵erentials on migration. However, contrary to expecta-
tion, labor demand was positively related to wages in the UK and Germany, and
negatively related to output in Germany.
Minimum wages would decrease migration. McKenzie et al. (2014) found that
Filipino migration to various destinations is significantly positively related to desti-
nation incomes. However, migrant wages are not significantly related to destination
incomes. They attribute this to binding minimum wages as the Philippine govern-
ment requires that overseas Filipino workers’ contracts guarantee wages not lower
than the minimum in the Philippines, host country or that set in bilateral agree-
ments or international conventions. This has increased Filipino wages in destinations
but decreased Filipino migration to low wage destinations. For domestic helpers,
migration to destinations with minimum wages decreased by 55 percent compared
to those with no minimum wages. Compared to other occupations, the migration
of domestic helpers decreased by 57 percent.
Restrictive polices reduce the e↵ects of push and pull factors. Mayda (2010)
analyzed migration to 14 OECD countries and found emigration rate rose by 20
percent for every 10 percent increase in (log) GDP per worker in destination coun-
tries. However, the income level in the home country did not a↵ect the emigration
rate. Distance between the destination and origin countries was highly negatively
related with emigration rate. On the other hand, having a common land border, a
common language, and colonial link did not a↵ect emigration rate. The share of the
young in the population positively a↵ected emigration rate. The average education
in the origin country positively a↵ected emigration rate, while that in the desti-
nation country negatively a↵ected emigration rate. The foregoing push and pull
factors were in turn a↵ected by migration policies in destination countries. Less re-
strictive policies reinforced the expected e↵ects of push and pull factors, making the
income level in the home country significant. Moreover, Mayda (2010) found that
a rise in the relative inequality between origin and destination countries increased
emigration. On the other hand, unemployment rates in the destination and origin
countries were insignificant.
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3.2.8 Previous Studies on the Philippines
In the Philippines, Tan (2006) cited poor economic performance, persistent poverty
and high unemployment; Filipinos’ ability to respond to labor market opportunities
and positive migration attitude among the factors a↵ecting emigration. Agbola and
Acupan (2010) analyzed migration for the Philippines for the period 1975-2005 using
an error correction model. They found that the share of emigrants to the population
was negatively related with per capita income, population density, adult literacy, and
political instability in the country. On the other hand, the share of emigrants was
positively related to the unemployment rate. The cost of migration proxied by one-
way airfare, income inequality, and the inflation rate were insignificant. A problem
with their model is its measure of human capital. Adult literacy is a poor measure
of human capital; literacy is achieved with primary education, attained by most of
the population, and does not say much about what it can do. Actual educational
attainment or years of schooling would have been more appropriate. Also, the model
includes push factors in the home country but not pull factors in the destination
countries.
In summary, migration was initially seen as motivated by population growth,
rising and then tapering o↵. The e↵ect of population, however, is conditional on
wage di↵erentials, with migration motivated by economic gain. The emigration rate
is positively related to average income in the destination country, and negatively re-
lated to average income in the home country and migration costs. Most early studies
on migration focused on relative incomes or economic conditions in origin and des-
tination countries, or push and pull factors. Arguments for push factors focus on
poverty in the origin country due to unregulated population growth and unemploy-
ment, with workers moving to other countries with higher wages. An alternative
view argues that economic development drives international migration, as it does
internal migration, with capital substitution for labor, agricultural consolidation,
and decreasing transportation and communication costs.
Arguments for pull factors focused on general economic conditions and employ-
ment opportunities in the United States. However, the dominance of pull factors
were conditional on structural technological changes. Moreover, pull factors were
dominant for some but not all countries, and their significance was sensitive to model
specification. Nevertheless, some authors maintain the significance of pull factors,
even more than push factors.
More recent studies explored the importance of barriers to migration, for in-
stance by looking at how existing migrant stocks facilitate subsequent migration by
3.3. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 121
reducing information costs. The importance of migration costs appears to explain
the migration hump, with emigration rising despite rising origin incomes. Em-
igration from European countries in the 19th-20th century manifested migration
humps although at di↵erent periods. These have been attributed to rising popula-
tion growth, industrialization, and rising emigrant stocks. Emigrations from Asia
and other regions were much less during this period due to policy barriers and
poverty constraint. Mass migrations happened only after 1965, with the Middle
East and North Africa, East Asia and South Asia having passed their migration
humps. Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa is still rising.
Previous studies generally find migration rising with incomes in developed
destination countries and decreasing related to migration costs proxied by distance.
Origin country incomes can be significant but sometimes only when controlling for
policy restrictions. A previous study in the Philippines finds a negative e↵ect of
domestic income on emigration. However, migration costs proxied by airfare is in-
significant. There is limited evidence on the determinants of Filipino migration to
particular destinations such as the U.S. This study determines factors in the Philip-
pines and the U.S. a↵ecting Filipino migration to the U.S. It focuses on e↵ects of the
rising economic growth in the Philippines, the education and skills of Filipino mi-
grants, the minimum wage policy of the Philippine government for overseas Filipino
workers.
3.3 Model and Methodology
3.3.1 Model
Our model begins with an emigration equation similar to Borjas (1987):
Mt = µ0 + µ1W1t + µ2W0t + µ3Kt + "t (3.1)
where the emigration rate, M , depends positively on the average wage in the des-
tination country, W1 (µ1 > 0), and negatively on the average wage in the origin
country, W0 (µ2 < 0), and the cost of migration, K (µ3 < 0). A larger wage di↵er-
ential will motivate greater migration to the higher-wage country. In other words,
migration increases with greater destination income holding origin income fixed, or
with lower origin income controlling for destination income. Thus, even with equi-
librium in the labor market in the origin country, the wage di↵erential motivates
migration but constraints render the status quo. Migration also depends on the cost
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of migration and related factors / proxies such as the previous stock of migrants or
remittances. The previous stock of migrants would reduce information costs while
remittances would cover transportation and settlement costs.
Since the decision to migrate depends not only on the wage di↵erential but
also on the probability of getting a job (Todaro, 1969; Harris and Todaro, 1970), the
model can be modified by including employment rates in the origin and destination
countries:
Mt = µ0 + µ1E1t + µ2W1t + µ3E0t + µ4W0t + µ3Kt + "t (3.2)
Emigration would be positively related to employment in the destination (µ1 > 0)
and negatively related to employment at home (µ3 < 0). However, wages and
employment are endogenously determined in the respective labor markets in both
countries.
Ls0t = ↵0 + ↵1W0t + ↵2LF0t + "2t (3.3)
Ld0t =  0 +  1W0t +  2Y0t + "3t (3.4)
Ls1t =  0 +  1W1t +  2LF1t + "4t (3.5)
Ld1t =  0 +  1W1t +  2Y1t + "5t (3.6)
where Ls and Ld are labor supply and demand, respectively, and the subscripts
0 and 1 refer to the origin and destination countries, respectively. Labor supply
depends on wages, W , and the size of the labor force, LF . The higher the wages,
the more people are willing to work (↵1 > 0,  1 > 0). The larger the labor force,
the bigger the labor supply (↵2 > 0,  2 > 0). The demand for labor depends on the
wage rate and on the economy’s output, Y . The higher the wage, the less workers
firms are willing to employ ( 1 < 0,  1 < 0). The higher the output, the greater the
demand for labor ( 2 > 0,  2 > 0).
These yield the reduced form equations:
L0t = ⇡10 + ⇡11LF0t + ⇡12Y0t +  1t (3.7)
W0t = ⇡20 + ⇡21LF0t + ⇡22Y0t +  2t (3.8)
L1t = ⇡30 + ⇡31LF1t + ⇡32Y1t +  3t (3.9)
W1t = ⇡40 + ⇡41LF1t + ⇡42Y1t +  4t (3.10)
where wages and employment in the origin destination countries depend on their
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respective labor force and output.7 High population growth and a large labor supply
relative to demand will keep wages low (⇡21 < 0) (Malthus, 1798; Lewis, 1954).
The endogeneity of wages and employment may lead to biased estimates in
equations 3.1 and 3.2. To address this problem, migration can be related ultimately
to the output and labor force underlying labor demand and supply, respectively, in
these countries as in Williamson (1974). Substituting the wage equations into 3.1
yields:
Mt = ⇡50 + ⇡51LF0t + ⇡52Y0t + ⇡53LF1t + ⇡54Y1t + µ3Kt +  5t8 (3.11)
Based on the literature, there are two competing hypotheses on the e↵ect of income
on migration. Correspondingly, does poverty in the Philippines drive migration
(⇡52 < 0) (Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970) or does economic growth facilitate
migration (⇡52 > 0) (Massey, 1988)? Is economic growth reducing transportation
and communication costs, thereby promoting migration? How are the economic
cycles of the Philippines and destination countries related? To what extent does the
Philippines’ economic links with destination countries drive migration? To what
extent does migration depend on economic conditions in destination countries? To
what extent does the previous migrant stock a↵ect current migration? How do
destination migration policies a↵ect migration? Do remittances promote inequality
that motivate more migration or do they prevent more workers from having to work
abroad?
Given the origin labor demand and supply, a higher destination wage would
raise the quantity of labor supplied relative to the quantity of labor demanded. The
resulting excess labor (unemployment) at corresponding destination wages would be
the supply of migrants from the origin country. The supply of migrants is positively
related to the destination wage, positively related to the origin labor supply, and
negatively related to the origin labor demand.
M s0t =  0 +  1W1t +  2LF0t +  3Y0t + "2t (3.12)
Rigidities or distortions in the labor market also a↵ect migration. A higher than
equilibrium origin wage creates domestic unemployment and a supply of migrants.
Changes in labor demand and supply conditions in the origin country would shift
7where ⇡11 =  (↵2 1)/(↵1    1),⇡12 = ↵1 2/(↵1    1),⇡21 =  ↵2/(↵1    1),⇡22 =  2/(↵1  
 1),⇡31 =   21/( 1    1),⇡32 =  1 2/( 1    1),⇡41 =   2/( 1    1), and ⇡42 =  2/( 1    1).
8where ⇡51 =  (↵2µ2)/(↵1    1),⇡52 = ( 2µ2)/(↵1    1),⇡53 =  ( 2µ1)/( 1    1), and ⇡54 =
( 2µ1)/( 1    1).
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the supply of migrants. These include changes in output and in the labor force. The
supply of migrants also depends on migration costs and related factors such as the
stock of migrants and remittances. Migrant stock and remittances decrease migra-
tion costs, e↵ectively raising domestic wages. Given the destination labor demand
and supply, the lower wage in the origin raises the quantity of labor demanded rela-
tive to the quantity of labor supplied. The resulting excess demand at corresponding
origin wages is the demand for migrants in the destination country. The demand for
migrants is negatively related to the origin wage, positively related to the destina-
tion country labor demand, and negatively related to the destination country labor
supply.
Md1t =  0 +  1W0t +  2LF1t +  3Y1t + "2t (3.13)
Under free market conditions, the level of migration from origin to destination is the
equilibrium level where the quantity of migrants supplied is equal to the quantity of
migrants demanded. It depends on the origin and destination wages, labor supply
and demand.
M et = µ0 + µ1W1t + µ2W0t + µ3LF0t + µ4Y0t + µ5LF1t + µ6Y1t + µ7Kt +  5t (3.14)
Migration may not be in equilibrium if there are market distortions. The quantity
demanded of migrants may be subject to barriers such as quotas and qualification
restrictions.
3.3.2 Methodology
With the objective of analyzing the behavior of migration over time, macroeconomic
time series analysis is used. Time series analysis di↵ers from cross-section analysis
in several ways. Firstly, independent variables may be endogenous, that is, they
may be correlated with the error term. Secondly, the variance may not be constant
over time. Thirdly, error terms may be correlated over time. Modeling time series
data depends on the stationarity of the data, that is, whether a process has the same
unconditional mean, variance and covariances across time. There are various time
series models. Independent variables may have a lagged e↵ect on the dependent
variable. Previous values of the dependent variable may also have an e↵ect on its
current value. The dependent variable may also depend on lagged values of the error
term.
In modeling the variables, the Box-Jenkins methodology is used. First, each
variable is plotted to determine whether it has an intercept, a deterministic trend
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and a stochastic trend. It is then checked for stochastic trend (unit root) using the
Dickey-Fuller test. Non-stationary series are di↵erenced (integrated) to make them
stationary. Second, the inclusion of auto-regressive and moving average terms is
determined using the auto-correlation and partial auto-correlation coe cients and
the models that exhibit no auto-correlation are identified. Third, the best model
with minimum information criteria (Schwarz information criterion) is chosen. For
the multi-variate regressions, Auto-regressive Distributed Lag (ADL) models are
used starting with one lag for all variables. Insignificant variables are then dropped
in a step-wise manner to achieve adequate (i.e. has no autocorrelation) parsimonious
models. In some instances, some insignificant variables of interest are retained. The
ADL models are supplemented with Vector Auto-Regressive models relating all the
variables. Finally, Granger Causality Test is used to determine which variables help
predict permanent and temporary migration.
3.4 Data and Descriptives
The emigration data are from the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. The data
pertain to registered emigrants for the period 1981-2012. The series is a trend
stationary auto-regressive, AR(1), process with a growth trend of 1.9 percent per
year, and growing at 74 percent its lag value (see Figure 3.3):
lnEmigrationt = 10.66 + 0.019 ⇤ T + 0.74 ⇤ lnEmigrationt 1
This confirms the process of cumulative causation whereby current migrants facili-
tate further migration as they help reduce the costs of migration.
Temporary migration data are from the Philippine Overseas Employment Ad-
ministration. The data pertain to the deployment of overseas Filipino workers from
1980-2012. The series is a trend stationary auto-regressive, AR(1), process, growing
at 5.2 percent per year (faster than permanent migration), and by 66 percent of its
lag value (see Figure 3.4):
lnOFWDeploymentt = 12.63 + 0.052 ⇤ T + 0.66 ⇤ lnOFWDeploymentt 1
Domestic wage data are from the Bureau of Labor and Employment Statistics.
The data represent to the Index of Compensation per Employee in Non-Agricultural
Industries from 1980-2011. The series is a moving average process whose current
value depends on its previous error term (see Figure 3.5). This makes wages unpre-
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Figure 3.3: Logarithm of Registered Emigration, 1982–2012
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dictable. In fact, as the results will show, wages do not conform to labor demand
and supply:
Wage = 111.59 + 0.99"t 1
For permanent migration, I use US wage for destination wage as the United
States is the primary destination for permanent migrants. Data on US wages are
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data pertain to the Employment Cost
Index for 1981-2012. The series is a di↵erence stationary moving average process of
order one, MA(1) (see Figure 3.6):
D(USWage) = 2.55 + 0.95"t 1
For temporary migration, I use Saudi wage for destination wage as Saudi
Arabia is the primary destination for temporary migrants. As there are no available
wage (index) data for Saudi Arabia, the Consumer Price Index for Saudi Arabia
from the IMF International Financial Statistics is used. The consumer price index
measures the cost of consumption goods and services in a given year relative to a
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Figure 3.4: Logarithm of OFW Deployment, 1985–2012
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base year. Wages are assumed to follow the cost of living closely. This implies that
wages are constant in real terms. Several macroeconomic theories indicate a positive
relationship between wages and prices (see e.g. Mankiw (2003)). Classical theory
states that nominal wages are directly proportional to prices and labor productivity.
Business cycle theory posits that aggregate supply shocks directly a↵ect prices. For
example, as labor unions push for higher wages, unemployment and output decrease;
as output decreases along the aggregate demand curve, the price level increases by
exactly the shift in the aggregate supply. Therefore, the cost of labor is expected
to move with the cost of living. This relationship has been empirically proven
as early as Mehra (1977) who found that nominal wages and consumer prices are
simultaneously determined and as recent as Josheski and Bardarova (2013) who
found that CPI and average real wages are cointegrated. The CPI series is a trend
stationary second order auto-regressive process, AR(2) (see Figure 3.7):
SACPIt = 84.21 + 0.927T + 1.569SACPIt 1   0.791SACPIt 2
An alternative to the consumer price index, oil prices is used as an instrument
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Figure 3.5: Philippine Wage Index, 1980–2011
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of Saudi Arabia’s demand for foreign labor. I use WTI crude oil spot price from the
U.S. Department of Energy. The oil price series is a di↵erence stationary process
growing at 3.9 percent annually, (see Figure 3.8):
D(LNOilPrice) = 0.98 + 0.039T   0.496LNOilPricet 1
Data on personal remittances received (current US dollars) are from the World
Bank World Development Indicators. The series in a trend stationary first-order
auto-regressive process, AR(1), growing at 12.5 percent per year and by 64 percent
of its previous value (see Figure 3.9):
lnRemitt = 20.12 + 0.125T + 0.64lnRemitt 1
Domestic employment data are from the Bureau of Labor and Employment
Statistics. The data pertain to the annual average number of employed persons
15 years old and over for 1980-2011. The log series is a trend stationary first-order
auto-regressive process, AR(1), growing at an average of 2.4 percent per year (slower
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Figure 3.6: Logarithm of US Wage Index, Trend and Cycle
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than the growth of the labor force; this partly explains migration) and by 36 percent
of its lag value (see Figure 3.10:
lnEmployedt = 16.68 + 0.024T + 0.36lnEmployedt 1
US employment data are from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The log
series is a trend stationary second-order auto-regressive process, AR(2), growing at
0.12 percent per year (see Figure 3.11):
lnUSEmpt = 18.75 + 0.0012T + 1.73lnUSEmpt 1   0.81lnUSEmpt 2
Saudi Employment data are from the Penn World Table 8.0, defined as number
of persons engaged (in millions). The log series is a trend stationary auto-regressive
process of order two, AR(2), growing at 3.8 percent per year (see Figure 3.12 (faster
than the labor force growth; this partly explains temporary immigration):
lnSAEmpt = 1.12 + 0.038T + 1.75lnSAEmpt 1   0.86lnSAEmpt 2
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Figure 3.7: Logarithm of Saudi CPI
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Data on GDP per capita in PPP (constant 2005 international dollars) are
from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The log series is a di↵erence
stationary first-order moving average process, MA(1) (see Figure 3.13), growing at
less than 0.1 percent per year:
D(lnGDPpct) = 0.00098T + 0.58"t 1
Data on US GDP per capita (constant 2005 international dollars) are from the
World Bank World Development Indicators. The log series is a trend stationary first-
order auto-regressive moving average process, ARMA(1,1), growing at an average
of 1.5 percent per year (see Figure 3.14) (faster than the growth of Philippine GDP
per capita):
lnUSGDPpct = 10.35 + 0.015T + 0.82lnUSGDPpct 1 + 0.49"t 1
Saudi GDP per capita data are from the Penn World Table 8.0. GDP per
capita is derived by dividing expenditure-side real GDP at chained PPPs (in mil.
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Figure 3.8: Logarithm of World Crude Oil Price
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2005US$) by population (in millions). The log series is a trend stationary first-order
auto-regressive process, AR(1), with a growth trend of 4.8 percent per year, and
growing by 84 percent of its previous value (see Figure 3.15):
lnSAGDPpct = 8.6 + 0.048T + 0.84lnSAGDPpct 1
The robust growth reflects growing demand for Overseas Filipino Workers.
Philippine labor force data are from the Bureau of Labor and Employment
Statistics. The labor force is defined as the population 15 years and over who are
either employed or unemployed.9 It excludes those not looking for work. The log
series is di↵erence stationary, growing at an average of 2.6 percent annually (see
Figure 3.16):
D(lnLabor) = 0.026
US labor force data are from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The log
series is di↵erence stationary first-order auto-regressive process, AR(1), growing at
9Source: National Statistics O ce
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Figure 3.9: Logarithm of Remittances, Trend and Cycle
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1.8 percent annually (see Figure 3.17):
D(lnUSLFt) = 0.018  0.0004T + 0.18D(lnUSLFt 1)
Saudi labor force data are from theWorld BankWorld Development Indicators.
The labor force is derived by adding the proportions of the population ages 15-64
and 65 and above and multiplying to the total population. The log series is a trend
stationary auto-regressive moving average process of orders 5 and 2, ARMA(5,2),
growing at an average of 3.6 percent annually (see Figure 3.18:
lnSALFt = 15.65 + 0.036T + 2.21lnSALFt 1   1.0lnSALFt 2   1.54lnSALFt 3
+ 1.99lnSALFt 4   0.71lnSALFt 5 + 1.84"t 1 + 0.85"t 2
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Figure 3.10: Logarithm of Employment
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Figure 3.11: Logarithm of US Employment, Trend and Cycle
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Figure 3.12: LN Saudi Employment
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Figure 3.13: Logarithm of GDP per capita, Trend and Cycle
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Figure 3.14: Logarithm of US GDP per capita, Trend and Cycle
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Figure 3.15: Logarithm of Saudi GDP per capita, Trend and Cycle
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Figure 3.16: Logarithm of Labor Force, Trend and Cycle
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Figure 3.17: Logarithm of US Labor Force, Trend and Cycle
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Figure 3.18: Logarithm of Saudi Labor Force, Trend and Cycle
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3.5 Regression Analysis
3.5.1 Permanent migration
Philippine labor market
Figure 3.19 graphs Philippine employment against wages. This is indicative of the
long term movement of equilibrium employment and wages and the relative move-
ments of labor demand and supply. The graph shows increasing wages and employ-
ment in 1980-1983. This is consistent with generally increasing income and labor
force in this period (Figure 3.20). While employment increased with the labor force
in 1984, wages decreased with income. However, wages and employment rose in 1985
as the labor force increased despite decreasing income. In 1986-1990, both wages
and employment increased with increasing income and labor force. In 1991-1994,
wages generally decreased as income decreased or fell below trend while employment
increased with the labor force. Wages and employment were on trend for a couple
of years as were income and labor force. In 1997, employment and wages declined as
the labor force fell, despite rising income. Subsequent wages were declining / below
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trend as income and labor fell below trend. Wages rose as income rose in 2003-2004,
but fell as labor force fell in 2005-2006. In 2007-2011, wages generally rose as in-
come rose, with employment rising with the labor force. Overall, there is a cubic
relationship between wages and employment, with wages rising with employment in
the 1980s, declining in the 1990s to early 2000s, and then climbing back from the
mid-2000s. On the other hand, there is a long term quadratic relationship between
income and labor force, with income declining as the labor force grew in the 1980s,
and rising with the labor force in the 1990s and 2000s.
Figure 3.19: Philippine Employment by Wage
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Philippine Wages
Table 3.7 shows the reduced form regression of wages on income and labor force
also in ADL form. Wages are positively related to income but not related to labor
force. As income increases by 1 percent, wages increase by 1.14 percent. Wages
are not significantly related to labor force. Wages are self-reinforcing: wages rise by
49 percent of its previous value. Accounting for structural break (Table 3.8) shows
that wages decrease by 0.4 percent as the labor force increases by 1 percent.
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Figure 3.20: Philippine income by labor force
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Table 3.9 shows the reduced form regression of employment on income and labor
force in Auto-regressive Distributed Lag (ADL) form (insignificant lags are dropped).
Employment is positively related to income and labor force. However, employment
is inelastic to both income and labor force. As the labor force increases by 1 percent,
employment increases by only 0.8 percent. The elasticity to income is even smaller.
As income increases by 1 percent, employment increases by only 0.08 percent.
Philippine migrant supply
Figure 3.21 shows the long-run supply of Filipino migrants for 1980-2011. It relates
local unemployment to destination wages and shows that Philippine unemployment
is positively related to US wages. A simple regression shows that as US wages
increase by 1 percent, the quantity of migrants supplied increases by 0.9 percent.
Controlling for Philippine wages, income and labor force, the elasticity of migrant
supply to US wages increases to 14.1. The supply of migrants is also positively
related to Philippine wages, contrary to expectation. As Philippine wages increase
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Table 3.7: Philippine Wage on Income and Labor
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LWAGE(-1) 0.487397 0.113721 4.285907 0.0002
LGDPPC 1.142604 0.265881 4.29743 0.0002
LGDPPC(-1) -1.2589 0.266348 -4.7265 0.0001
LLBR -0.04227 0.050723 -0.83334 0.4122
Constant 4.050152 0.895934 4.520591 0.0001
R-squared 0.689154 Mean dependent var 4.707597
Adjusted R-squared 0.641332 S.D. dependent var 0.073013
S.E. of regression 0.043727 Akaike info criterion -3.27503
Sum squared resid 0.049712 Schwarz criterion -3.04374
Log likelihood 55.76294 Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.19963
F-statistic 14.4107 Durbin-Watson stat 1.717231
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003
by 1 percent, the supply of migrants increases by 0.5 percent. Controlling for in-
come and labor force, an increase in wages increases excess supply of labor and the
motivation to migrate for employment abroad. The supply of migrants is negatively
related to Philippine income and positively related to Philippine labor force, as ex-
pected. Migrant supply is also elastic to the local labor force and income. As the
local labor force increases by 1 percent, migrant supply increases by 5.5 percent.
Migrant supply increases by 2.4 percent as GDP per capita decreases by 1 percent.
US labor market
Figure 3.22 plots US income against US labor force. The graph shows a long term
positive relationship between US income and US labor force. The US labor force
continuously rose except in 2009-2010. US income also generally increased but there
are notable declines in 1982, 1991, and 2008-2009. Income grew faster than the labor
force, growing at 1.5 percent for every percentage growth in the labor force. This
led to the increase in US demand for migrants. Figure 3.23 plots US wages against
US employment. The graphs shows a long term positive relationship between US
wages and US employment. US wages increased with income but also with the labor
force (Table 3.11). However, wages were inelastic to income. As income increased
by 1 percent, wages increased by 0.08 percent, controlling for the labor force. On
the other hand, wages increased by 0.47 percent as the labor force increased by
1 percent, holding income fixed. Employment increased with the increase in the
labor force but fell with the rise in income (Table 3.12). As labor force increased
by 1 percent, employment rose by 0.06 percent, controlling for income. Conversely,
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Table 3.8: Philippine Wages on Income and Labor (with structural break)
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
1981 - 1984 – 4 obs
LLBR -0.37881 0.073707 -5.13941 0
1985 - 2011 – 27 obs
LLBR -0.3675 0.071821 -5.11689 0
Non-Breaking Variables
LWAGE(-1) 0.483295 0.080207 6.025568 0
LGDPPC 1.312046 0.190303 6.894508 0
LGDPPC(-1) -0.99361 0.194594 -5.10607 0
Constant 6.235681 0.757897 8.22761 0
R-squared 0.851332 Mean dependent var 4.707597
Adjusted R-squared 0.821598 S.D. dependent var 0.073013
S.E. of regression 0.030839 Akaike info criterion -3.94809
Sum squared resid 0.023776 Schwarz criterion -3.67055
Log likelihood 67.19545 Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.85762
F-statistic 28.63199 Durbin-Watson stat 2.296581
Prob(F-statistic) 0
employment was negatively related to income. Employment rose (fell) by 0.007
percent as income fell (rose) by 1 percent. With wages rising against a growing
labor force, employment rose disproportionately lower than the labor force and fell
despite rising income.
US migrant demand
Figure 3.24 relates US migrant demand to Philippine wages for 1980-1999. It shows
a negative relationship between quantity demanded and wages. However, a simple
regression shows that the negative relationship is not significant. Controlling for US
wages, income and labor force (Table 3.13), the relationship remains insignificant.
This may be due to the fact that there are many other sources of US immigrants.
The Philippines does not have a monopoly of migrants to the US. On the other
hand, US migrant demand is negatively related to the US labor force, as expected.
As the US labor force decreases by 1 percent, migrant demand increases by 12.8
percent. However, migrant demand is not related to US income. The coe cient of
US GDP per capita is insignificant. This is due to the inelasticity of US wages to
income and the negative relationship between employment and income.
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Table 3.9: Philippine Employment on Income and Labor
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LEMP(-1) 0.556239 0.131181 4.240257 0.0002
LGDPPC 0.077019 0.027123 2.839578 0.0085
LLBR 0.77696 0.092722 8.379443 0
LLBR(-1) -0.37083 0.138698 -2.67366 0.0126
R-squared 0.998319 Mean dependent var 17.06706
Adjusted R-squared 0.998132 S.D. dependent var 0.220285
S.E. of regression 0.00952 Akaike info criterion -6.35084
Sum squared resid 0.002447 Schwarz criterion -6.16581
Log likelihood 102.4381 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.29053
Durbin-Watson stat 2.284033
Table 3.10: Migration Suppy (Unemployment)
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LUNEMP(-1) -0.29616 0.157389 -1.88172 0.0726
USLWAGE 14.122 2.866801 4.926047 0.0001
USLWAGE(-1) -15.5907 2.873106 -5.42644 0
LWAGE 0.525495 0.207616 2.531084 0.0187
LGDPPC -2.41234 0.345323 -6.98574 0
LLBR 5.472535 0.973774 5.61992 0
Constant -61.4968 13.33632 -4.61123 0.0001
R-squared 0.962588 Mean dependent var 7.816542
Adjusted R-squared 0.952828 S.D. dependent var 0.33816
S.E. of regression 0.073445 Akaike info criterion -2.18359
Sum squared resid 0.124067 Schwarz criterion -1.85665
Log likelihood 39.75386 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.079
F-statistic 98.62893 Durbin-Watson stat 2.185027
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Emigration
Emigration is positively related to the Philippine labor force, lagged US income
and lagged emigration, and negatively related to contemporaneous US income and
lagged US labor force (Table 3.14). As the local labor force increases by 1 percent,
emigration increases by 3 percent. As the previous US income increases by 1 percent,
emigration increases by 4.4 percent. Emigration also increases by 77 percent of its
previous level. As concurrent US income increases by 1 percent, emigration decreases
by 3.5 percent. Emigration decreases by 17 percent as lagged US labor force increases
by 1 percent.
However, emigration is not significantly related to Philippine income and con-
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Figure 3.21: Philippine Migrant Supply
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current US labor force. Accounting for structural break (Table 3.15) shows that
emigration is positively related to Philippine income, contrary to expectation. As
GDP per capita increased by 1 percent, emigration increased by over 0.4 percent.
This may be due to the fact that wages were highly elastic to changes in income,
especially in 1986-1995 when wages rose by 1.7 percent for every percentage increase
in income. In 1986-1990, wages rose faster than income with a populist government
taking over from an authoritarian regime. The rising wages were partly undone in
1991-1994 with wages falling faster than income, as a neo-liberal government took
over. The disproportionate changes in wages meant that employment could not
grow proportionately to income. Controlling for changes in the labor force, em-
ployment only grew by 0.07 percent as income grew by 1 percent. Consequently,
unemployment increased with the increase in wages. As wages rose by 1 percent,
unemployment increased by 0.53 percent.
Controlling for wages (Table 3.16), income remains insignificant and labor
force becomes insignificant as well. On the other hand, domestic wages positively
a↵ects migration. As domestic wages increase by 1 percent, emigration increases by
0.7 percent. Controlling for income and labor force, the increase in wages increases
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Figure 3.22: US Income by Labor Force
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unemployment and therefore the supply of migration. As migration supply increases,
controlling for migration demand, emigration increases. Controlling for US wages
raises the positive e↵ect of lagged US income and the negative e↵ect of lagged US
labor force. Emigration is positively related and highly elastic to US wages. As US
wages increase by 1 percent, emigration increases by 5.6 percent. Controlling for US
income and labor force, an increase in US wages decreases employment (quantity
demanded of labor). To produce the optimal output and reach optimal employment,
migrants are demanded to fill the decrease in domestic employment.
Accounting for remittances, emigration is negatively related to lagged income
as expected. However, emigration is positively related to concurrent income. While
this may be contrary to expectation, it would be reasonable if the direction of the
positive relationship is from emigration to income as emigration may increase in-
come apart from through remittances. On the other hand, emigration is negatively
related to remittances. The negative relationship between emigration and remit-
tances can be explained in several ways. Firstly, at the macro-level, remittances
complements national income in promoting investment and creating employment.
As employment increases, emigration decreases. Secondly, at the micro-level, as
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Figure 3.23: US Employment by Wage
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economic gain is the primary motivation for migration, since remittances provide
economic gai, migration becomes unnecessary. Finally, as emigration becomes more
di cult as destinations impose stringent requirements, dependents of migrants just
have to rely to remittances rather than migrate themselves.
A VAR of emigration on wages and remittances (Table 3.18) shows that em-
igration depends on its previous value. This confirms the process of ‘cumulative
causation’. On the other hand, emigration does not respond to the lagged values of
Philippine and US wages. Emigration is negatively related to remittances. Includ-
ing employment (column 6) shows that emigration is positively related to domestic
employment in the previous period but negatively related to employment 2 periods
before. This may indicate that emigration actually responds to unemployment as
far back as two years before and proceeds despite improvements in domestic employ-
ment. A VAR of emigration, income, remittances and labor (Table 3.19) shows that
the lagged values of Philippine and US incomes and remittances are insignificant to
emigration. Including employment [column 6] shows that emigration is positively
related to Philippine income lagged two years, negatively related to remittances
lagged two years, and positively related to the labor force lagged one year.
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Table 3.11: US Wages
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
USLWAGE(-1) 0.661321 0.070323 9.404079 0
USLGDPPC 0.07956 0.036976 2.151648 0.0413
LUSLF(-1) 0.479691 0.173625 2.762796 0.0106
YEAR 0.003897 0.001426 2.732125 0.0114
Constant -12.8044 3.274652 -3.91014 0.0006
R-squared 0.999775 Mean dependent var 4.293915
Adjusted R-squared 0.999739 S.D. dependent var 0.311946
S.E. of regression 0.005038 Akaike info criterion -7.59266
Sum squared resid 0.000635 Schwarz criterion -7.35912
Log likelihood 118.8898 Hannan-Quinn criter. -7.51795
F-statistic 27791.06 Durbin-Watson stat 0.798579
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Table 3.12: US Employment
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
USLEMP(-1) 1.019524 0.002929 348.0564 0
USLGDPPC -0.00786 0.00291 -2.70265 0.012
USLGDPPC(-1) -0.006 0.003312 -1.81245 0.0815
LUSLF 0.057243 0.007957 7.193977 0
YEAR -0.00045 5.41E-05 -8.28689 0
R-squared 0.999488 Mean dependent var 18.7669
Adjusted R-squared 0.999409 S.D. dependent var 0.011062
S.E. of regression 0.000269 Akaike info criterion -13.4578
Sum squared resid 1.88E-06 Schwarz criterion -13.2266
Log likelihood 213.5965 Hannan-Quinn criter. -13.3825
Durbin-Watson stat 1.287197
A full VAR of emigration, wages, employment, remittances, income and labor
(Table 3.20) shows that emigration is positively related to lagged domestic wages,
controlling for domestic income. This confirms that wages are growing faster than
the economy. Emigration is also positively related to US wages lagged one period
but negatively related to US wages lagged two periods, controlling for US income.
Emigration continues to be positively related to domestic employment, controlling
for labor force. Emigration is negatively related to GDP per capita lagged one
period. While wages may be increasing, the decline in the overall quality of life is
motivating people to migrate. However, emigration is positively related to GDP per
capita lagged two periods (significant at 10 percent). Controlling for employment,
emigration is negatively related to the labor force. Emigration grows despite a
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Figure 3.24: US Demand for Migrants
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decline in the labor supply. Emigration is also negatively related to the US labor
force. Emigration rises when the US labor supply is low relative to demand. A
Granger causality test (Table 3.21) shows that domestic and US wages, remittances,
domestic employment, Philippine and US incomes, and the US labor force help
predict emigration.
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Table 3.13: US Migration Demand
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
USMIGDEM(-1) 1.391163 0.061759 22.52555 0
LWAGE -0.13677 0.142375 -0.96061 0.3557
USLWAGE -0.63044 0.889748 -0.70856 0.4921
USLGDPPC 0.190784 0.481098 0.396559 0.6987
LUSLF -11.9299 2.963213 -4.02599 0.0017
LUSLF(-1) 15.10326 2.921934 5.168928 0.0002
Constant -39.6958 30.73756 -1.29144 0.2209
R-squared 0.998913 Mean dependent var 9.490173
Adjusted R-squared 0.998369 S.D. dependent var 0.690689
S.E. of regression 0.027895 Akaike info criterion -4.04339
Sum squared resid 0.009338 Schwarz criterion -3.69544
Log likelihood 45.41224 Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.98451
F-statistic 1837.153 Durbin-Watson stat 3.082247
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Table 3.14: Emigration on exogenous variables
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LEMIG(-1) 0.769613 0.157961 4.872163 0.0001
LGDPPC 0.160335 0.274681 0.583712 0.5654
LLBR 2.97783 1.439365 2.068849 0.0505
USLGDPPC -3.46658 1.771488 -1.95688 0.0632
USLGDPPC(-1) 4.402553 1.706333 2.580125 0.0171
LUSLF 10.17973 7.993905 1.273436 0.2162
LUSLF(-1) -17.0532 8.189954 -2.08221 0.0492
Constant 21.2515 17.96674 1.182825 0.2495
R-squared 0.802729 Mean dependent var 10.98343
Adjusted R-squared 0.739962 S.D. dependent var 0.218331
S.E. of regression 0.111336 Akaike info criterion -1.32936
Sum squared resid 0.272703 Schwarz criterion -0.95571
Log likelihood 27.94036 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.20982
F-statistic 12.78886 Durbin-Watson stat 1.913666
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002
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Table 3.15: Emigration (with structural break)
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
1982 - 1994 – 13 obs
LGDPPC 0.441055 0.23049 1.913554 0.0688
1995 - 2011 – 17 obs
LGDPPC 0.403002 0.227106 1.774515 0.0898
Non-Breaking Variables
LEMIG(-1) 0.477743 0.129386 3.692381 0.0013
LLBR 3.433068 1.020219 3.365032 0.0028
USLGDPPC -3.8955 1.345451 -2.89531 0.0084
USLGDPPC(-1) 3.745965 1.037478 3.610644 0.0016
LUSLF 15.51494 5.676856 2.733017 0.0121
LUSLF(-1) -20.1828 6.530712 -3.09044 0.0053
R-squared 0.87669 Mean dependent var 10.98343
Adjusted R-squared 0.837455 S.D. dependent var 0.218331
S.E. of regression 0.088024 Akaike info criterion -1.79923
Sum squared resid 0.170462 Schwarz criterion -1.42558
Log likelihood 34.98843 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.67969
Durbin-Watson stat 2.422218
Table 3.16: Emigration (with wages)
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LEMIG(-1) 0.47026 0.188973 2.48851 0.0218
USLWAGE 5.641766 2.353467 2.397214 0.0264
LGDPPC -0.12618 0.297703 -0.42384 0.6762
LLBR 1.507978 1.454719 1.036611 0.3123
LWAGE 0.715814 0.359939 1.988711 0.0606
USLGDPPC -4.3388 1.671818 -2.59526 0.0173
USLGDPPC(-1) 5.334659 1.68828 3.159818 0.0049
LUSLF 5.797129 7.576891 0.765107 0.4531
LUSLF(-1) -25.4093 8.244048 -3.08214 0.0059
Constant 174.1399 66.98404 2.599722 0.0171
R-squared 0.850371 Mean dependent var 10.98343
Adjusted R-squared 0.783038 S.D. dependent var 0.218331
S.E. of regression 0.101697 Akaike info criterion -1.47244
Sum squared resid 0.206845 Schwarz criterion -1.00538
Log likelihood 32.08661 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.32302
F-statistic 12.62932 Durbin-Watson stat 2.354296
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002
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Table 3.17: Emigration with remittances
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LEMIG(-1) 0.293965 0.149568 1.965429 0.0627
USLWAGE 7.39139 1.704472 4.336468 0.0003
LGDPPC 2.362028 0.669461 3.528254 0.002
LGDPPC(-1) -2.49175 0.643097 -3.87462 0.0009
USLGDPPC -4.99432 1.200142 -4.16144 0.0004
USLGDPPC(-1) 4.745853 1.311686 3.618133 0.0016
LUSLF(-1) -17.3752 4.99277 -3.48007 0.0022
LREMIT -0.27111 0.091492 -2.96326 0.0074
Constant 190.7113 50.29006 3.792227 0.0011
R-squared 0.894133 Mean dependent var 10.98343
Adjusted R-squared 0.853803 S.D. dependent var 0.218331
S.E. of regression 0.08348 Akaike info criterion -1.88509
Sum squared resid 0.146348 Schwarz criterion -1.46473
Log likelihood 37.27631 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.75061
F-statistic 22.17036 Durbin-Watson stat 2.42549
Prob(F-statistic) 0
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Table 3.18: VAR: Emigration, Wages, Remittances and Employment
(1) (2)
lnEmig Wage US Wage lnRemit lnEmig Wage US Wage lnRemit lnEmp
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
L.lnEmig 0.425*** 0.746 0.938* 0.518* 0.426*** -0.283 0.929* 0.491** -0.011
(0.159) (9.617) (0.528) (0.286) (0.136) (8.269) (0.527) (0.250) (0.028)
L2.lnEmig -0.082 -7.865 -2.229*** -0.515** -0.062 -2.670 -2.183*** -0.344 0.009
(0.145) (8.759) (0.481) (0.260) (0.128) (7.768) (0.495) (0.235) (0.026)
L.Wage 0.000 0.668*** 0.023** -0.002 -0.000 0.623*** 0.023** -0.004 0.000
(0.003) (0.172) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.149) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001)
L2.Wage 0.003 -0.126 0.001 0.007 0.003 -0.236 -0.000 0.003 -0.000
(0.003) (0.169) (0.009) (0.005) (0.002) (0.150) (0.010) (0.005) (0.001)
L.US Wage -0.007 -1.610 1.497*** -0.024 0.005 -0.593 1.506*** 0.019 0.004
(0.032) (1.927) (0.106) (0.057) (0.028) (1.725) (0.110) (0.052) (0.006)
L2.US Wage 0.032 2.365 -0.525*** 0.029 0.017 0.619 -0.541*** -0.038 -0.002
(0.032) (1.946) (0.107) (0.058) (0.030) (1.831) (0.117) (0.055) (0.006)
L.lnRemit -0.124 -1.232 0.367 0.674*** -0.131 -7.071 0.316 0.502*** 0.022
(0.098) (5.915) (0.325) (0.176) (0.090) (5.466) (0.348) (0.165) (0.019)
L2.lnRemit -0.276** -12.929* 0.408 0.236 -0.284*** -14.876** 0.391 0.171 -0.019
(0.121) (7.310) (0.401) (0.217) (0.104) (6.322) (0.403) (0.191) (0.021)
L.lnEmp 2.576*** -0.258 0.128 3.249** 0.418**
(0.849) (51.668) (3.291) (1.564) (0.175)
L2.lnEmp -2.210*** 116.672** 0.901 0.473 0.262
(0.774) (47.098) (3.000) (1.425) (0.160)
constant 13.932*** 390.273*** -2.364 1.263 7.979 -1,399.510** -18.198 -56.369*** 5.254**
(2.409) (145.935) (8.010) (4.339) (10.938) (665.562) (42.395) (20.143) (2.258)
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Table 3.19: VAR: Emigration, Income, Remittances and Labor
(1) (2)
lnEmig lnGDPpc lnUSGDPpc lnRemit lnEmig lnGDPpc lnUSGDPpc lnRemit lnLabor lnUSLabor
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
L.lnEmig 0.743*** 0.080** -0.004 0.522*** 0.395** 0.056 0.002 0.534** -0.015 0.010
(0.178) (0.040) (0.021) (0.197) (0.201) (0.051) (0.023) (0.267) (0.033) (0.006)
L2.lnEmig 0.027 -0.065* -0.024 -0.227 0.127 -0.030 -0.025 -0.200 -0.027 -0.001
(0.171) (0.038) (0.020) (0.188) (0.167) (0.042) (0.019) (0.222) (0.028) (0.005)
L.lnGDPpc -0.655 1.071*** -0.002 -0.727 -0.079 1.048*** 0.012 -0.799 -0.009 -0.034*
(0.700) (0.157) (0.083) (0.772) (0.636) (0.162) (0.074) (0.846) (0.106) (0.021)
L2.lnGDPpc 1.036 -0.296* -0.067 -0.722 1.282** -0.246 -0.104 -0.574 -0.001 -0.004
(0.676) (0.152) (0.080) (0.745) (0.601) (0.153) (0.070) (0.800) (0.100) (0.019)
L.lnUSGDPpc 0.838 -0.455* 0.968*** -2.976** -1.109 -0.459 1.261*** -2.737 -0.396 0.284***
(1.167) (0.262) (0.139) (1.286) (1.636) (0.417) (0.190) (2.178) (0.273) (0.053)
L2.lnUSGDPpc 0.825 0.559** -0.247* 3.580*** 1.492 1.117*** -0.093 3.180 -0.128 -0.006
(1.160) (0.260) (0.138) (1.278) (1.515) (0.386) (0.176) (2.016) (0.253) (0.049)
L.lnRemit -0.082 0.004 0.019 0.350** -0.188 0.001 0.019 0.386** 0.004 0.011***
(0.132) (0.030) (0.016) (0.145) (0.123) (0.031) (0.014) (0.164) (0.021) (0.004)
L2.lnRemit -0.140 0.007 0.022 0.632*** -0.373*** 0.010 0.030* 0.591*** -0.014 0.006
(0.141) (0.032) (0.017) (0.155) (0.138) (0.035) (0.016) (0.184) (0.023) (0.004)
L.lnLabor 4.466*** 0.376 -0.072 1.457 0.250 0.001
(1.604) (0.408) (0.186) (2.135) (0.268) (0.052)
L2.lnLabor -0.246 0.239 0.204 -1.474 0.105 -0.019
(1.196) (0.304) (0.139) (1.591) (0.200) (0.039)
L.lnUSLabor 6.802 -1.410 -2.970*** 3.063 1.265 -0.044
(7.902) (2.012) (0.919) (10.516) (1.319) (0.256)
L2.lnUSLabor -9.808 -0.706 1.874** -2.659 0.907 0.455*
(7.703) (1.962) (0.896) (10.252) (1.286) (0.249)
constant -13.157*** 0.282 2.923*** 2.471 -32.957 8.504 8.829*** -1.351 -8.211** 4.161***
(4.972) (1.115) (0.592) (5.479) (21.511) (5.478) (2.501) (28.628) (3.592) (0.697)
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Table 3.20: VAR: Emigration, Wages, Employment, Remittances, Income, and Labor
lnEmig Wage US Wage lnEmp lnRemit lnGDPpc lnUSGDPpc lnLabor lnUSLabor
L.lnEmig -0.018 -1.651 1.498** 0.022 0.293 0.081** -0.002 -0.037 0.001
L2.lnEmig -0.084 15.842** -1.872*** 0.008 -0.149 -0.014 -0.028 -0.024 -0.006
L.Wage 0.017*** -0.134 0.032 0.001 -0.021*** 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000
L2.Wage 0.023*** -0.457** 0.006 -0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001***
L.US Wage 0.208*** -12.733*** 1.149*** 0.009 -0.073 -0.027 0.006 0.023* 0.002
L2.US Wage -0.054* 10.531*** -0.138 0.001 0.082 0.035** 0.001 -0.016 0.000
L.lnEmp 3.630*** -239.896** -9.348 -0.522* -0.917 -0.713* -0.214 -0.339 0.152**
L2.lnEmp -0.396 -4.756 -5.192 0.010 -2.556 -0.337 0.306 0.062 0.050
L.lnRemit 0.572*** -27.916*** 0.971 0.034 0.134 0.022 0.062** -0.004 0.023***
L2.lnRemit 0.108* -13.988** 0.779 0.037* 0.475** 0.080*** 0.056*** 0.005 0.010**
L.lnGDPpc -6.984*** 227.959*** -2.076 -0.288 3.366 0.873** -0.372 -0.053 -0.125**
L2.lnGDPpc 0.706* -80.446* 2.257 -0.043 -4.461*** -0.388* -0.021 -0.297* -0.018
L.lnUSGDPpc -2.304*** -4.665 14.201** -0.065 -4.092* 0.230 1.378*** -0.716*** 0.283***
L2.lnUSGDPpc 4.463*** 188.506*** -0.020 -0.169 3.467 1.127*** 0.064 -0.321 0.087*
L.lnLabor -0.193 212.332** 5.287 0.243 -0.331 0.249 0.080 0.127 -0.117*
L2.lnLabor -2.722*** 128.231 4.785 0.009 1.184 0.322 -0.156 0.075 -0.094
L.lnUSLabor 1.768 -33.535 -30.412 -0.640 2.533 -3.728*** -3.544*** 1.034 -0.230
L2.lnUSLabor -37.057*** 289.623 -1.217 0.774 5.621 0.199 0.588 1.255 0.057
constant 418.568*** -6,654.857* 259.605 22.358* -27.830 35.901** 30.128*** 5.233 10.353***
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3.5.2 Temporary Migration
Saudi labor market
Figure 3.25 shows Saudi employment against wages (CPI). The graph shows wages
increasing in 1980-1983, decreasing in 1984-1987, rebounding in 1988-1998, falling
below trend in 1999-2005, and rising steeply in 2006-2009. On the other hand,
employment generally rose except in 1998-1999. The fitted line shows a long term
quadratic relationship between wages and employment. Figure 3.26 plots Saudi
income against labor force. The graph shows declining income in 1982-1989, a
recovery in 1990-1991, a decline in 1993-2002, and a resurgence in 2003-2010. On
the other hand the labor force shows a monotonic increase from 1980 to 2010. The
fitted line shows a long term quadratic relationship between income and labor force.
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Figure 3.25: Saudi Employment by Wage (CPI)
Saudi wages
Saudi wages are positively related to Saudi income and negatively related to Saudi
labor force, as expected. Table 3.22 shows the regression of Saudi wages on income
and labor force. As Saudi income increases by 1 percent, Saudi wages increase by
3.5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 155
Table 3.21: Granger Causality Test: Emigration
Dependent variable: LEMIG Dependent variable: LREMIT
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
WAGE 17.77687 2 0.0001 LEMIG 8.422021 2 0.0148
USWAGE 57.54051 2 0 WAGE 0.96399 2 0.6176
LREMIT 11.83716 2 0.0027 USWAGE 0.622844 2 0.7324
LEMP 5.417393 2 0.0666 LEMP 2.257329 2 0.3235
USLEMP 1.272791 2 0.5292 USLEMP 29.4745 2 0
LGDPPC 20.85637 2 0 LGDPPC 1.080437 2 0.5826
USLGDPPC 18.74415 2 0.0001 USLGDPPC 4.833904 2 0.0892
LLBR 1.003084 2 0.6056 LLBR 6.827721 2 0.0329
LUSLF 21.23846 2 0 LUSLF 2.522379 2 0.2833
All 208.9241 18 0 All 125.1237 18 0
Dependent variable: WAGE Dependent variable: USWAGE
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LEMIG 1.876559 2 0.3913 LEMIG 4.466052 2 0.1072
USWAGE 3.22336 2 0.1996 WAGE 7.881766 2 0.0194
LREMIT 5.029791 2 0.0809 LREMIT 1.757255 2 0.4154
LEMP 2.790493 2 0.2478 LEMP 0.529392 2 0.7674
USLEMP 1.449114 2 0.4845 USLEMP 9.52763 2 0.0085
LGDPPC 1.352416 2 0.5085 LGDPPC 5.054088 2 0.0799
USLGDPPC 3.690142 2 0.158 USLGDPPC 7.989551 2 0.0184
LLBR 3.068167 2 0.2157 LLBR 1.478744 2 0.4774
LUSLF 0.088003 2 0.957 LUSLF 3.255278 2 0.1964
All 32.06926 18 0.0216 All 45.41873 18 0.0004
Dependent variable: LEMP Dependent variable: USLEMP
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LEMIG 0.209039 2 0.9008 LEMIG 0.440496 2 0.8023
WAGE 1.424652 2 0.4905 WAGE 0.327336 2 0.849
USWAGE 1.857623 2 0.395 USWAGE 0.134516 2 0.935
LREMIT 0.683255 2 0.7106 LREMIT 1.045271 2 0.593
USLEMP 1.88855 2 0.389 LEMP 0.543734 2 0.762
LGDPPC 0.074717 2 0.9633 LGDPPC 0.269434 2 0.874
USLGDPPC 0.286871 2 0.8664 USLGDPPC 0.356426 2 0.8368
LLBR 1.446945 2 0.4851 LLBR 0.005545 2 0.9972
LUSLF 0.285636 2 0.8669 LUSLF 0.326146 2 0.8495
All 23.79811 18 0.1618 All 16.81849 18 0.5356
Dependent variable: LGDPPC Dependent variable: USLGDPPC
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LEMIG 5.210905 2 0.0739 LEMIG 0.597573 2 0.7417
WAGE 4.952347 2 0.0841 WAGE 5.786441 2 0.0554
USWAGE 2.557989 2 0.2783 USWAGE 0.745063 2 0.689
LREMIT 1.560628 2 0.4583 LREMIT 2.782146 2 0.2488
LEMP 1.54262 2 0.4624 LEMP 1.754807 2 0.4159
USLEMP 5.066006 2 0.0794 USLEMP 5.667633 2 0.0588
USLGDPPC 12.62379 2 0.0018 LGDPPC 6.005255 2 0.0497
LLBR 1.428362 2 0.4896 LLBR 2.611572 2 0.271
LUSLF 8.040727 2 0.0179 LUSLF 8.895811 2 0.0117
All 78.52677 18 0 All 38.26272 18 0.0036
Dependent variable: LLBR Dependent variable: LUSLF
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LEMIG 0.323609 2 0.8506 LEMIG 0.519994 2 0.7711
WAGE 0.218369 2 0.8966 WAGE 2.178435 2 0.3365
USWAGE 0.979487 2 0.6128 USWAGE 1.657265 2 0.4366
LREMIT 0.086566 2 0.9576 LREMIT 4.121561 2 0.1274
LEMP 0.507725 2 0.7758 LEMP 1.405899 2 0.4951
USLEMP 0.156346 2 0.9248 USLEMP 0.317631 2 0.8532
LGDPPC 1.011354 2 0.6031 LGDPPC 2.574985 2 0.276
USLGDPPC 2.883334 2 0.2365 USLGDPPC 9.03904 2 0.0109
LUSLF 0.518464 2 0.7716 LLBR 1.536965 2 0.4637
All 22.76907 18 0.1996 All 45.83543 18 0.0003
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Figure 3.26: Saudi Labor Force by Income
0.2 percent, controlling for labor supply. As Saudi labor force increases by 1 percent,
Saudi wages decrease by 0.86 percent, holding income fixed. Saudi wages also depend
on their previous values. Saudi wages grow by 79 percent of their previous values.
Oil prices appears to be a poor proxy for Saudi wages. The oil price series
does not depend on either Saudi output or labor force, nor on previous oil price
(regression results omitted). For this reason, I choose the CPI as a proxy for Saudi
wages.
Saudi employment
Saudi employment is positively related to Saudi income, labor force and previous
employment. Table 3.23 shows the regression of Saudi employment on Saudi income
and labor force. Saudi employment is elastic to the labor force but inelastic to
income. As the Saudi labor force increases by 1 percent, employment increases by
2.8 percent. As Saudi income increases by 1 percent, Saudi employment increases
by 0.9. Employment increases by 1.12 times its previous value.
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Table 3.22: Saudi wages
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LSACPI(-1) 0.792761 0.090599 8.75021 0
LSAUGDPPC 0.197822 0.038814 5.096702 0
LLFSA -0.86328 0.284744 -3.03177 0.0058
LLFSA(-1) 0.956034 0.283292 3.374733 0.0025
YEAR -0.00116 0.000236 -4.91635 0.0001
R-squared 0.954034 Mean dependent var 4.58215
Adjusted R-squared 0.946373 S.D. dependent var 0.077314
S.E. of regression 0.017904 Akaike info criterion -5.052
Sum squared resid 0.007693 Schwarz criterion -4.81626
Log likelihood 78.25398 Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.97817
Durbin-Watson stat 1.41088
Table 3.23: Saudi employment
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LEMPSA(-1) 1.125833 0.03006 37.45283 0
LSAUGDPPC 0.097447 0.033134 2.941 0.0071
LSAUGDPPC(-1) -0.09718 0.031943 -3.04234 0.0056
LLFSA 2.807204 0.155382 18.06648 0
LLFSA(-1) -2.90534 0.170665 -17.0237 0
Constant 1.306571 0.450681 2.899106 0.0079
R-squared 0.999506 Mean dependent var 1.718672
Adjusted R-squared 0.999403 S.D. dependent var 0.343532
S.E. of regression 0.008391 Akaike info criterion -6.54654
Sum squared resid 0.00169 Schwarz criterion -6.2663
Log likelihood 104.1981 Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.45689
F-statistic 9717.57 Durbin-Watson stat 1.475272
Prob(F-statistic) 0
OFW deployment
For OFW deployment, the regression starts with an Auto-regressive Distributed
Lag model with one lag for the dependent variables and the following independent
variables: emigration; Philippine and Saudi income and labor force; remittances
and trend. A step-wise deletion of insignficant variables yields the final regression
in Table 3.24. The results show that OFW deployment is positively related to
lagged deployment, Philippine labor force, lagged Saudi income and labor force,
and negatively related to concurrent Saudi labor force. Most of these results are as
expected except for the e↵ect of lagged Saudi labor force. An increase in Saudi labor
force would increase OFW deployment if Saudi wages are downward-rigid and Saudi
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native employment remains the same. The resulting additional demand is filled up
by migrants at lower wages. Philippine income and remittances are not significant.
Increases in Philippine income and remittances would not a↵ect emigration if wages
rise proportionately more, making employment and unemployment unchanged.
Controlling for Philippine and Saudi wages (Table 3.25), Philippine income and
remittances become negatively related to OFW deployment, as expected. OFW de-
ployment is also negatively related to concurrent Saudi incomes. As Saudi labor
demand increases, fixed wages increase the quantity of Saudi labor demanded rela-
tive to the quantity supplied. This increases Saudi native employment and decreases
the demand for migrants. On the other hand, OFW deployment is positively re-
lated to lagged Saudi income. An increase in destination income would increase
the demand for migrants. Controlling for wages increases the quantity demanded
even more. The elasticity of OFW deployment to income increases from 0.47 to 1.8.
OFW deployment is also positively related to lagged Philippine and Saudi wages.
Controlling for Philippine income, an increase in Philippine wages would increase
unemployment, increasing the supply of migrants. An increase in Saudi wages, con-
trolling for income, would decrease the quantity demanded for native Saudi labor.
Optimal employment is filled with migrant labor.
Table 3.24: OFW Deployment on exogenous factors
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LOFW(-1) 0.323956 0.151215 2.142349 0.0421
LLBR 1.09595 0.59175 1.852049 0.0759
LSAUGDPPC(-1) 0.471051 0.136815 3.44297 0.002
LLFSA -3.41181 1.426708 -2.39139 0.0246
LLFSA(-1) 3.568693 1.355565 2.632623 0.0143
Constant -16.4104 5.129516 -3.19921 0.0037
R-squared 0.976065 Mean dependent var 13.44299
Adjusted R-squared 0.971277 S.D. dependent var 0.475233
S.E. of regression 0.080541 Akaike info criterion -2.02811
Sum squared resid 0.162172 Schwarz criterion -1.75057
Log likelihood 37.43572 Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.93764
F-statistic 203.8954 Durbin-Watson stat 1.854462
Prob(F-statistic) 0
A VAR of OFW deployment, wages and remittances (Table 3.26) also shows
that OFW deployment is dependent on previous deployment. However, OFW de-
ployment is also not a↵ected by wages. However, OFW deployment is positively
related to employment. Again, this means that employment may be increasing but
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Table 3.25: OFW Deployment with wages
Variable Coe cient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
LSACPI(-1) 0.817347 0.278753 2.93216 0.0077
LGDPPC -1.11552 0.217105 -5.13816 0
LWAGE(-1) 1.356057 0.184608 7.345612 0
LSAUGDPPC -1.2116 0.276526 -4.38149 0.0002
LSAUGDPPC(-1) 1.832552 0.304907 6.010192 0
LREMIT(-1) -0.13341 0.058672 -2.27381 0.0331
YEAR 0.077707 0.008521 9.118965 0
Constant -145.718 16.23836 -8.97369 0
R-squared 0.989512 Mean dependent var 13.41312
Adjusted R-squared 0.986175 S.D. dependent var 0.452803
S.E. of regression 0.05324 Akaike info criterion -2.80483
Sum squared resid 0.06236 Schwarz criterion -2.43117
Log likelihood 50.07238 Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.68529
F-statistic 296.5233 Durbin-Watson stat 2.398095
Prob(F-statistic) 0
not enough to cope with the labor supply. A VAR of OFW deployment, income, la-
bor and remittances (Table 3.27) shows that OFW deployment does not seem to be
related to Philippine and Saudi GDP per capita. However, OFW deployment is neg-
atively related to labor supply in Saudi Arabia lagged one year, as expected. OFW
deployment rises when the labor supply is low relative to demand. A full VAR (Ta-
ble 3.28) of OFW deployment, wages, employment, remittances, income and labor
shows that OFW deployment is positively related to lagged domestic wages. Deploy-
ment is also positively related to destination wages lagged two periods. However,
deployment is not related to employment. OFW deployment is negatively related
to domestic income (lagged two year) and positively related to destination income
(lagged two years). OFW deployment is negatively related to domestic labor force,
positively related to destination labor force lagged two year but negatively related
to destination labor force lagged two years. A Granger causality test (Table 3.29)
shows that only Philippine and Saudi wages and domestic income help predict OFW
deployment.
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Table 3.26: VAR: OFW Deployment, Wages, Remittances and Employment
(1) (2)
lnOFW Wage SA CPI lnRemit lnOFW Wage SA CPI lnRemit lnEmp lnSAEmp
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
L.lnOFW 0.449** 0.391 -2.156 0.044 0.230 0.085 -7.072* 0.044 0.061** 0.001
(0.214) (12.087) (4.386) (0.387) (0.187) (9.146) (4.250) (0.369) (0.028) (0.027)
L2.lnOFW 0.091 12.093 2.676 0.121 -0.102 -6.856 0.656 -0.253 0.071*** 0.044*
(0.176) (9.986) (3.623) (0.320) (0.168) (8.209) (3.815) (0.331) (0.026) (0.024)
L.Wage 0.003 0.573*** 0.063 -0.005 0.004 0.353** 0.061 -0.010* -0.000 0.001**
(0.003) (0.197) (0.072) (0.006) (0.003) (0.149) (0.069) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
L2.Wage 0.001 -0.438** -0.069 0.001 0.005* -0.391*** -0.023 0.002 -0.001*** -0.000
(0.003) (0.181) (0.066) (0.006) (0.003) (0.137) (0.064) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
L.SA CPI 0.010 0.545 1.631*** 0.008 0.005 1.200*** 1.184*** 0.024 0.004*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.448) (0.163) (0.014) (0.009) (0.439) (0.204) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001)
L2.SA CPI -0.004 -1.707** -0.873*** -0.033 0.024 -2.592*** -0.229 -0.056* -0.008*** -0.001
(0.013) (0.710) (0.258) (0.023) (0.015) (0.754) (0.350) (0.030) (0.002) (0.002)
L.lnRemit 0.074 0.477 0.611 0.741*** -0.029 -12.960** 5.020* 0.429* 0.010 -0.019
(0.119) (6.743) (2.447) (0.216) (0.121) (5.913) (2.748) (0.239) (0.018) (0.017)
L2.lnRemit 0.057 -1.969 0.752 0.286 -0.246* -9.819 1.681 0.129 0.022 -0.024
(0.121) (6.828) (2.477) (0.219) (0.136) (6.643) (3.088) (0.268) (0.021) (0.019)
L.lnEmp 0.633 58.893 -19.114 4.330** 0.283* 0.394***
(0.956) (46.667) (21.689) (1.883) (0.145) (0.137)
L2.lnEmp 2.017** 159.073*** -31.321 0.591 0.404*** 0.045
(0.926) (45.184) (21.000) (1.824) (0.141) (0.132)
L.lnSAEmp 0.557 -96.314*** 13.720 -2.460** 0.119 1.825***
(0.587) (28.625) (13.304) (1.155) (0.089) (0.084)
L2.lnSAEmp -0.609 52.211* 9.182 1.373 -0.164* -1.037***
(0.622) (30.374) (14.116) (1.226) (0.094) (0.089)
constant 2.318** 73.761 -12.196 0.301 -31.106* -2,794.507*** 759.835** -65.355** 3.555 -6.917***
(0.906) (51.261) (18.600) (1.643) (16.300) (795.459) (369.698) (32.105) (2.474) (2.327)
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Table 3.27: VAR: OFW Deployment, Income, Remittances and Labor
(1) (2)
lnOFW lnGDPpc lnSAGDPpc lnRemit lnOFW lnGDPpc lnSAGDPpc lnRemit lnLabor lnSALabor
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
L.lnOFW 0.648*** -0.021 -0.021 0.213 0.406** -0.086** -0.101 -0.263 0.012 0.008
(0.208) (0.052) (0.188) (0.327) (0.195) (0.044) (0.187) (0.255) (0.038) (0.010)
L2.lnOFW 0.087 0.051 0.031 0.120 -0.090 -0.002 -0.010 0.015 0.033 0.000
(0.202) (0.050) (0.182) (0.317) (0.181) (0.041) (0.173) (0.236) (0.035) (0.009)
L.lnGDPpc 0.268 1.315*** 1.150* 0.235 0.056 1.311*** 1.240** 0.403 -0.101 0.007
(0.696) (0.174) (0.629) (1.094) (0.627) (0.140) (0.599) (0.818) (0.122) (0.032)
L2.lnGDPpc 0.223 -0.741*** -0.064 -2.759** 0.593 -0.624*** 0.125 -1.814** 0.035 0.032
(0.809) (0.202) (0.730) (1.271) (0.678) (0.152) (0.648) (0.884) (0.132) (0.035)
L.lnSAGDPpc 0.189 -0.071 0.420** 0.433 0.204 -0.093** 0.349* 0.542** -0.031 0.000
(0.225) (0.056) (0.203) (0.354) (0.196) (0.044) (0.188) (0.256) (0.038) (0.010)
L2.lnSAGDPpc -0.234 0.177*** 0.012 0.341 0.040 0.260*** 0.055 0.978*** -0.026 -0.005
(0.213) (0.053) (0.192) (0.335) (0.221) (0.050) (0.211) (0.288) (0.043) (0.011)
L.lnRemit 0.087 0.030 0.057 0.494** -0.073 -0.027 0.005 0.025 0.061** 0.001
(0.132) (0.033) (0.119) (0.207) (0.150) (0.034) (0.143) (0.196) (0.029) (0.008)
L2.lnRemit -0.031 -0.009 -0.043 0.460** -0.124 -0.056** -0.144 0.049 0.002 -0.003
(0.131) (0.033) (0.118) (0.205) (0.127) (0.028) (0.121) (0.165) (0.025) (0.006)
L.lnLabor 1.284 0.663** 1.799 7.475*** 0.263 0.098*
(1.156) (0.259) (1.105) (1.507) (0.226) (0.059)
L2.lnLabor 1.479 0.346 -0.545 2.336 -0.110 0.026
(1.356) (0.303) (1.296) (1.768) (0.265) (0.069)
L.lnSALabor -5.444** -0.868* 1.315 -12.310*** 0.912** 1.779***
(2.114) (0.473) (2.020) (2.755) (0.412) (0.108)
L2.lnSALabor 4.847*** 0.666* -1.458 8.982*** -0.594* -0.872***
(1.616) (0.362) (1.545) (2.107) (0.315) (0.082)
constant -1.059 1.487** -3.590 9.226** -31.343* -10.106** -19.794 -93.371*** 8.431** -0.938
(2.548) (0.636) (2.301) (4.004) (18.450) (4.128) (17.631) (24.052) (3.600) (0.941)
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Table 3.28: VAR: OFW Deployment, Wages, Employment, Remittances, Income and Labor
lnOFWt Waget SACPIt lnEmpt lnSAEmpt lnRemitt lnGDPpc lnSAGDPpc lnLabor lnSALabor
lnOFWt 1 -0.498*** -8.770 2.555 -0.073*** 0.004 -0.396 0.014 0.094 -0.064** 0.005
lnOFWt 2 -0.289* -6.680 16.467*** 0.000 0.075*** -0.147 -0.007 0.014 0.010 0.011***
Waget 1 0.013*** 0.087 0.224*** -0.000 0.002*** -0.010 0.000 0.001 0.001** 0.000***
Waget 2 0.022*** -0.184 -0.158* 0.000 0.000 0.007 -0.004*** -0.015*** 0.002*** 0.000**
SA CPIt 1 0.004 1.308*** 0.815*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.016 0.002 -0.036*** 0.006*** 0.000**
SA CPIt 2 0.066*** -1.495* -0.596** -0.002* -0.002** -0.002 -0.011*** -0.013 -0.001 -0.000
lnEmpt 1 -1.233 -121.318 134.411*** -0.976*** 0.604*** -0.705 0.220 -0.421 -0.384 0.056
lnEmpt 2 1.566 -48.340 100.452** -0.786*** 0.266* -7.275** -0.790 -2.991 0.105 0.032
lnSAEmpt 1 -1.142 -162.213 115.363*** 0.310** 0.713*** 9.003*** 0.648 5.533*** -0.143 -0.023
lnSAEmpt 2 0.011 84.761 -100.469** -0.459*** -0.107 -10.972*** -0.797 -4.261** -0.279 -0.123**
lnRemit(-1) 0.321** -22.647*** -4.899* 0.090*** -0.026** 0.137 -0.068* 0.132 0.098*** -0.001
lnRemit(-2) -0.045 -18.775*** -8.612*** 0.072*** -0.056*** 0.248 -0.001 0.079 0.053*** -0.009***
lnGDPpct 1 -3.851*** 125.382** 9.552 -0.344*** -0.145** 0.340 1.141*** 0.438 -0.746*** -0.084***
lnGDPpct 2 -1.250 -100.201* 36.787** -0.155** 0.222*** -3.985*** -0.250 2.944*** -0.192 0.030
lnSAGDPpct 1 0.149 -29.286** -8.774** -0.000 0.029** -0.044 -0.029 0.662*** 0.007 0.005
lnSAGDPpct 1 0.776*** 38.576*** 19.151*** 0.060*** 0.013 1.862*** 0.226*** -0.079 0.043 0.015***
lnLabort 1 -2.206 109.854 16.906 0.278** -0.271** 5.091** 0.646 5.221*** -0.354 -0.039
lnLabort 2 -2.885* 173.777* -9.328 0.162 -0.185 6.825** 1.280*** 1.891 -0.560** -0.049
lnSALabort 1 11.744* 64.263 -501.195*** 0.295 2.172*** -35.569*** -4.551** -24.145*** 2.628** 1.751***
lnSALabort 2 -5.897 75.220 355.066*** 0.909** -1.841*** 37.093*** 4.087*** 19.594*** -1.069 -0.591***
constant 27.195 -3,120.083* -2,130.611*** 20.870*** -12.053*** -57.286 -13.716* -14.158 16.510*** -2.195***
3.6. SUMMARY 163
3.6 Summary
Over the past three decades, permanent migration from the Philippines has grown by
an average of two percent per year. The number of registered emigrants has further
grown by 74 percent of its previous value, confirming the process of ‘cumulative
causation’. The cycle of emigration is characterized by an increase in the 1980s, a
decrease in the 1990s and a resurgence in the 2000s.
Emigration is driven by a growing labor force as expected. The corresponding
decrease in wages would shift the migrant supply curve outward raising the wage
di↵erential between the US and the Philippines. As a result, more Filipino workers
are willing to migrate at any given US wage. Emigration is significantly related to
Philippine income only when accounting for structural break. However, the positive
relationship is contrary to expectation. This is due to wages rising faster than
income. Consequently, employment was not rising fast enough and unemployment
was growing. This suggests that a migration hump (where migration increases with
income) occurs only in as much as wages are growing faster than income thereby
depressing employment and motivating migration. Emigration is positively related
to lagged US income. As US income increases, the corresponding increase in US
wages compels employers to substitute US workers with migrant labor. The lagged
e↵ect is understandable given the information and transactions cost for migration.
Conversely, emigration is negatively related to lagged US labor force. As the US
labor force increases, the resulting decrease in wages would increase the quantity
demand for US labor.
Standard models of migration relate migration to wages and employment in the
origin and destination countries. Others model migration as a function of income
and labor force underlying labor demand and supply. Both implicitly assume no
distortions in the economy and that wages and employment respond to income and
labor in a free market. In a world of legislated wages and regulated employment, the
e↵ects on migration of changes in income and labor force may not be as expected.
Moreover, either set of factors may be capturing the e↵ects of the other, generating
biased estimates. Accounting for distortions has an implication on the e↵ects of
changes in labor demand and supply on migration.
Controlling for wages, emigration is not significantly related to income and
labor force. On the other hand, wages have a positive e↵ect even when controlling
for income and labor force. Holding income and labor force fixed, an increase in
wages creates / increases excess labor supply, motivating migration. Like making
bricks without straw makes the work harder, higher wages without corresponding
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Table 3.29: Granger Causality Test: OFW Deployment
Dependent variable: LOFW Dependent variable: LREMIT
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
WAGE 10.57381 2 0.0051 LOFW 0.160487 2 0.9229
SACPI 5.859322 2 0.0534 WAGE 1.617313 2 0.4455
LREMIT 0.956637 2 0.6198 SACPI 1.612021 2 0.4466
LEMP 1.715729 2 0.4241 LEMP 1.51033 2 0.4699
LEMPSA 2.912554 2 0.2331 LEMPSA 1.440182 2 0.4867
LGDPPC 7.931628 2 0.019 LGDPPC 4.030378 2 0.1333
LRGDPEPCSA 1.124105 2 0.57 LRGDPEPCSA 0.766985 2 0.6815
LLBR 3.468241 2 0.1766 LLBR 0.547889 2 0.7604
LLFSA 2.902377 2 0.2343 LLFSA 4.344218 2 0.1139
All 47.81165 18 0.0002 All 37.62406 18 0.0043
Dependent variable: WAGE Dependent variable: SACPI
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LOFW 1.528793 2 0.4656 LOFW 7.282983 2 0.0262
SACPI 2.82164 2 0.2439 WAGE 2.267524 2 0.3218
LREMIT 2.262908 2 0.3226 LREMIT 3.432484 2 0.1797
LEMP 0.246431 2 0.8841 LEMP 5.739144 2 0.0567
LEMPSA 0.058357 2 0.9712 LEMPSA 7.918002 2 0.0191
LGDPPC 7.42438 2 0.0244 LGDPPC 3.078259 2 0.2146
LRGDPEPCSA 1.697157 2 0.428 LRGDPEPCSA 5.499196 2 0.064
LLBR 0.271121 2 0.8732 LLBR 4.935641 2 0.0848
LLFSA 0.21431 2 0.8984 LLFSA 3.759809 2 0.1526
All 48.47521 18 0.0001 All 54.02303 18 0
Dependent variable: LEMP Dependent variable: LEMPSA
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LOFW 0.653631 2 0.7212 LOFW 170.1047 2 0
WAGE 0.248948 2 0.883 WAGE 58.13901 2 0
SACPI 5.375179 2 0.068 SACPI 28.1922 2 0
LREMIT 0.252512 2 0.8814 LREMIT 21.15045 2 0
LEMPSA 4.186038 2 0.1233 LEMP 54.34114 2 0
LGDPPC 4.854956 2 0.0883 LGDPPC 48.01553 2 0
LRGDPEPCSA 5.419738 2 0.0665 LRGDPEPCSA 112.757 2 0
LLBR 4.227312 2 0.1208 LLBR 177.7005 2 0
LLFSA 2.891121 2 0.2356 LLFSA 97.28008 2 0
All 42.30222 18 0.001 All 1973.591 18 0
Dependent variable: LGDPPC Dependent variable: LRGDPEPCSA
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LOFW 0.00675 2 0.9966 LOFW 0.182283 2 0.9129
WAGE 3.150716 2 0.2069 WAGE 6.489731 2 0.039
SACPI 2.093063 2 0.3512 SACPI 5.140358 2 0.0765
LREMIT 1.459775 2 0.482 LREMIT 0.009145 2 0.9954
LEMP 0.348467 2 0.8401 LEMP 0.506988 2 0.7761
LEMPSA 0.009775 2 0.9951 LEMPSA 4.409067 2 0.1103
LRGDPEPCSA 0.094224 2 0.954 LGDPPC 8.545485 2 0.0139
LLBR 0.453492 2 0.7971 LLBR 0.836324 2 0.6583
LLFSA 0.037581 2 0.9814 LLFSA 1.302075 2 0.5215
All 15.85172 18 0.6029 All 59.79593 18 0
Dependent variable: LLBR Dependent variable: LLFSA
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. Excluded Chi-sq df Prob.
LOFW 0.180397 2 0.9137 LOFW 15.95003 2 0.0003
WAGE 2.510324 2 0.285 WAGE 14.15856 2 0.0008
SACPI 3.312317 2 0.1909 SACPI 2.33228 2 0.3116
LREMIT 0.57619 2 0.7497 LREMIT 6.889636 2 0.0319
LEMP 0.422817 2 0.8094 LEMP 3.769471 2 0.1519
LEMPSA 6.173991 2 0.0456 LEMPSA 34.48577 2 0
LGDPPC 4.693654 2 0.0957 LGDPPC 0.147554 2 0.9289
LRGDPEPCSA 2.057232 2 0.3575 LRGDPEPCSA 0.44017 2 0.8025
LLFSA 2.829428 2 0.243 LLBR 11.82893 2 0.0027
All 27.03256 18 0.0784 All 401.1735 18 0
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increase in income makes employment more di cult. Controlling for US wages
raises the e↵ects of US income and labor force. An increase in income, controlling
for labor force and wages, raises the quantity of labor demanded relative to quantity
supplied, thereby increasing migrant demand. An increase in labor force raises
the quantity of US labor supplied relative to quantity demanded, holding income
and wages fixed, decreasing migrant demand. Emigration is positively related and
highly elastic to US wages. Controlling for US income and labor force, an increase
in US wages decreases US employment, requiring migrants to fill the decrease in US
native employment. Emigration is negatively related to remittances. An increase
in remittances increases local labor demand, increasing employment and decreasing
the supply of migrants.
Accounting for employment using a vector auto-regression model shows that
permanent migration is positively related to domestic wages, holding labor demand
and supply and employment fixed. Higher wages raise the quantity of labor supplied
creating unemployment even at existing employment levels. Emigration is also posi-
tively related to domestic employment, controlling for labor demand and supply and
wages. Higher employment reduces wages relative to what workers are willing to
accept. Emigration is negatively related to national income. A decrease in income
reduces the quantity of labor demanded at the same wage, creating unemployment.
Otherwise, employers are willing to pay a lower wage at existing employment levels.
Emigration is negatively related to the domestic labor force, with labor demand,
wage and employment fixed. With higher labor supply at the same wage, producer
surplus rises, increasing the quantity of labor supplied.
Permanent migration increases with destination wages. As US wages increase,
the quantity of US labor demanded decreases. If migrants can be paid lower than the
wages for US labor, migrants can fill the decrease in US labor. Emigration increases
with destination income as this increases the demand for labor; but is undeterred by
subsequent declines. Emigration decreases as the destination labor force increases
as this creates excess labor supply at prevailing wages and employment levels. Em-
igration is positively related to remittances. If remittances increase labor demand
holding wages constant, the increase in the quantity of labor supplied had wages
increased would have to migrate.
Like permanent migration, temporary migration is also positively related to
the Philippine labor force but also not related to income and remittances. In-
creases in income and remittances would not a↵ect OFW deployment if wages rise
proportionately more, making employment and unemployment unchanged. OFW
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deployment is positively related to lagged Saudi income. As Saudi income increases,
Saudi wages increase attracting more migrants. At the same wages, the quantity
of labor demanded also increases relative to the quantity supplied increasing the
demand for migrant labor. OFW deployment is positively related to lagged Saudi
labor force, contrary to expectation. An increase in Saudi labor force would increase
OFW deployment if Saudi wages are downward-rigid, with native employment not
increasing. The additional labor demand would have to be filled up with migrant
labor at lower wages.
Controlling for Philippine wages, Philippine income and remittances are neg-
atively related to OFW deployment, as expected. A decrease in income and remit-
tances, holding wages fixed, would decrease quantity of labor demanded relative to
quantity supplied, increasing the supply of migrants. Controlling for lagged Saudi
wages, the elasticty of OFW deployment to lagged Saudi income increases. As Saudi
labor demand increases, fixed wages increase the quantity of Saudi labor demanded
relative to quantity supplied, increasing the demand for migrant labor. OFW de-
ployment is positively related to lagged Philippine and Saudi wages. Controlling
for Philippine income, an increase in Philippine wages would increase unemploy-
ment, increasing the supply of migrants. An increase in Saudi wages, controlling
for income, would decrease the quantity demanded for native Saudi labor. Optimal
employment is filled with migrant labor.
Accounting for employment, temporary migration is also positively related
to domestic wages, as well as to Saudi wages. However, OFW deployment is not
significantly related to domestic employment and Saudi employment. Temporary
migration is also negatively related to domestic income and positively related to
Saudi income. OFW deployment is also negatively related to the local labor force.
On the other hand, OFW deployment is positively related to Saudi labor force. Con-
trolling for wages and employment, the increase in the quantity of labor demanded
has to be filled with migrants at lower wages. OFW deployment is also positively
related to remittances.
Chapter 4
Of Milk and Honey: Returns to
Migration and Education of
Overseas Filipino Workers
“So I have come down to rescue them from the hand of the Egyptians
and to bring them up out of that land into a good and spacious land,
a land flowing with milk and honey...” - Exodus 3:8
The third study aims to estimate the returns to migration and education for overseas
Filipino workers. It finds that earnings of overseas Filipino workers in most key
destinations are higher than those of domestic workers, but their returns to schooling
are not significantly di↵erent from, or are even lower than, those of domestic workers.
These findings together with the result of a Heckman selection model confirm the
negative selection of temporary migrants. Apart from purchasing power parity gains
to either earnings or returns to schooling, there are also monetary gains in the
conversion of foreign earnings to the local currency through the US dollar as in the
case of remittances.
4.1 Context and Objectives
While much is known about the benefits of migration in the Philippines at the
household and national levels, not much is known about the private returns that are
motivating migration in the first place. This paper aims to determine the returns to
migration of Filipinos and to the education of Filipino migrants. It extends earlier
research on returns to education of local workers. Estimates of domestic returns to
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education are suspected to be underestimated considering the migration especially of
the more able from the periphery to the capital or abroad. The inability to account
for migration in domestic returns to education led this author to analyze returns to
education for migrants.
Most existing studies on the Philippines focus on remittances, such as the
benefits of remittances and the motives for remittances. Other studies analyzed the
determinants of migration. Existing studies of income gains from migration are quite
limited. Some compare incomes across destinations, but not between migrants and
non-migrants. They also estimate returns to education over all destinations, but do
not compare returns across destinations nor with the Philippines. Another study
compares wages of Filipinos in the US and in the Philippines, accounting for both
their observed and unobserved di↵erences. However, to my knowledge, there is
still no study comparing the wages and returns to education of Filipinos in various
destinations and the Philippines. This is the research gap that this study seeks to
fill.
The third part of this dissertation aims to determine the returns to tempo-
rary migration and education of overseas Filipino workers. Return to migration
is the income gain from working overseas relative to what one would earn in the
Philippines. Return to education for overseas Filipino workers is the income gain
per year of schooling relative to return to education for domestic workers. It uses a
unique data-set on overseas workers rarely used in previous studies including income
data which are not available from widely-used survey data. Gains to income and
returns to schooling are estimated for overseas workers altogether, for workers in
major destinations and in other destinations as separate groups, and for individual
top destination countries. Earnings and returns to schooling are also disaggregated
by sex, and estimated in purchasing power parity and in US Dollars.
The study finds that earnings are higher but returns to education are lower
for overseas workers in general and in most top destinations. In some destinations,
earnings are not higher but returns to schooling are higher. However, there are no
apparent gains in a few key destinations for males and females, either to labor or to
human capital, nor to work experience. Nevertheless, gains may be realized through
the exchange rate as earnings are brought home and converted to local currency.
The study is organized as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the literature on the
impacts of migration and return on migration. Section 4.3 discusses the econometric
model and methodology. Section 4.4 describes the data sources and the variables.
Section 4.5 presents the descriptive statistics. Section 4.6 analyzes the econometric
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results. Finally, Section 4.7 provides a summary discussion.
4.2 Literature Review
4.2.1 Impacts of Migration
Much has been written about the benefits and costs of migration. UNDP (2009)
surveys the literature on the impacts of migration to origin and host countries. In
origin countries, at the household level, migration provides remittances that help
improve nutrition, health and general household welfare. Remittances serve as an
alternative income source, mitigate against income shocks and encourage household
entrepreneurship, investments, and savings for further migration. Moreover, remit-
tances raise education spending, enhancing the formation of human capital. Even
when used for consumption, remittances boost economic activity. There are also
migration costs to the household, such as negative emotional e↵ects and adverse
e↵ects on child and elderly care.
Across countries, mobility is said to reduce income disparities. At the national
level, remittances can provide macroeconomic stability more than foreign aid and
foreign investment do. Migrants also provide collective remittances that finance
community infrastructure and services. Migration has social and political e↵ects as
well, such as political participation and the development of political institutions.
Migration also provides ideas and good practices from abroad such as egalitarian
gender relations and a ‘culture of migration’.
On the other hand, emigration of skilled workers is feared to decrease the
quality of services. Remittances can be a ‘resource curse’, resulting in currency ap-
preciation and reducing competitiveness. Migration also a↵ects income distribution
depending on which segment of the economy moves more. Remittances from inter-
national migration tend to benefit the better o↵ while those from internal migration
benefit the poor more. Migration also has negative cultural e↵ects such as the gang
culture from the United States, and migrants with revolutionary ideas can spur civil
wars.
In destination countries such as the OECD, immigration has been found to
raise employment, stimulate business, encourage investment, and enhance innova-
tion. While there are concerns that immigrants drive wages down, the e↵ect is found
to be small and depends on whether the skills of immigrants complement or compete
with the skills of locals. The e↵ect on employment also depends on market segmen-
170 CHAPTER 4. RETURNS TO MIGRATION
tation; displacements are unlikely if migrants take on low-skilled jobs that allow
locals to move up the value chain. The negative impact on employment is small
in light of the institutional discrimination against migrants which compel them to
settle for informal employment.
Migration can also push rapid urbanization putting a stress on services and
driving migrants into informal settlement subject to environmental and social risks.
In some European countries, migrants are viewed as a fiscal burden, “tak(ing) more
than they give”. In the U.S., the newer generations of migrants are a source of fiscal
surplus rather than costs. Other concerns about migrants relate to security and
crime, and cultural diversity. In Europe, there are twice more immigrants in prison
than locals while in the U.S., proportionately less immigrants are in prison. Nations
established by migrants tend to be more accepting of migrants, and some cultural
characteristics such as food are easier to adopt than others such as religion. Atti-
tude toward migrants is determined by education, age, employment, and migration
background.
Migration provides various benefits to the household. Reviewing the litera-
ture on the economic impact of migration and remittances in the Philippines on
households, Orbeta (2008) finds remittances raising household consumption, as well
as the shares of housing, durable goods, education, health, and recreation. While
remittances increase education spending and promotes school enrolment over youth
employment, they also increase inequality in this spending. Remittances also reduce
poverty incidence. Labor force participation rates among households with overseas
workers are lower than among households without, as household incomes and de-
mand for leisure increase.
At the national level, the largest benefit from migration appears to be remit-
tances, reaching over 17 billion dollars in 2011 and amounting to 7.6 percent of GDP.
The national Socio-Economic Report 2010-2012 identifies growth in remittances as
complementary to overall economic growth, contributing to a stronger domestic cur-
rency, stabilizing private consumption, and keeping the current account in surplus
(NEDA, 2013). Overseas Filipinos also provide funding support through govern-
ment and NGOs for “relief and rehabilitation, education and scholarships, health
equipment/facilities and medical missions, water and sanitation facilities, and liveli-
hood assistance” (CFO, 2010). They also facilitate transfer of technology through
return-visits to and sharing in the Philippines such as through the Department of
Science and Technology’s Balik (Return)-Scientist Program.
There are also economic, social and political costs of migration. Baggio (2009)
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analyzes the costs of Filipino international migration. The economic costs of migra-
tion include increasing inequality as remittances accrue to households with higher
incomes and education. Overseas workers come from richer regions so remittances
go to these regions widening regional inequalities. The social costs of migration
includes separation in the family which threatens relationships and the unity of the
family. The stability of the family appears to be threatened more with the migra-
tion of mothers, as certain roles such as care-giving are under stress. Children face
school, emotional, psychological and health problems, especially in cases where the
mothers migrate, although these are mitigated in extended families. A long history
of migration has created a ‘culture of migration’ with 60 percent of children of over-
seas workers considering working abroad, and taking up education oriented toward
the international labor market. The exodus of professionals such as doctors and
nurses is also showing adverse e↵ects on the health care system. The political costs
of migration includes the excessive reliance on remittances that has prevented gov-
ernment from developing sustainable development policies. The deployment of huge
numbers of emigrants has also placed Filipino migrants at the mercy of destination
countries, facing discrimination and human rights violations.
Much of the literature on migration focuses on the social benefits and costs of
migration. Analyses on benefits focus on the e↵ects of remittances to the household
and the nation. On the other hand, analyses on costs focus on ‘brain drain’ and
negative externalities to non-migrants. Little is known about the private benefits
and costs to the migrant himself. However, while remittances have only second-order
e↵ects on welfare, individual income gains from migration have first-order e↵ects on
welfare (Clemens, 2011). Clemens describes the potential gains from unrestricted
migration as “trillion dollar bills on the sidewalk”, estimated at 50-150 percent of
world GDP. The gains from migration of 5 percent of the world population alone is
said to exceed gains from the removal of all barriers to trade and capital flow.
4.2.2 Return to Migration
Migration theory developed in the context of economic development. The movement
of labor was considered to depend on relative supplies of and demand for labor,
and on the corresponding productivities. Lewis (1954) observed that unlimited
supplies of labor in agriculture kept rural wages at subsistence level and excess labor
moved to urban areas for industrial employment at wages higher than subsistence
rates. Similarly, Harris and Todaro (1970) argued that labor migrates from rural
to urban areas as long as urban incomes exceed rural outputs. The disparities
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in labor supplies and wages that drove internal migration were also thought to be
driving international migration. Migration proceeded from labor-abundant low-wage
countries to labor-scarce high-wage countries. Conversely, investment flowed from
rich capital-abundant countries to poor capital-scarce countries where returns are
higher.
In microeconomic theory, migration is seen as an investment in human capital
(Sjaastad, 1962). As such, return on investment in migration can be determined
by the income gain from moving relative to the monetary and opportunity costs of
migration. Migration is essentially a response to di↵erences in earnings and a move-
ment towards higher pay. Accordingly, the emigration rate is positively related to
average income in the destination country, and negatively related to average income
in the home country and migration costs (Borjas, 1987). Institutional restrictions
limit mobility by raising migration costs generating migration selection. Migration
also depends on the probabilities of obtaining a job in the destination and origin
countries (Todaro, 1969; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987). Human capital tends to raise
the likelihood of employment and wages in the destination and therefore the proba-
bility of migration (Massey et al., 1993). Governments regulate migration through
policies a↵ecting employment, wages and costs.
Determining the returns to migration can be considered as an evaluation prob-
lem. The framework of analysis is adapted from the theory of impact evaluation
(Khandker et al., 2010) with migration as the treatment. It involves comparing
the actual earnings of migrants with their counterfactual earnings had they not
migrated. The di↵erence is called the treatment e↵ect on the treated :
TOT = E(Yi(1)|Mi = 1)  E(Yi(0)|Mi = 1).
The problem is that the counterfactual is unobserved. Given this missing data
problem, the second best option is to compare the earnings of migrants with those
of non-migrants, endeavouring to choose a non-migrant comparison group that is
much like the migrant group. The basic econometric model can be written as:
Yi = ↵Xi +  Mi + "i
where M is a dummy equal to 1 for migrants and 0 for non-migrants/domestic
workers;   is the income e↵ect of migration; X is a vector of other observed charac-
teristics; and " is the error term. If migration were random, the migration dummy
would be uncorrelated with the error term, and the OLS estimate of the e↵ect of
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migration would be unbiased. The average e↵ect of migration would then be:
D = E(Yi(1)|Mi = 1)  E(Yi(0)|Mi = 0).
The problem is that migration is not random: migrants and non-migrants may not
be similar in the absence of migration. Rather, migrants self-select based on observed
as well as unobserved characteristics (e.g. ability, motivation).1 The di↵erence in
earnings between migrants and non-migrants may not due to migration alone. The
discrepancy between the average e↵ect of migration and the treatment e↵ect on the
treated creates selection bias:
D TOT = [E(Yi(1)|Mi = 1) E(Yi(0)|Mi = 0)] [E(Yi(1)|Mi = 1) E(Yi(0)|Mi = 1)].
D   TOT = [E(Yi(0)|Mi = 1)  E(Yi(0)|Mi = 0)].
D   TOT = Bias.
If migrants were randomly selected as in McKenzie et al. (2010), there would be
no selection bias. However, if random selection is not feasible, non-experimental
methods can be used to evaluate the impact of migration. One option is to use
propensity score matching to create a comparison group based on a model of the
probability of migration, using observed characteristics. Migrants are then matched
to non-migrants based on the likelihood of migration or propensity score. Matching
is valid only if earnings are independent of migration given observed characteristics
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) (that is, unobserved characteristics do not a↵ect
migration), and there is su cient overlap in the propensity scores between migrants
and non-migrants. The treatment of treated for the propensity score matching is
the mean di↵erence in earnings between the migrants and the comparison group:
TOTPSM = EP (X)|M=1[E[Y T |M = 1, P (X)]  E[Y C |M = 0, P (X)]].
As migration is a↵ected by unobserved characteristics such as ability, propensity
score matching estimates may still be biased. A similar bias is cited in Chiquiar and
Hanson (2005) by Moraga (2010). In this case, the double-di↵erence method may
be used as it assumes the presence of unobserved heterogeneity a↵ecting migration.
However, these unobserved characteristics are time-invariant and can be di↵erenced
out. The double-di↵erence technique usually uses panel data as did Clemens et al.
1In the latter case, the migration dummy is correlated with the error term, making the estimates
biased.
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(2009). The technique involves estimating the changes (di↵erences) in earnings for
both migrants and non-migrants over time. The average income e↵ect of migration
is the di↵erence between these di↵erences:
DD = E(Y M1   Y M0 |M1 = 1)  E(Y C1   Y C0 |M1 = 0).
where Y Mt and Y
C
t are the earnings of migrants and non-migrants, respectively, at
time t. However, given the single time period for our data, we can not apply double
di↵erence.
If unobserved characteristics are time-varying, the double di↵erence method es-
timates may also be biased. To allow for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, in-
strumental variable regression can be used. It involves finding an instrument that is
highly correlated with migration but not correlated with unobserved characteristics
a↵ecting earnings. As no suitable instrument is available at this time, instrumental
variable regression can not be employed as yet. Data limitations notwithstanding,
useful estimates of income gains from migration which have not been derived until
now can still be derived.
Income gains from migration depend on the origin and destination countries
and can be substantial. Among migrants to OECD countries, those coming from
least developed countries earn about 14 times more than the average income in their
country. Those from moderately developed countries, highly developed countries and
very highly developed countries earn about 4.4 times more, 2 times more, and 10
percent more, respectively, than the average income in their country (Ortega, 2009).
While the poorest countries stand to gain the most from migration, their emigration
rates are the lowest as they are constrained by poverty (UNDP, 2009).
Existing studies on the Philippines compare earnings across key destinations
(relative to the top destination, Saudi Arabia), across occupations (relative to
nurses), by age and sex. They also estimate returns to education with primary
education as reference. Tan (2005) analyzed the wage structure of overseas Filipino
workers in 2003. She found that newly hired overseas Filipino workers in the US
and Canada earned 194 percent more than those in Saudi Arabia (the destination
with the largest flow of overseas workers). Those in the UK and Ireland earned
153 percent more, Japan 140 percent more, Israel 98 percent, Singapore 32 percent,
Africa 30 percent, Hong-Kong 102 percent, and Taiwan 44 percent. Relative to
nurses, other professionals earned 4 percent less, domestic helpers earned 68 percent
less, salespersons 60 percent less, skilled manual workers 46 percent less, and clerks
33 percent less. Wages of entertainers were not significantly di↵erent from those of
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 175
nurses. Overseas workers with complete tertiary education earned 12 percent more
than those with only primary education, but the wages for other levels of education
were not significantly di↵erent from that for primary education. Overseas workers
earn 0.85 percent more per year as they age. Females earn 9.6 percent less than
males.
A similar analysis for rehires yields lower advantages for the US and Canada,
UK and Ireland, Israel, Hong-Kong and Taiwan, and even a disadvantage for Japan,
but higher advantages for Singapore and Africa, relative to Saudi Arabia. Other
rehired professionals earn as much as nurses, while the rest of the occupations earn
even much less than nurses. Relative to new hires, rehires with complete tertiary
education earn much more than those with only primary education. The coe cient
of age rose to 1.3 percent while wages for females are much lower than for males.
Tan (2006) found that overseas Filipino workers earned 46.6 percent higher in
Europe than in Saudi Arabia, 27.5 percent higher in Taiwan, 35.1 percent more in
Hong Kong, 56.7 percent more in Africa, 67.8 percent more in Japan, 116.5 percent
more in UK, and 47.4 percent more in the US. Overseas Filipino workers’ earnings
rose by 25 percent with a college education (relative to vocational training), and
rose by 3.2 percent per year of stay in the host country. She also analyzed the
determinants of remittances. She found that remittances rose by 5.3 percent for
every 10 percent increase in migrant wage. Permanent migrants remit 41 percent
less than do temporary migrants. This confirms the remittance motive of temporary
migration. US migrants remit even less, up to 61 percent less. Females remit
less than males, and overseas workers remit 3.4 percent less per working household
member.
Several points are worth noting from the foregoing studies. First, the destina-
tion with the most Filipino workers does not necessarily provide the highest wage.
While Saudi Arabia hosted the largest flow of Filipino workers, it pays lower wages
than most other key countries. It is possible that the probability of employment
has a stronger e↵ect than wages in this case. Second, growing occupations provide
the highest wages. Nurses are part of the smallest but only growing occupational
category (administrative and managerial workers) in 2002-3 (Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, 2003) and have the highest wages. Third, tertiary
education is important for overseas employment.
A few comments are also in order. First, while these estimates show com-
parative earnings across destinations, they do not determine income gains from
migration. While these estimates are useful in understanding the selection of desti-
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nations, choosing a destination is secondary to the decision to migrate. Comparing
the incomes of migrants to non-migrants is of primary importance. Second, return
to education is estimated over all destinations. It would be useful to compare returns
to education across di↵erent destinations. Third, using age instead of work expe-
rience generates biased estimates. Experience can be approximated by deducting
years of education and age before schooling from current age.
Even if one can compare the wages and returns to education between migrants
and non-migrants, one has to confront another key issue. The income gains from
migration may be overstated given selectivity. Selection can occur in observed char-
acteristics such as education. If return to education is higher in the host country,
migrants tend to have more schooling (Borjas, 1999). Otherwise, if return to educa-
tion is higher in the home country, migrants tend to have less schooling. Given the
importance of tertiary education for overseas employment, Filipino migrants must
be positively selected in terms of education.2
Evidence suggests that Filipino migrants are positively selected in terms of
education. Docquier and Marfouk (2005) show that in 2000, the Philippines had
the fifth highest selection rate; the share of skilled emigrants to the emigrant stock
was 67.1 percent compared to the average of 51.4 percent for Southeast Asia and 46.8
percent for Asia. Schi↵ and Sjoblom (nd) compile the shares of Filipino migrants
in six key OECD destination countries (U.S.A., U.K., Australia, Canada, France,
and Germany) by education level for 1975-2000 [Table 3.5]. The table shows the
proportion of highly educated migrants (i.e. those with tertiary education) rising
from 51.5 percent in 1975 to 72.2 percent in 2000. In the U.S., the proportion highly
educated migrants rose from 51 percent in 1975 to 73 percent in 2000. In Canada, the
proportion of Filipino migrants with a high level education rose from 71 percent in
1975 to over 81 percent in 2000. In Australia, most (86 percent) Filipino migrants in
1975 had a low level of education (i.e. only primary education). However, since 1980,
most migrants had a high level education although this dropped from 84 percent in
1980 to 66 percent in 2000. These figures show that Filipino migrants to the OECD,
particularly in the U.S., Canada, and Australia are positively selected in terms of
education. If the educational attainment of migrants is positively correlated with
unobserved characteristics a↵ecting their migration, standard estimates of income
2Given the earnings functions, lnw0 = µ0 +  0s + "0 and lnw1 = µ1 +  1s + "1, where w0 and
w1 are the wages for the home and destination countries, respectively, and s is years of schooling;
the education distribution in the home country, s = µs + "s; the migration rate, P (z⇤) = Pr[⌧ >
 [(µ1   µ0)   ( 1    0)µs   ⇡]] = 1    (z⇤), where ⌧ = ("1   "0) + ( 1    0)"s, and z⇤ =
 [(µ1 µ0+( 1   0 ⇡]/ ⌧ . The mean schooling of migrants, E(s|µs, I > 0) = µs+  
2
s
 ⌧
( 1   0) 
is > µs if  1 >  0 and < µs if  1 <  0.
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gains from migration would be biased upward.
Accounting for observed characteristics, there appears to be huge income gains
for Filipino migrants. Using the US Census and household survey data across various
countries, Clemens et al. (2009) estimate the ratio, R0, between the wages of workers
in the United States and those of observably identical (in terms of country of birth,
country of education, education level, age, sex, and urbanity) workers in 42 other
countries including the Philippines. They find a median real wage ratio of between 4
and 14 depending on the exchange rate used and the proportion of income spent in
the home country assumed. Observable characteristics account for a third of wage
di↵erences across countries. The ratio for the Philippines is 3.82 using PPP, 4.53
if 20 percent of the income is consumed in the Philippines, 7.16 if 60 percent is
consumed in the Philippines, and 17.09 using the o cial exchange rate.
The importance of the exchange rate is apparent in light of the “new economics
of labor migration”. According to this perspective, the decision to migrate is made
not only by the migrant but also his non-migrant family (Stark and Bloom, 1985).
Migration costs and returns are shared among family members with an implicit
agreement as to their distribution. Returns to migration for the family include
remittances. Lucas and Stark (1985) presents three motivations for remittances.
The first is ‘pure altruism’ where the migrant’s utility is enhanced not only by his
consumption, but also by that of his family in the home country. The second is
‘pure self-interest’ where the migrant sends remittances with a view to gaining an
inheritance, or to ensure that business interests/property are cared for, or to promote
social standing upon return. The third is ‘tempered altruism or enlightened self-
interest’ where the migration of some members is a household strategy to spread risk.
Remittances are a contractual obligation of the migrant to the sending household.
It includes repayment of the household’s investment in the migrant’s education.
The exchange rate is important not just in determining income gains across
countries but also changes over time. Yang (2008) found that remittances rose by
6 percent for every 10 percent increase in the exchange rate. Improvements in the
exchange rate also tend to keep migrants from returning home. Higher exchange
rates also led to higher household income essentially through remittances. How-
ever, while the exchange rate does not a↵ect consumption, it does a↵ect investment
(in consumer durables) positively. Positive exchange rate shocks also led to more
child schooling and less child labor, and more self-employment. While positive
exchange rate shocks increase the likelihood of new entrepreneurial activity par-
ticularly in transportation, communication and manufacturing, they have no e↵ect
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on entrepreneurial income. Yang concludes that household investment is primarily
a↵ected by exchange rate shocks rather than real economic shocks.
Income gains from migration may also be over-estimated due to unobserved
characteristics. Returns from migration are higher for people with higher ability and
motivation as these raise earnings relatively more than migration costs (Chiswick,
1978).3 The quality of migrants depends on the correlation between income dis-
parities in the home and destination countries on one hand and the ratio between
the disparities on the other (Borjas, 1987).4 Positive selection, where the most able
persons migrate and earn more than the average person in the destination country,
occurs to the extent that income disparities between home and destination coun-
tries are highly correlated and income inequality is higher in the destination country.
This suggests that the more able are taxed more in their home country and less in
the destination country, so they choose to move. Otherwise, if income inequality is
higher in the home country, negative selection occurs, where the less able migrate
but earn lower than the average person in the destination country. This means that
the less able benefit from redistribution in the destination country. If the correlation
in income disparities is lower than their ratio, the less able migrate but earn higher
than average wages in the destination country, a phenomenon which Borjas (1987)
calls refugee sorting.
Findings on the selection of earlier migrants to the United States in terms
of earnings and returns to schooling are mixed. Chiswick (1978) found that US
immigrants have three percent higher earnings than native-born Americans, holding
schooling, work experience, residence, and labor e↵ort constant. While returns
to schooling for immigrants are lower than those of the native born, these rise
when considering the number of years since migration. Borjas (1987) found that
the quality of immigrants who arrived in the US in 1979 measured by entry wage
is lower for those from higher inequality countries. A rise in income inequality
reduces the motivation to migrate for people in the higher segments of the income
3The rate of return to migration for person i is ri = (Wd,i   Wo,i)/(Co + Cd) where Wd,i
and Wo,i are the earnings in the destination and origin countries, respectively, Co = pWo,i is the
opportunity cost of migration and is a fraction p of domestic earnings Wo,i, and Cd is the direct
cost of migration. Return to migration for a more able person j, rj = (Wd,j  Wo,j)/(pWo,j +Cd),
is greater than that for a less able person i, ri = (Wd,i  Wo,i)/[pWo,i + (Cd/1 + l)], if greater
ability does not raise migration costs more than earnings. Migrants are also likely to have higher
ability and motivation than natives of destination countries.
4Given the conditional means E(lnw0|I > 0) = µ0 +  0 1 v (⇢    0 1 )  and E(lnw1|I > 0) =
µ1+
 0 1
 v
( 1 0   ⇢) , where ⇢ is the correlation between "0 and "1,   =
 (z)
1  (z) ; E(lnw0|I > 0) > µ0
if ⇢ >  0 1 , and E(lnw1|I > 0) > µ1 if  1 0 > ⇢. Otherwise, E(lnw0|I > 0) < µ0 if ⇢ <  0 1 , and
E(lnw1|I > 0) < µ1 if  1 0 < ⇢.
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distribution, decreasing the quality of migrants. Entry wage is 26 percent higher
for those with English proficiency, is lower for the older, and rises 1.2 percent per
10 percent growth in origin country. Immigrants’ assimilation into the economy,
measured by their earnings growth over ten years, is found to be higher for those
with English proficiency, rise with age at immigration, and be higher for those from
richer countries. The change in cohort quality measured by the di↵erence in wages
between the 1955 and 1979 immigrant cohorts, is 13 percent higher for those from
countries that shifted from political competition to repression, increased for those
from Western Europe, decreased for those from less developed countries, and is
higher for countries with migrant quotas. Finally, emigration rate decreases with
distance and origin country GDP per capita, and is lower for countries with higher
inequality.
Findings on the selection of Mexican migrants to the United States are also
mixed. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) found that returns to education among Mex-
ican immigrants in the U.S. are lower than those in Mexico. Using wage densities
and immigrant population shares by decile from the 1990 and 2000 Mexican and
U.S. Census of Population and Housing, they found that Mexican male migrants
come from the middle to upper-middle segment of the wage distribution, indicating
intermediate selection among Mexican males. Similarly, Mexican female migrants
are drawn from upper-middle segment of the wage distribution, indicating moderate
positive selection. These seem to be inconsistent with higher inequality in Mexico
relative to the US. Moraga (2010) criticize these results on three grounds. Firstly,
these results, estimated from the U.S. census, pertain more to the selection of the
stock rather than the flow of migrants. Secondly, the methodology does not account
for unobserved characteristics such as wage shocks prior to migration. Thirdly, U.S.
data underestimate immigrants from Mexico, especially the undocumented.
Conversely, Moraga (2010) presents new evidence supporting the negative se-
lection of Mexican migrants to the U.S. He uses the nationally-representative Quar-
terly National Labor Survey (ENET) for 2000-2004, capturing the flow rather than
the stock of migrants. Based on density and cumulative distribution functions, he
finds that migrants have from 11 to 38 percent lower wages than non-migrants.
Using frequency distributions, he finds that male migrants have three years less
schooling than non-migrants, but female migrants have three years more schooling
than non-migrants. Comparing the wage density distributions of non-migrants and
migrants on one hand, and non-migrants and a counterfactual on the other, he finds
that 62 percent of the di↵erence in wages is due to observable characteristics while
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the remaining 38 percent is due to unobservables.
The foregoing findings confirm the hypothesis of negative selection of migrants
from countries with relatively higher inequality. If migrants are also negatively se-
lected in the destination countries, standard estimates on returns to their migration
would be downward biased.
Filipino migrants appear to be positively selected in terms of unobservable
characteristics. Clemens et al. (2009) estimate the place premium, Re, (i.e. the
ratio of the wages of observably and unobservably identical workers) in the United
States and nine other countries including the Philippines. They estimate a place
premium of 3.5 for the Philippines. This means that based on both observable and
unobservable characteristics, Filipino workers in the US earn 3.5 times more than
observably and unobservably idential workers in the Philippines. They then derive
the ratio, R0Re , to determine selection, and find a value of 1.08 for the Philippines.
This means that the ratio of wages of observably identical workers in the US and the
Philippines of 3.8 would be biased by 8 percent. Using panel data, the corresponding
place premia and R0Re for Mexico are 2.49 and 1.03, and for South Africa 2.3 and 1.2,
respectively. Using wage histories, the figures are 2.35 and 1.07 for Mexico, 3.08
and 0.96 for Guatemala, 3.28 and 1.07 for Nicaragua, 1.68 and 1.23 for Costa Rica,
1.87 and 1.06 for Dominican Republic, 7.84 and 1.32 for Haiti, and 2.61 and 1.45 for
Peru. These figures suggest modest positive selection for most. Using residual wage
kernel densities, they find that the median migrant comes from the 58th percentile
of non-migrants in the Philippines, 56th percentile in Mexico, and 60th percentile
in South Africa. This means that migrants from the Philippines are above average
in terms of unobserved characteristics.
McKenzie et al. (2010) study the migration of Tongans to New Zealand, gen-
erating the only random experimental estimate of the returns to migration together
with non-experimental estimates. With higher inequality in New Zealand than in
Tonga, they predict positive selection of Tongans. They analyze New Zealand’s Pa-
cific Access Category, which accepts a yearly quota of Tongans into Zealand from a
lottery of applicants. They find that lottery winners earn 88 percent more income
than non-winners with similar characteristics and that migrants earn 263 percent
more than non-migrants. Using non-experimental methods, they find that the in-
strumental variable estimate using a bad instrument is biased upward by 82 percent,
while OLS overestimates by 31 percent. Propensity score matching overstates by 19-
33 percent, while single-di↵erence method is biased by 25 percent. Double-di↵erence
overestimates by 20 percent, while instrumental variable estimation with a good in-
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strument has the lowest bias at 9 percent. The results confirm positive selection in
unobserved characteristics.
To sum up, migration is primarily motivated by income gain. Therefore, we
would expect income gains to be higher in destination countries hosting more Fil-
ipinos. Existing studies suggest that this is not always true as there may be con-
straints or restrictions to migration or employment in certain destinations. On the
other hand, occupational choice appears to follow market signals, with Filipinos tak-
ing up occupations providing the highest possible wages. However, existing studies
of income gains from migration are quite limited. Some compare incomes across des-
tinations but not between migrants and non-migrants. They also estimate returns
to education over all destinations, but do not compare returns across destinations
nor with the Philippines. Another study compares wages of Filipinos in the US and
in the Philippines accounting for both their observed and unobserved di↵erences.
However, to my knowledge, there is still no study comparing the wages and returns
to education of Filipinos in various destinations and the Philippines. This is the
research gap that this study seeks to fill.
4.3 Model and Methodology
The basic model is an augmented human capital earnings function (Mincer, 1974):
ln(Wi) = ↵1+ 1Si+  1ti+  2t
2
i +↵2Mi+ 2(MiSi)+  3(Miti)+  4(Mit
2
i )+X
0
i✓+ "i
(4.1)
where ln(Wi) is the natural logarithm of the wage of individual i, Si is years of
schooling, ti is work experience, andMi is a dummy variable for temporary migrants
(non-migrants as reference). Xi is a vector of observable characteristics including
dummy variables for male (female as reference), civil status, 16 regions (the national
capital region as reference), and nine occupations (o cials in government and special
interest organizations, executives, managers, and supervisors as reference). " is the
error term.
 1 is the return on schooling for non-migrants,  1+ 2 is the return on schooling
for migrants. The coe cient of a quantitative regressor in a semi-logarithmic model
measures the semi-elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to that regressor.
However, to obtain the elasticity with respect to a dummy variable, Halvorsen and
Palmquist (1980) suggest that the coe cient be transformed as follows: exp( )  1.
Thus, the return on migration without schooling is 100 ⇤ [exp(↵2)   1]. How-
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ever, Kennedy (1981) argues that the resulting estimate is biased and suggests
exp(    1/2V ( ))   1. Giles (1982) shows that while this is also biased, it ap-
proximates his own minimum variance unbiased estimator with a large sample, and
is easier to compute. While the Halvorsen and Palmquist (HP) estimator posi-
tively corrects for interpretation, the Giles estimator negatively corrects for bias
(van Garderen and Shah, 2002). In choosing the estimator, van Garderen and Shah
suggest that uncertainty be considered. They find that while the standard errors for
the unbiased estimator is lower than that for the HP estimator, the naive estimator
can have the lowest standard error, as well as lower mean squared error than even
the unbiased estimator. Thus, in case of uncertainty (loss of significance) in the
unbiased estimates, we can still rely on the standard estimates.
The foregoing model is expanded by accounting for di↵erences by sex. This is
done by including a dummy variable for males, Bi:
ln(Wi) = ↵1 +  1Si +  1ti +  1t
2
i + ↵2Mi +  2(MiSi) +  2(Miti) +  2(Mit
2
i )
+ ↵3Bi + ↵4BiMi +  3(BiSi) +  4(BiMiSi) +  3(Biti) +  3(Bit
2
i )
+  4(BiMiti) +  4(BiMit
2
i ) +X
0
i✓ + "i
(4.2)
where ↵1 is the average wage for non-migrant females, ↵1 + ↵2 is the average wage
for migrant females, ↵1 + ↵3 is the average wage for non-migrant males, and ↵1 +
↵2+↵3+↵4 is the average wage for migrant males. The return to schooling for non-
migrant females is  1 while  1 +  2 is the return to schooling for migrant females,
 1+ 3 is the return to schooling for non-migrant males, and  1+ 2+ 3+ 4 is the
return to schooling for migrant males. Henceforth, return to labor or labor wage is
used interchangeably with return to migration. Likewise, return to human capital
is used interchangeably with return to schooling.
The migration dummy Mi in Equations 4.4 and 4.2 are then replaced with
dummy variables for major destinations and other countries, and then with a dummy
variable for each key destination country to determine return to migration and return
to schooling for Filipino workers in each of these countries.
In estimating returns to migration and the education of migrants, both wages
and schooling for the same sample are needed. However, these data are not available
in a single dataset but are found in separate datasets. Migrant wage data are derived
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) while migrant
education data are found in the Survey of Overseas Filipinos (SOF). Several charac-
teristics, namely age, civil status, region, destination country, sex, and occupation,
are common to both datasets. To combine the information from the two data-sets,
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two sample two stage least squares (TS2SLS) regression (Inoue and Solon, 2010) is
employed. This is superior to two sample instrumental variable (TSIV) estimation
using the General Method of Moments (GMM) (Angrist and Krueger, 1992) as it
corrects for di↵erences in the distribution of instruments between the two samples
thereby enhancing e ciency (Inoue and Solon, 2010). In the first stage, schooling is
regressed on the aforementioned characteristics namely age, civil status, region and
the interactions between destination country, sex, and occupation using the SOF
dataset:
Si = X
0
iB + ✏i (4.3)
The predictions Sˆi = X 0iB are then applied to the POEA dataset. The LFS and
POEA datasets are then combined for the estimation of an augmented human capital
earnings function in the second stage:
ln(Wi) = ↵1+ 1Si+  1ti+  2t
2
i +↵2Mi+ 2(Mi bSi)+  3(Miti)+  4(Mit2i )+X 0i✓+ "i
(4.4)
allowing the estimation of returns to education for migrants.
Interpreting the estimated returns to education of migrants as causal e↵ects
using this approach relies on several assumptions. Firstly, the quality of the SOF and
POEA datasets are assumed to be the same. We discuss the quality of the datasets in
the next section. Secondly, the samples in the SOF and POEA datasets are assumed
to be similar in unobserved characteristics on the whole. These assumptions may
not always be realistic. For this reason, an alternative approach is also employed.
If wage is a function of destination, w = f(d), destination is a function of
occupation, d = g(o), and occupation is a function of schooling, o = h(s), then
return to schooling can be derived by multiplying the derivative of wage with respect
to destination by the derivative of destination with respect to occupation and the
derivative of occupation with respect to schooling.
dw
ds
=
dw
dd
dd
do
do
ds
(4.5)
All elements in the product on the right hand side can be estimated separately and
without merging datasets. Returns to various occupations across destinations are
estimated using the POEA dataset and compared to those in the Philippines using
the LFS dataset:
ln(Wi) = ↵ +  1Oi +  2(DiOi) +X
0
i✓ + "i (4.6)
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where Di is the destination country, Oi is occupation,  1 is the return on a partic-
ular occupation in the Philippines and  1 +  2 is the return on that occupation in
destination D.
The probabilities of taking on di↵erent occupations across di↵erent destina-
tions are derived using the following equation:
P (Oi) =
1
1 + e Zi
(4.7)
where Zi = ↵1 +  1Si +X 0i✓ + "i, Si is the schooling of person i, and Xi is a vector
of demographic characteristics including age, sex, civil status, and region.
P (Oi)
1  P (Oi) (4.8)
is the odds of person i taking on a certain occupation O relative to being a laborer
or unskilled worker. Taking the natural logarithm of equation 4.8 yields:
Li = ln(
P (Oi)
1  P (Oi)) = Zi = ↵1 +  1Si +X
0
i✓ + "i (4.9)
where  1 is the change in the log odds per additional year of schooling.
As discussed in the literature review, we acknowledge the issue of migration
selection. However, given the data constraints, we settle on standard estimation.
Nevertheless, the estimation of returns to migration and education of Filipino mi-
grants of this kind is novel in itself and is the main contribution of this paper. The
methodology for addressing migration selection is discussed in the Appendix.
4.4 Data
The study uses merged cross-sectional data from the Labor Force Survey (LFS)
July 2011 round and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
Balik-Manggagawa (returning overseas workers) micro-data for 2011, data from the
Survey of Overseas Filipinos 2011 round. A list of variables, description and sources
is given in Table 4.1.
4.4.1 Labor Force Survey
The Labor Force Survey primarily aims to generate statistics on employment, un-
employment, and underemployment for the Philippines at the national, regional,
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provincial and key city levels. It includes a sample of 41,000 households su cient to
provide reliable estimates at the provincial and key city levels, with a master sample
covering 3,421 villages (both urban and rural) as primary sampling units (PSUs) for
provincial estimates and a sub-sample of 2,219 villages as PSUs for regional esti-
mates. A multi-stage design is used in sample selection. First, sample villages are
selected with probabilities proportional to size. Second, enumeration areas are se-
lected in sample villages. Finally, households are selected within enumeration areas.
The survey uses a structured questionnaire with the information collected through
personal interviews by National Statistics O ce personnel.
The Labor Force Survey is used for data on domestic workers including wage,
schooling, work experience, sex, marital status, occupation, and region. Wages for
local workers are measured in terms of hourly wage, as annual or weekly wage would
yield returns to education that include the e↵ect of time spent at work. Hourly wage
is computed as basic pay per day divided by the normal number of hours worked
per day. Years of schooling is derived from the variable ‘highest grade completed’
where ‘no grade’ is assigned 0, incomplete elementary = 3, elementary graduate =
6, incomplete high school = 8, high school graduate = 10, college undergraduate =
12, college graduate =14, and completed post-graduate = 16.5
Consistent with the literature, work experience is used rather than age as us-
ing age leads to omitted variable bias that would underestimate return to schooling.
Work experience is computed as age minus years of schooling minus six (6), the
normal age before the start of schooling. This assumes continuous work experience
after schooling and does not account for periods of unemployment and unpaid work.
Sex is recoded as a male dummy variable with females as reference. A variable occu-
pation is created by classifying various occupations into the ten major occupations
in the 1992 Philippine Standard Occupation Classification (PSOC). The variable
region is a categorical variable of the 17 regions of the country with the national
capital region as reference.
The labor force survey also records observations of household members who
are overseas, classified into overseas contract workers (temporary migrants), work-
ers other than OCWs (irregular migrants), employees in Philippine embassies and
5The educational system that applies to the data comprise six years of elementary education
starting around age seven, four years of secondary education starting around age 13, and tertiary
education starting around age 17. The Philippine Constitution promotes the right to education
and provides a system of free public education at the primary and secondary levels, and mandates
primary education as compulsory. Starting in 2012, the Department of Education has implemented
the K-12 program, a new system with Kindergarten, six years of primary education, four years of
junior high school, and two years of senior high school.
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consulates, and students abroad or tourists. However, while the data include demo-
graphic characteristics, they do not include wages. For this reason, other datasets
on overseas workers are used, particularly the Survey of Overseas Filipinos and the
POEA micro-data on re-deployed overseas workers.
4.4.2 Survey of Overseas Filipinos
The Survey of Overseas Filipinos (SOF) is a national survey that collects information
on overseas Filipinos including contract workers who left within the last five years.
Conducted as a rider to the October round of the Labor Force Survey, it has the
same sampling frame as the LFS, but collects data with the past six months as
reference period. Aimed at providing information on overseas Filipinos, particularly
their economic contribution, it collects data on remittances and other socio-economic
characteristics.
The Survey of Overseas Filipinos (SOF) collects data on overseas Filipinos
including contract workers (temporary migrants), workers in Philippine embassies
and consulates, workers other than contract workers (irregular migrants), tourists,
students, immigrants, and those on o cial missions. The survey includes data on
age, sex, education, marital status, occupation, region, and destination country.
However, there are also no data on overseas workers’ incomes, although the sur-
vey includes data on remittances in cash sent or brought home and in kind. For
data on income of overseas workers, data from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration are used.
4.4.3 POEA Micro-data
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) collects data on the
re-deployment of overseas contract workers using the “Balik Manggagawa” (return-
ing overseas workers) information sheet completed by vacationing overseas Filipino
workers as a requirement for the re-issuance of their overseas employment certifi-
cate. The dataset includes personal information such as birth date, sex, civil status,
province of origin; contract information including country of employment, salary
and currency, and occupation (position); and beneficiary information. The data
from this registry appears quite reliable considering that overseas contract workers
certify the truthfulness and accuracy of the information under penalty of perjury.
As wage (salary) is reported in various periods, we derive hourly wage by di-
viding daily wage by 8, weekly wage by 8x5, monthly wage by 8x5x4, and annual
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wage by 8x5x50. Salary is generally reported in host country currency so to make
them comparable, we convert them to International Dollars (PPP) by dividing the
amount in host country currency by the PPP conversion factor (local currency unit
per international dollar) from the World Development Indicators. With remittance
as a motive for migration (Baines, 1994) and possibly the primary motive for tem-
porary migration, the exchange rate matters a great deal to the size of the income
or this case consumption gain from migration. Thus, conversion from international
dollars to the local currency through the US dollar may be more relevant.
The dataset also includes data on age, sex, civil status, occupation, and re-
gion. However, the dataset does not include education. A similar questionnaire,
the OFW Information Sheet, asks for the highest educational attainment, but the
data are unavailable given that di↵erent information from the questionnaire is com-
piled separately by di↵erent agencies and not equally/readily available. To derive
schooling, the Survey of Overseas Filipinos data-set is used where schooling data is
available. Schooling is fitted on age, civil status, region and the interactions between
destination country, sex, and occupation. Dummy variables are used for each of the
20 major destination countries in the SOF where there are su cient observations
(N   30) and the rest are combined into ‘others’. This allows a precise prediction of
the education levels of overseas workers in various occupations in various countries.
The idea is that each destination country requires a certain level of education for a
worker of a particular sex in a particular occupation. The prediction is then applied
onto the POEA data for the same set of explanatory variables.
4.5 Descriptive Statistics
The merged Labor Force Survey - Philippine Overseas Employment Administra-
tion (LFS-POEA) data includes 131,148 local workers comprising 54.2 percent and
110,809 overseas workers (45.8 percent). Local workers are equally divided by sex
with 50.02 percent females and 49.98 males. On the other hand, most (67.48 percent)
overseas workers are males while the other third (32.52 percent) are females.
The top destinations can be classified into Western Europe and O↵shoots
including UK, Italy, USA, Canada, and Australia; North-East Asia including Japan,
Korea, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan; South-East Asia including Singapore and
Malaysia; and Middle East including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Kuwait, and Bahrain. Table 4.2 shows the sample distribution by top destination
and sex. The Middle East is the predominant destination, with Saudi Arabia being
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the number one destination accounting for over 41 percent of overseas workers,
followed by the United Arab Emirates with 17 percent, while Qatar accounts for
nine percent and Kuwait 3.5 percent. Singapore, Canada, Taiwan, Italy, Korea, and
China each account for less than two percent of overseas Filipino workers while Hong
Kong, Bahrain, USA, Malaysia, Australia, Japan, and UK account for less than one
percent each. Other countries account for 15 percent of overseas Filipinos workers.
Within destinations, there are more males in Australia (89 percent), Korea
(86 percent), Qatar (80 percent), Saudi Arabia (74 percent), Malaysia (69 percent),
China (59 percent), Japan (58 percent), UAE (56 percent), USA (54 percent), and
in all other countries (73 percent). There are more females in Hong Kong (92
percent), UK (68 percent), Italy (66 percent), Taiwan (60 percent), Canada (57
percent), Singapore (53 percent), and Kuwait (52 percent). There is an almost equal
distribution in Bahrain between males (50.8 percent) and females (49.2 percent).
Table 4.3 shows the sample distribution by country and occupation. In the
Philippines, the largest group of workers are laborers and unskilled workers com-
prising a third of workers, followed by farmers. Similarly, most Filipino workers in
Hong Kong and Italy are laborers and unskilled workers. In contrast, most Filipino
workers in the US and China and the largest group of Filipinos in Japan, UK, Sin-
gapore, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia are professionals. The largest group of Filipino
workers in Australia and Qatar are trade workers. Most Filipino workers in Korea
and Taiwan are clerks. Most workers in Canada and the largest group in United
Arab Emirates and Bahrain are service and sales workers. In other countries, the
largest group of Filipino workers are professionals.
The distribution by sex in each country is a function of occupational choice.
Table 4.4 shows the distribution of males by country and occupation. In Australia,
most males (53 percent) are engaged in trade and related work. In Korea, most
males (70 percent) do clerical work. In Qatar, over a third (35 percent) of males
are engaged in trade. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of females by country and
occupation. Most female workers in Hong-Kong (96 percent) and Italy (85 percent)
and 36 percent in Kuwait are laborers and unskilled workers. In Canada, most
females (72 percent) are service and sales workers. In Taiwan, most females are
either service and sales workers (49 percent) or clerks (45 percent).
Occupational choice is in turn a function of educational attainment. Table
4.6 shows the average schooling of local workers and the predicted schooling for
overseas workers overall and for top destinations. Overseas workers on average are
expected to have higher education than local workers. On average, males overseas
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have 12.2 years of expected schooling, equivalent to incomplete tertiary education,
compared to 8.4 years for male domestic workers, equivalent to incomplete secondary
education. Females overseas have an expected average of 11.6 years of schooling
whereas female domestic workers have only 8.9 years of schooling. Females in top
destinations are expected to have the same schooling (11.6) as in other destinations.
In contrast, males in top destinations are expected to have slightly less schooling
(12.1) than those in other destinations (12.6).
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Table 4.1: List of Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
Hourly wage Basic Pay per Day (Primary Occupation) di-
vided by Normal Working Hours for the Day
for the Past Week;
LFS
Salary: daily divided by 8, weekly divided by
8x5, monthly divided by 8x5x4, and annual
divided by 8x5x50
POEA
Years of Schooling Highest Grade Completed: no grade = 0, in-
complete elementary= 3, elementary gradu-
ate = 6, incomplete high school = 8, high
school graduate = 10, college undergraduate
= 12, college graduate =14, and completed
post-graduate = 16
LFS, SOF
Experience Age as of Last Birthday minus years of
schooling minus 6 (age before start of school-
ing)
LFS, POEA
Male Sex recoded as a dummy variable = 1 for
males, 0 for females
LFS, POEA
Civil Status Marital Status: Single = 1, Married = 2,
Widowed = 3, Divorce/Separate = 4, Un-
known = 5
LFS, POEA
Occupation 1 O cials of Government and Special-
Interest Organizations, Corporate Execu-
tives, Managers, Managing Proprietors and
Supervisors; 2 Professionals, 3 Technicians
and Associate Professionals, 4 Clerks, 5 Ser-
vice Workers and Shop and Market Sales
Workers, 6 Farmers, Forestry Workers and
Fishermen, 7 Trades and Related Workers,
8 Plant and machine Operators and Assem-
blers, 9 Laborers and Unskilled Workers, 10
Special Occupation
LFS, POEA
Region 0 NCR (reference), 1 Ilocos, 2 Cagayan
Valley, 3 Central Luzon, 5 Bicol, 6 West-
ern Visayas, 7 Central Visayas, 8 Eastern
Visayas, 9 Zamboanga Peninsula, 10 North-
ern Mindanao, 11 Davao, 12 SOCSKSAR-
GEN, 14 Cordillera, 15 ARMM, 16 Caraga,
41 CALABARZON, 42 MIMAROPA
LFS, POEA
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Table 4.2: Sample Distribution by Top Destination Country and Sex
Freq. Percent Females Males
Saudi Arabia 43,654 41.3 25.6 74.5
UAE 17,942 17.0 44.0 56.0
Qatar 9,319 8.8 19.6 80.4
Kuwait 3,668 3.5 52.0 48.0
Singapore 2,077 2.0 53.3 46.7
Canada 1,876 1.8 57.3 42.7
Taiwan 1,706 1.6 59.9 40.1
Italy 1,388 1.3 65.6 34.4
Korea 1,361 1.3 14.3 85.7
China 1,291 1.2 41.2 58.8
Hongkong 1,043 1.0 92.3 7.7
Bahrain 1,042 1.0 49.2 50.8
USA 809 0.8 45.9 54.1
Malaysia 746 0.7 30.7 69.3
Australia 676 0.6 11.4 88.6
Japan 589 0.6 41.8 58.2
Great Britain 372 0.4 68.0 32.0
Other 16,032 15.2 26.9 73.1
Total 105,591 100
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Table 4.3: Sample Distribution by Country and Occupation
PHL AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials, Managers, and Executives 14.3 9.4 9.8 13.6 25.2 3.0 3.0 1.2 9.9 8.2
Professionals 4.4 16.2 18.6 3.8 52.5 2.5 0.7 7.3 16.5 43.3
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 2.5 7.6 9.8 2.9 5.1 2.0 0.2 0.8 10.1 6.0
Clerks 5.1 5.8 7.2 3.8 6.3 0.3 4.5 69.7 9.5 9.1
Service and Sales Workers 10.0 7.9 20.9 59.2 2.0 0.2 11.7 0.7 21.0 9.4
Farmers, Forestry Workers, & Fishermen 17.6 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 2.4
Trades and Related Workers 7.2 48.1 11.4 6.4 4.5 0.0 1.2 14.6 9.0 7.7
Plant and Machine Operators 5.4 2.1 2.7 1.8 0.4 0.0 0.2 1.8 2.4 0.9
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 33.1 2.1 18.6 7.4 2.3 91.5 78.2 3.7 21.3 12.0
Special Occupation 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.2 1.6 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.4 1.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER Total
O cials, Managers, Executives 7.6 10.5 10.0 18.2 0.2 9.9 10.8 6.4 18.7 12.5
Professionals 34.7 14.1 24.1 36.4 1.8 14.2 29.0 53.2 21.7 13.5
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 7.6 10.5 12.4 12.9 0.8 11.9 3.8 4.2 8.0 7.0
Clerks 11.8 11.4 9.3 7.9 58.7 17.1 0.8 1.9 8.7 9.0
Service and Sales Workers 10.3 11.0 6.6 4.2 30.6 19.7 28.0 7.4 6.8 10.7
Farmers, Forestry Workers & Fishermen 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 7.7
Trades and Related Workers 10.8 28.6 23.8 5.1 6.3 13.6 5.1 22.5 20.5 14.2
Plant and Machine Operators 2.0 4.2 5.0 0.9 0.2 2.5 1.1 0.1 4.7 4.5
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 12.0 9.4 8.4 12.2 1.3 10.6 20.7 3.6 10.2 20.6
Special Occupation 2.0 0.5 0.3 1.7 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 4.4: Distribution of Males by Country by Occupation
PHL AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials, Managers, and Executives 11 8 11 16 26 19 5 1 13 10
Professionals 2 12 24 3 53 23 1 6 17 44
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 2 8 11 4 5 20 0 1 10 8
Clerks 3 6 5 5 4 0 10 70 11 9
Service and Sales Workers 8 8 18 42 3 1 14 0 22 4
Farmers, Forestry Workers & Fishermen 25 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3
Trades and Related Workers 9 53 22 14 7 0 3 16 18 13
Plant and Machine Operators 8 2 5 3 1 0 1 2 5 1
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 31 2 3 10 0 33 66 3 5 6
Special Occupation 1 1 1 0 1 5 0 0 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER Total
O cials, Managers, and Executives 8 11 12 20 0 11 11 4 20 12
Professionals 37 14 14 36 3 14 32 36 18 10
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 8 10 12 17 1 12 8 4 9 7
Clerks 14 11 11 7 80 14 1 2 10 9
Service and Sales Workers 11 9 7 4 4 17 20 11 6 9
Farmers, Forestry Workers & Fishermen 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 10
Trades and Related Workers 15 35 31 11 12 24 16 42 27 21
Plant and Machine Operators 3 5 7 2 0 3 3 0 6 7
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 2 3 4 1 0 4 7 0 4 15
Special Occupation 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 4.5: Distribution of Females by Country by Occupation
PHL AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials, Managers and Executives 20 19 9 12 24 2 2 1 7 6
Professionals 8 49 13 5 52 1 0 15 16 42
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 3 8 8 2 5 1 0 0 11 3
Clerks 8 3 10 3 9 0 2 69 8 9
Service and Sales Workers 13 8 24 72 1 0 11 3 20 16
Farmers, Forestry Workers & Fishermen 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Trades and Related Workers 4 5 1 0 1 0 0 6 1 1
Plant and machine Operators 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 36 5 34 5 5 96 85 6 36 20
Special Occupation 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER Total
O cials, Managers and Executives 6 6 3 17 0 8 11 9 16 13
Professionals 30 16 54 37 1 14 28 73 32 20
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 6 11 13 10 1 12 2 5 5 7
Clerks 8 13 3 8 45 21 1 2 6 9
Service and Sales Workers 10 17 5 5 49 22 32 4 10 14
Farmers, Forestry Workers & Fishermen 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Trades and Related Workers 1 1 2 0 3 1 0 0 3 3
Plant and Machine Operators 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 35 34 20 22 2 19 27 7 27 30
Special Occupation 4 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 4.6: Years of Schooling, Local and Overseas Workers (predicted), Top and Other Destinations, by Sex
Domestic OCW Top Destinations Other Destinations
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
All 8.9 8.4 11.6 12.2 11.6 12.1 11.6 12.6
O cials, Managers and Executives 9.5 10.0 13.1 12.7 13.5 12.7 11.0 12.7
Professionals 14.0 14.0 13.9 14.0 13.9 14.0 14.0 14.0
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 11.6 11.8 12.8 13.3 12.8 13.2 14.0 13.5
Clerks 12.6 11.9 13.4 12.9 13.4 12.9 13.6 13.1
Service and Sales Workers 9.9 10.2 11.9 12.2 11.9 12.3 11.7 12.1
Farmers, Forestry Workers & Fishermen 6.2 6.1 9.6 10.0 8.5
Trades and Related Workers 7.9 8.6 11.0 11.3 11.0 11.3 10.0 11.0
Plant and Machine Operators 10.4 9.0 12.3 12.3 12.2 12.1 13.0 13.2
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 7.1 7.2 10.9 11.0 10.9 11.0 11.1 11.8
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Predicted schooling by top destination and sex is given in Table 4.7. Across
top destinations, overseas workers in Canada, Australia, and USA, have the highest
expected educational attainment at over 13 years followed by UK, China, Germany,
Japan, Italy, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan at over 12 years. Overseas workers in
United Arab Emirates, Hong-Kong, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Malaysia, and Bahrain
have over 11 years of expected schooling.
Table 4.7: Predicted Years of Schooling, by Top Destination Country and Sex
Country Female Male Total
AUS 13.25 13.05882 13.09524
BHR 10.62069 11.85714 11.02326
CAN 13.36111 12.66667 13.10526
CHN 12.41667 13.11765 12.82759
DEU 11.5 12.96296 12.77419
GRC 11.77778 13.6087 13.30909
HKG 11.57936 12.25 11.6194
ITA 12.07143 12.51429 12.31746
KOR 11.88889 12.27451 12.17391
KWT 10.57233 11.80488 10.825
JPN 11.44186 13.15447 12.71084
LBN 10.32143 10.32143
MYS 11.31915 10.92593 11.17568
QAT 11.18898 11.3522 11.27972
SAU 11.49521 11.54942 11.53247
SGP 11.67742 13.52941 12.2583
CHN 12.10784 11.90476 12.0303
ARE 11.85561 12.02593 11.92702
GBR 12.68571 13.05882 12.86957
USA 13.17391 12.9697 13.03448
Table 4.8 shows the predicted years of schooling for overseas workers by oc-
cupation and sex. Among overseas workers across occupations, professionals have
the highest expected years of schooling at 14 years, equivalent to having completed
tertiary education, as would be expected. Technicians and associate professionals
and clerks follow at 13.1 years of schooling (incomplete tertiary or vocational edu-
cation). O cials in government, managers and executives are expected to have an
average of 12.8 years of schooling, followed by plant and machine operators (12.3),
service and sales workers (12.0), and trades and related workers (11.2), all equiva-
lent to incomplete tertiary education. The occupations with the lowest educational
attainment are farmers, forestry workers and fishermen (9.6)(i.e. incomplete sec-
ondary education), laborers and unskilled workers (10.9)(i.e. complete secondary
4.5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 197
education).
Table 4.8: Predicted Years of Schooling by Occupation and Sex
Occupation Female Male Total
O cials of Government and Special-Inte 13.1 12.7 12.8
Professionals 13.9 14.0 14.0
Technicians and Associate Professionals 12.8 13.3 13.1
Clerks 13.4 12.9 13.1
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sale 11.9 12.2 12.0
Farmers, Forestry Workers and Fishermen 9.6 9.6
Trades and Related Workers 11.0 11.3 11.2
Plant and machine Operators and Assemble 12.3 12.3 12.3
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 10.9 11.0 10.9
Table 4.9 shows the predicted schooling of Filipino workers by country and
occupation. Overseas Filipino workers across destinations are expected to have a
higher level of education than local workers. This is also true for most occupations.
As in the Philippines, professionals across practically all destinations are expected to
have complete tertiary education, except in Italy. While technicians and associate
professionals in the Philippines on average have only incomplete tertiary educa-
tion (11.7 years of schooling), those in Australia, Canada, Hongkong, Bahrain and
Kuwait are expected to have on average complete tertiary education. While those
in other countries are also expected to have on average less than complete tertiary
education, they have no less than 12 years of expected schooling. Local clerks are
expected to have only incomplete tertiary education. Clerks overseas are generally
expected to have a higher education level than those in the Philippines, with those
in China and Italy even having complete tertiary education. However, those in
Bahrain and Qatar are expected to have slightly less schooling. O cials, managers
and executives and service workers across destinations are expected to have more
schooling than those in the Philippines. Trade workers in most destinations are
expected to have more schooling than those in the Philippines, except in Malaysia
where they are expected to have the same schooling. Plant and machine operators
and assemblers, and laborers and unskilled workers overseas are also expected to
have more schooling than their local counterparts. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 show the
predicted schooling by country and occupation for males and females, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Predicted Years of Schooling by Country and Occupation
PHL AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
All 8.6 13.1 11.0 13.1 12.8 11.6 12.3 12.2 10.8 12.7
O cials of Government and Special-Inte 9.8 14 14 13.2 12.7 12 13.4 14
Professionals 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 14 14 14
Technicians and Associate Professionals 11.7 14 14 14 12.4 14 12 12.5 14 13.1
Clerks 12.3 12 12.8 14 12.7 14 13 14
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sale 10 13.3 11.6 13.1 12.4 11.7 12.4 11.5 11 12.1
Farmers, Forestry Workers and Fishermen 6.2 10 10
Trades and Related Workers 8.4 12.2 10 13 13.7 11.3 11.3 12.7 10.7 12.5
Plant and machine Operators and Assemble 9.1 13.7 12 12.6 13.8 12 12.8 12.1 10.3 13.3
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 7.1 12.5 10 13 12 11.6 12.1 11.5 10.3 11.7
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER
All 11.2 11.3 11.5 12.3 12.0 11.9 12.9 13.0 12.3
O cials of Government and Special-Inte 12 12.2 12.6 13.8 14 12.3 12.7 13.3 12.4
Professionals 14 13.9 14 13.9 13 13.9 14 14 14
Technicians and Associate Professionals 12 13.5 12.7 13.5 12 13.1 14 13.7 13.6
Clerks 12.5 12.1 13.2 13.8 13.3 13.3 12.8 13.8 13.3
Service Workers and Shop and Market Sale 12.3 12 11.5 13.2 11.5 11.9 12.7 12.7 11.9
Farmers, Forestry Workers and Fishermen 14 10 8 10 10 8 8.5
Trades and Related Workers 10 10.7 11 13.3 11.1 11.1 12.8 11.3 11
Plant and machine Operators and Assemble 13.5 10.6 10.8 13.6 12.1 11.3 13.6 13.5 13.2
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 10.3 10.4 10.2 11.2 12.2 10.8 11.6 10.9 11.3
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Table 4.10: Predicted Years of Schooling by Top Destination by Occupation: Males
AUS BHR CAN CHN DEU GRC HKG ITA KOR KWT
O cials, Managers and Executives 14 12 14 16 12 13.2 14
Professionals 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Technicians and Associate Professionals 14 14 14 12.7 14 13.6 14 14 14 14
Clerks 12.7 14 14 13 14
Service and Sales Workers 13.6 12.7 12.6 12.3 11.5 12.7 11.3 12.3 11.5 11.3
Farmers, Forestry Workers and Fishermen 10 10
Trades and Related Workers 12.2 10 13 13.7 12.8 13.3 12 11.3 13 11.3
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers 13.7 12 12.6 13.8 13.3 13.8 12 13 12.2 10.3
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 13.3 12 12 12 12 11.3 13.3 10.6 10.6 13
JPN MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA 0
O cials, Managers and Executives 10 12.2 12.6 13.7 14 11.8 12.7 13 12.7
Professionals 14 13.8 14.0 13.9 14 14 14 14 14.0
Technicians and Associate Professionals 14 13.3 12.7 13.5 12 12.8 14 13.6 13.5
Clerks 12 10.75 13.1 14 12 13.0 12 13.3 13.1
Service and Sales Workers 13.1 12.7 12.1 11.8 13.2 14 12.2 13.1 12.4 12.1
Farmers, Forestry Workers and Fishermen 14 10 8 10 10 8 8.5
Trades and Related Workers 12.5 10 10.7 11.0 13.3 10.9 11.1 13.3 11.3 11.0
Plant and Machine Operators and Assemblers 13.4 13.5 10.6 10.7 13.6 12.1 11.3 13.6 13.5 13.2
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 8.5 10.6 10.4 13.3 12 11.4 12.7 11.5 11.8
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Table 4.11: Predicted Years of Schooling by Top Destination by Occupation: Females
AUS BHR CAN CHN DEU GRC HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials, Managers and Executives 14 14 11 14
Professionals 14 14 14 14 12 14 14
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 14 14 12 12 11.6 14 11.71
Clerks 12 13 14 12 12.7 13 14
Service and Sales Workers 12 11 13.3 12.7 10 12.7 11.8 13 11.5 10.9 11.3
Trades and Related Workers 10 10 9.3 13
Plant and Machine Operators 12 14 12 11.3 12
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 10 9.9 13.2 12 12 10 11.6 11.9 13 10.3 11.1
LBN MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER
O cials, Managers and Executives 14 14 14 14 13.2 14 11
Professionals 14 13.9 14 12 13.9 14 14 14
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 12 11.5 14 12.7 13.5 12 13.5 14 14 14
Clerks 14 13 13.5 13.7 14 13.4 13.3 14 13.6
Service and Sales Workers 10 12.2 11.9 11.1 13.2 11.3 11.8 12.4 13.1 11.7
Trades and Related Workers 10.7 11 12 12 10
Plant and Machine Operators 14 12 14 12.1 14 13
Laborers and Unskilled Workers 10.2 10.9 10.4 10.1 11.1 12.3 10.7 11.3 10.6 11.1
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4.6 Regression Analysis
Table 4.12 shows the results of the first stage regression of schooling on age, sex
(female as reference), destination country (other countries as reference), civil status
(single as reference) and region (National Capital as reference) using the data on the
Survey of Overseas Filipinos. It shows that years of schooling decreases with age.
Males have more schooling than females. Across destinations, workers in roughly half
of the countries have on average complete college education, namely in Europe, the
North America, but also in China, Japan and Hong Kong. In the other major Asian
destinations and in the Middle East, the average worker has less than complete
college education. Across occupations, only professionals have at least complete
college education on average. Most overseas workers in other occupations have only
incomplete college education and farmers and fishermen have only an average of
complete secondary education. Across regions of origin, workers from over 4 out
of 10 regions have at least complete college education, higher than the educational
attainment of those from the National Capital. Workers from almost quarter of the
regions have the same education as those from the capital. Workers from almost 3
out of 10 regions have less education than those from the capital. The table also
shows the di↵erent schooling by marital status.
4.6.1 Returns to migration and education
Overseas versus domestic workers
Using equation 4.4, earnings and returns to schooling of overseas workers relative to
domestic workers are estimated by relating wages in the POEA dataset to predicted
schooling from the SOF dataset. Results show that earnings are higher but returns
to education are lower for overseas workers. Table 4.6.1 shows the results of the
regression of wage on the interactions between migration and schooling, experience
and its square, and on civil status, region, and occupation. Overseas Filipino workers
on average earn more than their domestic counterparts. Overseas workers earn
almost 3.1 times more than domestic workers, controlling for experience, sex, civil
status, occupation and region. While return on labor is higher for overseas workers,
return to schooling is higher for local workers. The return to schooling for local
workers is six percent per year, while that for overseas workers is 2.9 percentage
points lower, or about half that of local workers. This is not at all surprising and
consistent with the fact that labor is more abundant in Philippines but human
capital is more scarce. Thus, labor wage is lower in the Philippines and higher
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Table 4.12: 1st Stage Regression: Schooling on Age, Sex, Destination Country, Civil
Status, and Region
Coe cient Robust S.E.
Age -0.0176*** 0.0038
Male 0.2424*** 0.0705
Australia 0.6192** 0.2372
Bahrain -0.7076* 0.3259
Canada 0.9596*** 0.1601
China 0.5773** 0.2204
Germany 0.4530 0.2705
Greece 0.8420*** 0.2138
Hong Kong 0.3394* 0.1492
Italy 0.5084* 0.2395
Korea -0.0457 0.2497
Kuwait -0.8365*** 0.1806
Japan 0.4608** 0.1479
Lebanon -1.0039** 0.3392
Malaysia -0.8046** 0.2615
Qatar -0.7073*** 0.1369
Saudi Arabia -0.6892*** 0.1013
Singapore 0.0994 0.1199
Taiwan -0.0100 0.1734
United Arab Emirates -0.3717*** 0.1106
Great Britain 0.3255 0.2322
United States 0.4211** 0.1381
Professionals 1.1000*** 0.1645
Technicians and Assoc. Professionals 0.1013 0.1839
Clerks 0.2943 0.1874
Service and Sales Workers -0.9371*** 0.1777
Farmers, Forestry and Fishermen -3.5792*** 0.5888
Trades and Related Workers -1.5054*** 0.1795
Plant and machine Operators... -0.8005*** 0.1787
Laborers and Unskilled -1.8187*** 0.1766
Married -0.2963*** 0.0691
Widowed -0.8273** 0.2804
Separated -0.4406** 0.1639
Unknown -1.4708* 0.5857
Common-law 0.4305 0.5234
Ilocos 0.0538 0.1093
Cagayan Valley -0.1133 0.1266
Central Luzon -0.3798*** 0.1127
Bicol 0.1363 0.1502
Western Visayas 0.4628*** 0.1222
Central Visayas 0.3770** 0.1335
Eastern Visayas 0.5915*** 0.1557
Zamboanga 0.5232* 0.2300
Northern Mindanao 0.4028* 0.1571
Davao -0.3304 0.2007
SoCSKSarGen -0.4050* 0.1725
Cordillera 0.2789 0.1615
ARMM -1.0870*** 0.2507
Caraga 0.3499* 0.1747
CaLaBaRZon -0.2235* 0.1040
MiMaRoPa 0.0208 0.1842
Constant 13.8166*** 0.2297
Adjusted R2 0.3075
Observations 4322
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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abroad, while return to schooling is higher in the Philippines and lower abroad.
This is consistent with the stylized fact of diminishing returns to income: returns to
education decrease as a country’s per capita income increases (Psacharopoulos, 1993;
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). Higher return on labor warrants temporary
migration despite lower return on human capital.
Table 4.13: Return on Labor and Human Capital, Local and Overseas Workers, and
by Sex
(1) (2)
coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
OCW 1.421*** (0.103) 1.161*** (0.175)
Male 0.0102 (0.0106) 0.787*** (0.0283)
OCW*Male 0.566** (0.202)
Semi-Elasticity
OCW 3.11858*** 0.423209 2.14533*** 0.545072
Male 1.1961*** 0.062079
OCW*Male 0.724987** 0.34432
Schooling 0.0604*** (0.00175) 0.0934*** (0.00261)
MALE*Schooling -0.0411*** (0.00220)
OCW*Schooling -0.0287*** (0.00736) 0.00150 (0.0118)
OCW*Male*Schooling -0.0772*** (0.0135)
Experience 0.0321*** (0.00104) 0.0281*** (0.00143)
Male*Experience -0.000883 (0.00162)
OCW*Experience -0.0432*** (0.00374) -0.0216** (0.00702)
OCW*Male*Experience -0.0137 (0.00839)
Experience Squared -0.000451*** (0.0000198) -0.000320*** (0.0000295)
Male*Exper.Sq. -0.0000562 (0.0000346)
OCW*Exper.Sq. 0.000492*** (0.0000849) -0.0000575 (0.000177)
OCW*Male*Exper.Sq 0.000443* (0.000203)
constant -0.428*** (0.0420) -0.959*** (0.0479)
N 95475 95475
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
4.6.2 Overseas versus domestic workers by sex
Regression results for Equation 4.2 decomposing returns to labor and human capital
for local and overseas workers by sex are shown in Table 4.6.1 column (2). Local
male workers on average earn 119 percent more than their female counterparts, but
return on schooling for local male workers is 4.1 percentage points lower, or 5.2
percent. Relative to local female workers, female overseas workers earn 215 percent
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more. The return to schooling for local female workers is 9.3 percent. The return
to schooling for female overseas workers is not significantly di↵erent from that of
local female workers. Male overseas workers earn 73 percent more than their local
or female counterparts, but the return to schooling for male overseas workers is 7.7
percentage points lower than that of their local or female counterparts. So even if
overseas workers earn less for their level of education, they work overseas because
they earn much more for sheer labor. This is the case on average and applies to men
in particular. Filipino women overseas earn more for their labor than their local
counterpart, but earn as much for their human capital.
4.6.3 Major and other destinations
Return on labor is lower but return on education is higher in top destinations.
Table 4.14 disaggregates returns to labor and human capital for overseas workers
into that for the 20 major destinations and all others. Surprisingly, return on labor
in top destination countries is 26 percent less than that for local workers. If theory
suggests that higher incomes in destination countries motivate migration, then why
do most Filipinos work in countries that pay less for their labor? It turns out that
while these countries pay less for labor, they pay more for human capital. Return
on schooling in top destinations are 11 percentage points more than that in the
Philippines (7.3 percent). So, human capital abroad is not as cheap after all, not
in top destination countries as a whole. Obviously, this matters only if you have
su cient education. A Filipino worker without schooling would not choose to work
in these countries. However, those with more education would. Not surprisingly,
Filipinos in top destinations on average have more years of schooling (12.2) than
local workers. Returns to labor in other countries is 96 percent higher than that
for local workers. However, they have lower returns to schooling. These results
seem to be driving those for overseas workers at large. Labor returns are su ciently
attractive to warrant temporary migration. It appears that other countries provide
a di↵erent incentive system for temporary migrants from that of top destinations,
one that is not based so much on education. In fact, workers who are unable to
work in top destinations due to lack of education or skill might be the ones who end
up in other destinations.
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Table 4.14: Earnings Function by Domestic, Top and Other Destinations
(1) (2)
coef. std.err. coef. std.err.
Top Destinations -0.300*** (0.0798) 0.538*** (0.114)
Other Destinations 0.956* (0.464) 4.184*** (1.088)
Male 0.825*** (0.0278)
Top*Male -1.202*** (0.128)
Other*Male -4.514*** (1.191)
SEMI-ELASTICITY
Top Destinations -0.261306*** 0.058823 0.701704*** 0.192964
Other Destinations 1.33642 1.02887 35.3126 30.2426
Male 1.28105*** 0.06347
Top*Male -0.701808*** 0.037881
Other*Male -0.994611*** 0.004693
Schooling 0.0727*** (0.00164) 0.106*** (0.00243)
Top Destinations*Schooling 0.106*** (0.00590) 0.0509*** (0.00782)
Other Destinations*Schooling -0.146*** (0.0316) -0.315*** (0.0734)
Male*Schooling -0.0462*** (0.00215)
Top*Male*Schooling 0.0672*** (0.00855)
Other*Male*Schooling 0.223** (0.0803)
Experience 0.0275*** (0.000986) 0.0250*** (0.00139)
Top Destination*Experience -0.0203*** (0.00252) -0.00700 (0.00454)
Other*Experience -0.0465** (0.0175) -0.111* (0.0437)
Male*Experience -0.00242 (0.00159)
Top*Male*Experience -0.00730 (0.00549)
Other*Male*Experience 0.104* (0.0478)
Experience Squared -0.000374*** (0.0000189) -0.000262*** (0.0000290)
Top*Exper.Sq. 0.000390*** (0.0000555) -0.0000392 (0.000109)
Other*Exper.Sq. 0.000603 (0.000359) 0.000899 (0.00100)
Male*Exper.Sq. -0.0000465 (0.0000341)
Top*Male*Exper.Sq. 0.000382** (0.000127)
Other*Male*Exper.Sq. -0.000876 (0.00108)
cons -0.505*** (0.0374) -0.996*** (0.0422)
N 95475 95475
Standard errors in parentheses
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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4.6.4 Major and other destinations by sex
Table 4.14 Column (2) disaggregates returns to labor and human capital further by
sex. Female overseas workers in top destination countries earn 70 percentage points
more for their labor than their local counterparts. On top of this, the return to
their schooling is 5.1 percentage points higher than that for their local counterparts
(10.6 percent). The top destinations seem to be attractive to females, both skilled
and unskilled. On the other hand, male overseas workers in top destinations earn
70 percentage points less for their labor than their local and female counterparts.
However, the return to their schooling is 6.7 percentage points higher. The top des-
tinations are more attractive to skilled men than unskilled men. Returns to labor for
female overseas workers in other destinations are 4.2 times higher than that for their
local counterparts, although returns to their schooling is less. Conversely, although
male overseas workers in other countries earn less than their local counterparts, re-
turn on their schooling is up to 22 percentage points more. Other destinations are
more attractive to unskilled than skilled females but more attractive to skilled than
unskilled men.
4.6.5 Individual major destinations
Earnings are higher but returns to education are lower in most top destinations.
Table 4.15 shows return on labor and human capital in top destination countries.
Returns to labor in most of the top destination countries are higher than in the
Philippines. Overseas Filipino workers earn over five times more in Australia, Italy,
and Japan, over three times more in Canada, China, Taiwan, and USA, two times
more in Kuwait, over twice as much in Bahrain and Malaysia, and almost 40 percent
more in UAE than in the Philippines. The wage di↵erentials are su cient to explain
why these countries are top destinations. Human capital does not receive additional
incentive. Returns to schooling in Bahrain, Canada, Malaysia, and the United
States are not significantly di↵erent from those in the Philippines. Actually, returns
to schooling resembling those of developing countries like the Philippines are already
high for developed countries considering the stylized fact of decreasing returns to
income. Returns to schooling are lower in Australia, China, Italy, Korea, Kuwait,
Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan than in the Philippines. The return to schooling is
higher only in UAE.
4.6.
R
E
G
R
E
S
S
IO
N
A
N
A
LY
S
IS
207
Table 4.15: Human Capital Earnings Function by Destination in PPP (Philippines as reference)
Destination Semi-elasticity Dest*Schooling Dest*Experience Dest*ExperSquared
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Australia 5.11*** 0.761 123.08 82.262 -0.19*** 0.045 -0.06 0.036 0 0.001
Bahrain 1.71*** 0.396 0.00 0.000 -0.04 0.025 -0.04 0.022 0.00* 0.001
Canada 3.50*** 0.751 0.00 0.000 -0.05 0.050 -0.08* 0.033 0.00* 0.001
China 3.38*** 0.822 20.00 14.717 -0.14* 0.056 -0.01 0.022 0 0.000
Hongkong 0.93 0.600 0.00 0.000 0.09* 0.045 -0.07** 0.025 0.00* 0.001
Italy 5.43*** 1.144 0.00 0.000 -0.29** 0.093 -0.03 0.044 0 0.001
Korea 7.92 4.136 -0.47 0.532 -0.76** 0.272 0.12 0.166 -0.01 0.005
Kuwait 2.07*** 0.230 6.69*** 1.747 -0.11*** 0.015 0.03** 0.011 0 0.000
Japan 5.51** 1.918 38.19 38.690 -0.36** 0.138 -0.01 0.060 0 0.001
Malaysia 1.08** 0.329 1.78** 0.890 -0.01 0.017 0.03 0.021 0 0.000
Qatar -1.22*** 0.143 0.00 0.000 0.15*** 0.010 -0.03*** 0.006 0.00*** 0.000
Saudi Arabia 0.01 0.080 0.00 0.000 0.06*** 0.006 -0.02*** 0.003 0.00*** 0.000
Singapore 0.23 0.413 0.16 0.458 0.08** 0.028 0.03** 0.011 -0.00* 0.000
Taiwan 3.46*** 0.185 0.00 0.000 -0.04*** 0.010 -0.02** 0.007 0.00** 0.000
UAE 0.39** 0.148 0.00 0.000 0.03** 0.011 0.01 0.005 -0.00* 0.000
Great Britain 0.95 1.263 0.00 0.000 0.04 0.083 0.02 0.047 0 0.001
United States 3.18*** 0.931 14.54 11.831 -0.06 0.054 -0.04 0.035 0 0.001
Other 1.41** 0.465 2.67* 1.618 -0.18*** 0.032 -0.05** 0.018 0 0.000
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Earnings are not higher for some destinations but returns to schooling are
higher. While the return to labor is lower in Qatar than in the Philippines, the return
to schooling is 15.1 percentage points higher. Returns to labor for overseas workers in
Hong Kong, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and U.K. are not significantly di↵erent
from that of local workers. Nevertheless, returns to schooling are higher in Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. This is surprising considering that 91 percent
of overseas workers in Hong Kong are laborers and unskilled workers.
There are no income and return on schooling gains for a few destinations.
The return to schooling in the U.K. is not significantly di↵erent from that in the
Philippines, and they are even lower in Korea. The puzzle is why do Filipinos work
in the U.K. and Korea without apparent gains to either their labor or human capital?
Does experience pay where labor and education do not? Column 6 shows returns to
experience. While returns to experience are higher in Kuwait and Singapore, returns
to experience in Korea and the U.K. are not significantly di↵erent from those in the
Philippines.
4.6.6 Individual major destinations by sex
Earnings are lower but returns to schooling are higher for males in some top destina-
tions. With no apparent gains to labor, schooling, and experience in some countries,
are the gains obscured by the averages? Disaggregating by sex might shed light on
the issue. Table 4.16 shows the returns to labor and schooling for male overseas
Filipino workers by destination. Returns to male labor is lower in top destination
countries particularly in Hong Kong, Kuwait, Qatar, Taiwan, and the United King-
dom than in the Philippines. Nevertheless, returns to male schooling are higher in
Hong Kong, Kuwait, Taiwan, and the UK than in the Philippines. Over 63 percent
of male Filipino workers in Hong-Kong are either managers and executive, profes-
sionals, or associate professionals. In Taiwan, 80 percent of male Filipino workers
do clerical work. However, return to male schooling in Qatar is not significantly
di↵erent from that in the Philippines.
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Table 4.16: Human Capital Earnings Function by Destination in PPP: Males
Destination Schooling Experience Experience Squared
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Australia 1.77 1.40 -0.12 -0.12 -0.06 0.121 0 0.0033
Bahrain 0.83 1.19 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 0.054 0 0.0013
Canada 1.24 1.88 -0.2 -0.20 0.15* 0.065 0 0.0017
China 0.03 1.88 -0.07 -0.07 0.11** 0.044 -0.00** 0.0009
Hongkong -3.73** 1.18 0.20** 0.20 0.15 0.081 0 0.0016
Italy 0.3 1.84 -0.14 -0.14 0.09 0.080 0 0.0017
Korea 41.90*** 9.09 -2.93*** -2.93 0.13 0.296 -0.01 0.0081
Kuwait -2.91*** 0.45 0.22*** 0.22 -0.04 0.022 0.00** 0.0005
Japan -0.49 4.42 0.26 0.26 -0.2 0.129 0 0.0030
Malaysia 0.29 0.67 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 0.051 0 0.0012
Qatar -1.02*** 0.31 0.03 0.03 0.04* 0.017 0 0.0004
Saudi Arabia 0.33* 0.13 -0.04*** -0.04 0 0.005 0 0.0001
Singapore 1.68* 0.82 -0.11* -0.11 -0.01 0.025 0 0.0007
Taiwan -2.34*** 0.35 0.16*** 0.16 0.01 0.019 0 0.0005
UAE 0.68* 0.27 -0.07*** -0.07 0 0.010 0 0.0003
Great Britain -10.26*** 2.41 0.76*** 0.76 0.06 0.113 0 0.0023
USA 2.89 2.32 -0.19 -0.19 -0.04 0.075 0 0.0015
Other -4.32*** 1.19 0.21** 0.21 0.10* 0.048 0 0.0011
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Earnings and returns to schooling are higher for a few top destinations. Re-
turns to male labor are higher only for Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and UAE,
and return on male schooling is higher in Singapore but lower in Korea, Saudi Ara-
bia, and UAE. In Singapore, over 72 percent of male workers are either managers
and executives, professionals or associate professionals.
Earnings and returns to schooling for males are not higher in some top des-
tinations. Returns to male Filipino labor in Australia, Bahrain, Canada, China,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and the USA are not significantly di↵erent from that in the
Philippines. Moreover, returns to male schooling in Australia, Bahrain, Canada,
China, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and USA are not significantly di↵erent from that
in the Philippines. So why do Filipino males work in these countries if there are
no apparent gains on either their labor or human capital? Does work experience
pay for what sheer e↵ort and education cannot? Returns to experience are higher
in Canada, China, and Qatar, but not significantly di↵erent in Australia, Bahrain,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, and USA.
Earnings are higher but returns to schooling are the same or lower for females
in most top destinations. Table 4.17 shows the returns to labor and schooling for
female overseas workers. Returns to labor for female overseas workers are higher in
most destination countries. Returns to labor for females is 7.5 times more in Japan
than in the Philippines, 5.4 times more in Taiwan, 4.7 times more in the U.K., over
3 times more in Australia, China, Hong Kong, Italy, Kuwait, and twice as much
in Malaysia. This is expected for Hong Kong, Italy, Kuwait and Malaysia where
96 percent, 85 percent, 36 percent and 35 percent of the female overseas workers,
respectively, work as laborers and unskilled workers. However, returns to female
schooling in Australia, China, Italy and Malaysia are not significantly di↵erent from
that in the Philippines, and lower in Hong-Kong, Kuwait, Japan, Taiwan and the
UK. While return to female labor is lower in Korea than in the Philippines, return
to female schooling is higher. So for the preceding countries, female workers either
gain on their labor or their human capital.
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Table 4.17: Human Capital Earnings Function by Destination in PPP: Females
Destination Schooling Experience Experience Squared
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Australia 3.77*** 1.08 -0.11 0.06 0 0.116 0 0.0032
Bahrain 1.29 1.03 -0.03 0.06 0 0.046 0 0.0011
Canada 2.17 1.68 0.08 0.12 -0.13** 0.047 0.00* 0.0013
China 3.64** 1.17 -0.12 0.08 -0.07* 0.033 0 0.0007
Hongkong 3.16*** 0.51 -0.08* 0.04 -0.08** 0.026 0.00** 0.0007
Italy 3.69*** 0.92 -0.09 0.06 -0.09 0.048 0 0.0010
Korea -19.55* 8.02 1.15* 0.55 -0.12 0.211 0.01 0.0060
Kuwait 3.05*** 0.30 -0.19*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.015 -0.00*** 0.0003
Japan 7.53* 3.44 -0.67* 0.26 0.13 0.093 0 0.0018
Malaysia 1.05* 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.044 0 0.0011
Qatar -0.45 0.27 0.13*** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.016 0.00** 0.0004
Saudi Arabia -0.12 0.11 0.08*** 0.01 -0.01*** 0.004 0.00** 0.0001
Singapore -0.04 0.56 0.09* 0.04 0.04* 0.019 0 0.0006
Taiwan 5.43*** 0.19 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.006 0.00*** 0.0001
UAE 0.15 0.19 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.007 -0.00* 0.0002
Great Britain 4.76*** 1.40 -0.22* 0.09 -0.02 0.063 0 0.0014
USA 0.5 2.03 0.12 0.13 0 0.063 0 0.0013
Other 4.60*** 1.09 -0.35*** 0.07 -0.11* 0.044 0 0.0010
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Earnings are not di↵erent but returns to schooling are higher for females in
a few top destinations. In contrast, returns on female labor in Bahrain, Canada,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE and USA are not significantly di↵erent from
that in the Philippines. Nevertheless, returns to female schooling are higher in
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and UAE. In Saudi Arabia, 54 percent of female
overseas workers are professionals. In Singapore, 37 percent are professionals, an-
other 17 percent are managers and executives, and another 18 percent are associate
professionals and clerks.
Earnings and returns to schooling for females are not di↵erent in a few top
destinations. However, returns to female schooling in Bahrain, Canada, and USA
are not signficantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines. Again, why would Filipino
women work in Bahrain, Canada and the USA without apparent gains on either their
labor or their human capital? 73 percent of female overseas workers in the United
States are professionals. Do income gains from experience make up for low returns
to labor and education? While return on experience is higher in Kuwait, returns
in Bahrain and the USA are not significantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines,
and the return in Canada is even lower. Are they gaining enough with returns to
schooling comparable to that in the Philippines? Considering the cost of living (i.e.
in PPP), they may not, but converted to Philippine pesos, they might.
4.6.7 Individual major destinations, in US Dollars
There are exchange rate gains on top of income gains or where there are no income
gains. With no apparent income gains to labor, schooling and experience in some
countries, why do Filipinos choose to work in these destinations? Do di↵erences in
cost of living create gains that otherwise seem non-existent? Table 4.18 shows the
human capital earnings function by destination country in US Dollars. The table
shows that there are monetary gains from di↵erences in cost of living between desti-
nation countries and the Philippines. If we take the ratio of the returns in US dollars
to those in PPP, we find gains of 18 percent in Australia, 31 percent in Bahrain, 22
percent in Canada, 8 percent in China, 10 percent in Italy, 32 percent in Kuwait, 16
percent in Japan, 8 percent in Malaysia, 3 percent in Taiwan, 15 percent in the US
and 117 percent in UAE. Moreover, while there are no real income gains in Korea
and Saudi Arabia, exchange rate gains are 8.16 times and 34 percent respectively.
There are also gains in returns to schooling from exchange rate conversions ranging
from 3 percent in Hongkong and Qatar, 5 percent in Singapore, 8 percent in China
and Saudi Arabia, 14 percent in UAE, and 25 percent in other destinations.
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Table 4.18: Human Capital Earnings Function by Country in US Dollars (Philippines as reference)
Destination Semi-elasticity Dest*Schooling Dest*Exper Dest*ExperSq
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Australia 6.02*** 0.761 305.94 203.48 -0.18*** 0.045 -0.06 0.036 0.0000 0.001
Bahrain 2.25*** 0.396 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.025 -0.04 0.022 0.00* 0.001
Canada 4.28*** 0.751 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.050 -0.08* 0.033 0.00* 0.001
China 3.66*** 0.823 26.64 19.39 -0.15** 0.056 -0.01 0.022 0.0000 0.000
Hongkong 1.08 0.600 0.00 0.00 0.09* 0.045 -0.06** 0.025 0.00* 0.001
Italy 5.97*** 1.144 0.00 0.00 -0.29** 0.092 -0.03 0.044 0.0000 0.001
Korea 8.16* 4.136 -0.32 0.68 -0.76** 0.272 0.12 0.166 -0.01 0.005
Kuwait 2.73*** 0.230 13.92 3.39 -0.11*** 0.015 0.03** 0.011 0.0000 0.000
Japan 6.38*** 1.916 93.46 93.25 -0.36** 0.138 -0.01 0.060 0.0000 0.001
Malaysia 1.16*** 0.329 2.02* 0.97 -0.01 0.017 0.03 0.021 0.0000 0.000
Qatar -0.68*** 0.144 0.00 0.00 0.16*** 0.010 -0.03*** 0.006 0.00*** 0.000
Saudi Arabia 0.34*** 0.081 0.00 0.00 0.06*** 0.006 -0.02*** 0.003 0.00*** 0.000
Singapore 0.56 0.414 0.61 0.64 0.08** 0.028 0.03** 0.011 -0.00* 0.000
Taiwan 3.57*** 0.185 0.00 0.00 -0.04*** 0.010 -0.02** 0.007 0.00** 0.000
UAE 0.85*** 0.149 0.00 0.00 0.03** 0.011 0.01 0.005 -0.00* 0.000
Great Britain 1.69 1.264 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.083 0.02 0.047 0.0000 0.001
United States 3.65*** 0.932 24.03 19.07 -0.05 0.054 -0.04 0.035 0.0000 0.001
Other 2.29*** 0.477 7.82* 3.98 -0.23*** 0.033 -0.05** 0.018 0.0000 0.000
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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4.6.8 Individual major destinations by sex, in US Dollars
Table 4.19 shows the human capital earnings function by destination in US dollars
for males. The monetary gains in earnings from the exchange rate range from one
percent in Qatar, two percent in Taiwan, three percent in Hong Kong, Singapore,
and UAE, to 24 percent in other destinations. On the other hand, there is an
exchange rate loss of two percent in Saudi Arabia. There are exchange rate gains to
returns to schooling of three percent in Saudi Arabia, four percent in Hongkong, but
there is an exchange rate loss of two percent, in Taiwan and UAE, and three percent
in Singapore. There remain no income gains for males in Australia, Bahrain, Italy,
Japan, Malaysia, and USA.
For females, the human capital earnings function by destination in US dollars
is shown in Table 4.20. Taking the ratio of returns in US dollars to those in PPP, the
monetary gains from the exchange rate range from 2 percent in Taiwan, 7 percent
in China and Hongkong, 8 percent in Malaysia, 12 percent in Japan, 14 percent
in Italy, 15 percent in Great Britain, and 5 percent in other destinations. While
there are no real income gains in Saudi Arabia and UAE, monetary gains are 25
percent and 62 percent, respectively. There are also exchange rate gains to returns
to schooling ranging from 1 percent in Qatar, 2 percent in Saudi Arabia, 4 percent
in Hongkong, 5 percent in Singapore, and 6 percent in UAE. On the other hand,
there is a 2 percent exchange rate loss in Great Britain. However, there remain no
gains to earnings and returns to schooling for female Filipino workers in Bahrain,
Canada, and the US.
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Table 4.19: Human Capital Earnings Function by Destination in USD: Males
Destination Schooling Experience Experience Squared
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Australia 1.69 1.40 -0.11 0.08 -0.06 0.12 0 0.0033
Bahrain 0.83 1.19 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 0.05 0 0.0013
Canada 1.32 1.88 -0.21 0.13 0.15* 0.06 0 0.0017
China 0.13 1.89 -0.08 0.13 0.11** 0.04 -0.00** 0.0009
Hongkong -3.83** 1.18 0.20** 0.07 0.15 0.08 0 0.0016
Italy 0.27 1.84 -0.14 0.15 0.08 0.08 0 0.0017
Korea 41.93*** 9.09 -2.94*** 0.62 0.13 0.30 -0.01 0.0081
Kuwait -2.91*** 0.45 0.22*** 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.00** 0.0005
Japan -0.6 4.41 0.26 0.33 -0.2 0.13 0 0.0030
Malaysia 0.31 0.67 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0 0.0012
Qatar -1.04*** 0.31 0.03 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0 0.0004
Saudi Arabia 0.33* 0.13 -0.04*** 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.0001
Singapore 1.73* 0.82 -0.12* 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0 0.0007
Taiwan -2.29*** 0.35 0.15*** 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.0005
UAE 0.70** 0.27 -0.08*** 0.02 0 0.01 0 0.0003
Great Britain -10.27*** 2.42 0.76*** 0.16 0.06 0.11 0 0.0023
USA 2.87 2.32 -0.19 0.15 -0.04 0.07 0 0.0015
Other -3.29** 1.24 0.13 0.08 0.10* 0.05 0 0.0011
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Table 4.20: Human Capital Earnings Function by Destination in USD: Females
Destination Schooling Experience Experience Squared
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Australia 4.75*** 1.09 -0.11 0.06 0.01 0.12 0 0.0032
Bahrain 1.81 1.03 -0.02 0.06 0 0.05 0 0.0011
Canada 2.91 1.67 0.08 0.12 -0.13** 0.05 0.00* 0.0013
China 3.88*** 1.17 -0.13 0.08 -0.07* 0.03 0 0.0007
Hongkong 3.38*** 0.51 -0.08* 0.04 -0.08** 0.03 0.00** 0.0007
Italy 4.22*** 0.92 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 0.05 0 0.0010
Korea -19.31* 8.02 1.16* 0.55 -0.12 0.21 0.01 0.0060
Kuwait 3.72*** 0.30 -0.19*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.01 -0.00*** 0.0003
Japan 8.43* 3.43 -0.67* 0.26 0.13 0.09 0 0.0018
Malaysia 1.14* 0.49 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0 0.0011
Qatar 0.13 0.27 0.13*** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 0.00** 0.0004
Saudi Arabia 0.25* 0.12 0.08*** 0.01 -0.01** 0.00 0.00** 0.0001
Singapore 0.27 0.57 0.10* 0.04 0.04* 0.02 0 0.0006
Taiwan 5.53*** 0.19 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 0.00*** 0.0001
UAE 0.62** 0.19 0.06*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00* 0.0002
Great Britain 5.47*** 1.40 -0.23** 0.09 -0.03 0.06 0 0.0014
USA 1.06 2.03 0.12 0.13 0 0.06 0 0.0013
Other 4.82*** 1.14 -0.35*** 0.08 -0.11* 0.05 0 0.0011
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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4.6.9 Returns by Region
The first part of this dissertation compared returns to education across regions
in the Philippines in 2007-2010. That study found that returns to education in the
national capital region are higher than in the rest of the regions in the country, using
standard least squares estimation and the fixed-e↵ects estimation. These estimates
may be biased as they do not account for migration. If the more able migrate from
the periphery to the capital or abroad, the returns to education in the peripheral
regions may be underestimated while those in the capital may be overestimated.
Table 4.21 shows the regression results of the human capital earnings function for
domestic and overseas workers by region for 2011. Similar to the earlier results,
the average return to schooling for local workers in the national capital region is
higher than in most other regions, except Central Visayas (the economic hub of
central Philippines) and surprisingly Bicol. Average earnings for local workers in
the capital are also higher than those in most other regions, except CaLaBaRZon,
adjacent to the capital and home to the export processing zone. To address the
suspected bias in domestic returns to education across regions, returns to education
for overseas workers from di↵erent regions are compared, controlling for sex, civil
status, occupation and destination country. If the relative returns are similar to
those for domestic workers, then the domestic returns may be deemed unbiased.
Otherwise, domestic returns are unbiased. Unlike earnings for domestic workers,
earnings of overseas Filipino workers from most regions are not significantly di↵erent
from those from the national capital. Only the earnings of those from Ilocos, Central
Luzon, Zamboanga, and Northern Mindanao are lower than the earnings of those
from the capital region. Conversely, returns to schooling for overseas workers from
Ilocos, Central Luzon, Central Visayas, Zamboanga, and Northern Mindanao are
higher than the returns for those from the capital region, while returns to schooling
for those from the rest of the regions are not significantly di↵erent from returns
for those in the capital. This confirms the hypothesis that the higher returns for
domestic workers in the capital are due to the migration of workers with higher
ability, and not to superior quality of education in the national capital.
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Table 4.21: Human Capital Earnings Function, Domestic and Overseas Workers by Region
Intercept Schooling Experience Exper.Sq. OCW OCW*Schooling OCW*Exper. OCW*Exper.Sq.
coef (se) coef (se) coef (se) coef (se) coef (se) coef (se) coef (se) coef (se)
NCR (base) -0.350*** 0.080*** 0.015*** -0.000*** -1.542*** -0.010 -0.009 0.000*
(0.055) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.148) (0.010) (0.006) (0.000)
1.Ilocos -0.196*** -0.017*** 0.007** -0.000 -0.749** 0.076*** 0.010 -0.000
(0.068) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.356) (0.023) (0.015) (0.000)
2.Cagayan -0.177*** -0.021*** 0.003 -0.000 -0.039 0.042 -0.017 0.000
(0.059) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.398) (0.026) (0.017) (0.000)
3.C.Luzon -0.110* -0.014*** 0.007** -0.000 -0.573*** 0.056*** -0.009 0.000
(0.058) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.212) (0.014) (0.009) (0.000)
5.Bicol -0.521*** -0.003 0.017*** -0.000*** -0.354 0.053* 0.019 -0.001**
(0.075) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.461) (0.030) (0.019) (0.000)
6.W.Visayas -0.456*** -0.013*** 0.011*** -0.000* 0.558 -0.011 -0.009 -0.000
(0.059) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.526) (0.033) (0.023) (0.001)
7.C.Viasayas -0.465*** -0.006 0.016*** -0.000*** -0.525 0.092** -0.074*** 0.002***
(0.063) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.629) (0.042) (0.026) (0.001)
8.E.Visayas -0.444*** -0.020*** 0.023*** -0.000*** 0.395 0.010 -0.016 0.000
(0.067) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.595) (0.039) (0.023) (0.001)
9.Zamboanga -0.169*** -0.035*** 0.003 0.000 -3.279*** 0.211*** 0.147*** -0.004***
(0.062) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.761) (0.045) (0.036) (0.001)
10.N.Mindanao -0.501*** -0.013*** 0.019*** -0.000*** -3.066*** 0.209*** 0.052* -0.001
(0.066) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.705) (0.046) (0.027) (0.001)
11.Davao -0.152** -0.022*** 0.006* -0.000 2.908*** -0.126** -0.156*** 0.004***
(0.061) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.972) (0.060) (0.052) (0.001)
12.SoCCSKSarGen -0.406*** -0.021*** 0.014*** -0.000 -0.409 0.062 0.034 -0.001*
(0.068) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.753) (0.048) (0.035) (0.001)
14.Cordillera -0.218*** -0.022*** 0.025*** -0.000*** -0.475 0.087 -0.049 0.001
(0.076) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.750) (0.056) (0.031) (0.001)
15.ARMM -0.290*** -0.014* 0.001 0.000 -0.802 0.057 0.057 -0.002*
(0.106) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.690) (0.045) (0.036) (0.001)
16.Caraga -0.214*** -0.036*** 0.019*** -0.000*** -0.492 0.041 0.013 -0.001
(0.069) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.941) (0.060) (0.043) (0.001)
41.CaLaBaRZon 0.042 -0.017*** 0.004 -0.000 0.281 -0.007 -0.007 0.000
(0.059) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.208) (0.014) (0.009) (0.000)
42.MiMaRoPa -0.253*** -0.031*** 0.017*** -0.000** 0.158 0.024 0.017 -0.001
(0.075) (0.005) (0.004) (0.000) (0.590) (0.042) (0.022) (0.001)
Controls: sex, civil status, occupation, destination country
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4.6.10 Income gains through occupational choice
Interpreting the estimated returns to education of migrants as causal e↵ects using
the foregoing approach relies on assumptions that may not always be realistic. For
this reason, an alternative approach is also employed. Using equations 4.6 - 4.8, the
following analysis relates wages to level of schooling indirectly through occupation.
Overseas workers take on particular occupations depending on their level of schooling
and earn di↵erent wages depending on their occupation.
4.6.11 Returns to migration (Purchasing Power Parity)
Table 4.22 shows the relative wages for various occupations across countries. The
second column shows the wages for various occupations in the Philippines relative
to those of laborers and unskilled workers. Professionals have the highest wages rel-
ative to laborers, earning 1.4 times more on average, followed by o cials, managers
and executive with 1.3 times more. Technicians earn 92 percent, those in special
occupations 84 percent, clerks 83 percent, plant and machine operators 44 percent,
traders 38 percent, and service workers 23 percent - more than laborers. Farmers,
fishermen and forestry workers do not earn di↵erently from laborers.
The rest of the columns in Table 4.22 show wages in destination countries by
occupation relative to those of the same occupation in the Philippines in purchasing
power parity. Earnings for o cials, managers and executives are between 1.44 to
3.81 times higher in most top destinations than in the Philippines, except for Korea
with lower earnings. Professionals in top destinations earn 1.67 to 4.45 times more
than in the Philippines, except in Korea with lower earnings. Professionals in other
destinations earn less than in the Philippines. Technicians earn between 1.44 to
3.71 times higher in top destinations than in the Philippines except in Korea. Even
those in other destinations earn 17 percent more than in the Philippines. Clerks in
top destinations earn from 1.26 to 3.83 times more than in the Philippines, except
in Korea and Great Britain with the same earnings as in the Philippines. Service
workers in top destinations earn between 92 percent to 3.9 times more than in the
Philippines. Farmers earn from 50 percent to 4.13 times more in top destinations
than in the Philippines, except in Great Britain and Kuwait with the same earnings.
Trade workers in top destinations earn 38 percent to 3.81 times more than in the
Philippines. Plant operators earn between 1.13 to 4.98 times more. Trade workers
and plant operators in other destinations earn less. Laborers earn 49 percent to 3.69
times more, except in Korea with same earnings as in the Philippines. Laborers in
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other destinations also 68 percent more than in the Philippines. Workers in special
occupation earn 1.26 to 3.79 times higher in top destinations, except in Canada
where they earn the same as in the Philippines. Those in other destinations also
earn the same.
4.6.12 Returns to migration (U.S. Dollars)
Apart from real income gains from working overseas, there are monetary gains from
currency conversions. Table 4.23 shows the wage ratios in US Dollars. O cials,
managers and executives earn between 1.87 to 4.59 times more in top destinations
than in the Philippines, except in Korea with lower earnings. Professionals over-
seas in top destinations have between 1.4 to 4.6 times higher earnings than local
professionals, also except Korea. Professional earnings in other destinations are not
significantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines. Technicians in top destinations
earn between 2.03 to 4.35 times higher than those in the Philippines, again except
in Korea. Technicians in other destinations earn 38 percent more than in the Philip-
pines. Clerks earn from 1.06 to 4.07 times more in top destinations, except in Japan
where they have the same earnings as in the Philippines. Clerks in other destina-
tions earn less than in the Philippines. Trade workers in top destinations except
Italy earn between 1.06 to 4.18 times more than in the Philippines. Those in other
destinations earn less.
Depending on the occupation, the income gains of Filipino workers in Australia
rise by 24 to 33 percent when using the o cial exchange rate (USD). In Bahrain,
the gains rise by 16 to 38 percent; in Canada, 19 to 26 percent; China 4 to 8 percent,
Hongkong 5 to 8 percent. In Italy, the gains rise by 15 to 43 percent when using the
o cial exchange rate, in Korea 9 to 36 percent, Kuwait 33 to 77 percent, Japan 17
to 69 percent. In Malaysia, the gains from the exchange rate are 3 to 9 percent, in
Qatar 27 to 130 percent, Saudi 18 to 55 percent, Singapore 13 to 31 percent, and
Taiwan 3 to 4 percent. In UAE, the exchange rate gains are 23 to 56 percent, in
UK 21 to 186 percent, and in the US 15 to 22 percent. In other destinations, the
exchange rate gains are between 80 to 224 percent.
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Table 4.22: Return on Occupation by Country in PPP (laborers and unskilled workers as reference)
PHL AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials 1.27*** 3.45*** 2.10*** 3.81*** 2.52*** 3.63*** 2.16*** -3.84*** 1.44*** 1.52***
Professionals 1.39*** 3.46*** 2.53*** 4.07*** 2.65*** 3.85*** 3.60*** -2.98*** 2.11*** 1.69***
Technicians 0.92*** 3.36*** 2.05*** 3.36*** 2.56*** 4.11*** (empty) -3.46*** 1.46*** 1.67***
Clerks 0.83*** 3.08*** 1.75*** 3.09*** 1.77*** (empty) 1.27* 0.78 1.26*** -0.17
Service Workers 0.23*** 3.02*** 1.49*** 3.29*** 1.47** (empty) 2.22*** -3.62** 0.92*** 2.31***
Farmers -0.03 4.13*** (empty) 2.99*** (empty) (empty) (empty) (empty) 0.5 (empty)
Trades 0.38*** 3.16*** 1.75*** 3.41*** 1.50*** (empty) 1.71 1.04* 1.21*** 2.19***
Plant Operaters 0.44*** 3.77*** 1.46** 3.65*** 2.60*** (empty) (empty) 1.85** 1.38*** 4.98***
Laborers 2.99*** 1.46*** 3.63*** 1.70*** 2.38*** 2.11*** 0.86 1.51*** 1.56***
Special Occupation 0.84*** 3.79*** 3.34** 0.56 3.20*** 2.47*** (empty) (empty) 1.73** 1.26*
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER
O cials 2.25*** 1.54*** 1.48*** 2.65*** 3.35*** 1.69*** 1.98** 3.79*** -0.49***
Professionals 2.50*** 2.19*** 2.19*** 2.46*** 4.45*** 2.22*** 2.59*** 3.63*** -0.30***
Technicians 2.39*** 1.44*** 1.64*** 2.45*** 3.71*** 1.68*** 3.11*** 3.23*** 0.17*
Clerks 1.92*** 1.44*** 1.51*** 2.45*** 3.83*** 1.58*** 2.22 3.56*** -0.71***
Service Workers 1.55*** 1.38*** 1.19*** 2.26*** 3.90*** 1.20*** 1.29* 2.63*** 0.04
Farmers (empty) (empty) 1.20*** 1.58** (empty) 1.81*** -0.76 (empty) 2.54***
Trades 1.79*** 0.46*** 1.02*** 2.05*** 3.81*** 1.12*** 2.66*** 3.05*** -0.83***
Plant Operaters 1.80** 1.28*** 1.13*** 2.35*** 3.91*** 1.33*** 2.14* 2.72* -0.75***
Laborers 0.91** 0.49*** 0.71*** 1.26*** 3.69*** 0.91*** 1.81** 2.59*** 0.68***
Special Occupation 2.90*** 2.16*** 1.99*** 2.83*** (empty) 2.01*** 2.22* (empty) 0.33
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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Table 4.23: Return on Occupation by Country in US Dollars (laborers and unskilled workers as reference)
PHL AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials 1.27*** 4.43*** 2.66*** 4.59*** 2.65*** 3.82*** 2.71*** -3.56*** 2.14*** 2.39***
Professionals 1.39*** 4.44*** 3.09*** 4.85*** 2.78*** 4.04*** 4.15*** -2.70*** 2.81*** 2.55***
Technicians 0.92*** 4.35*** 2.61*** 4.14*** 2.68*** 4.30*** (empty) -3.19*** 2.16*** 2.54***
Clerks 0.83*** 4.07*** 2.31*** 3.87*** 1.90*** (empty) 1.82** 1.06* 1.96*** 0.7
Service Workers 0.23*** 4.00*** 2.05*** 4.07*** 1.59** (empty) 2.77*** -3.34** 1.63*** 3.18***
Farmers -0.03 5.12*** (empty) 3.76*** (empty) (empty) (empty) (empty) 1.2 (empty)
Trades 0.38*** 4.14*** 2.30*** 4.18*** 1.62*** (empty) 2.26 1.31** 1.91*** 3.05***
Plant Operaters 0.44*** 4.75*** 2.02*** 4.43*** 2.72*** (empty) (empty) 2.12*** 2.08*** 5.85***
Laborers 3.97*** 2.02*** 4.40*** 1.82*** 2.58*** 2.66*** 1.14* 2.21*** 2.43***
Special Occupation 0.84*** 4.77*** 3.89** 1.33 3.33*** 2.66*** (empty) (empty) 2.43*** 2.13***
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER
O cials 2.33*** 2.14*** 1.87*** 3.03*** 3.48*** 2.20*** 2.62*** 4.35*** -0.32***
Professionals 2.58*** 2.79*** 2.58*** 2.84*** 4.58*** 2.73*** 3.24*** 4.19*** -0.06
Technicians 2.47*** 2.04*** 2.03*** 2.84*** 3.83*** 2.19*** 3.75*** 3.79*** 0.38***
Clerks 2.00*** 2.05*** 1.90*** 2.84*** 3.95*** 2.09*** 2.86* 4.12*** -0.52***
Service Workers 1.63*** 1.98*** 1.58*** 2.65*** 4.03*** 1.71*** 1.93** 3.18*** 0.33***
Farmers (empty) (empty) 1.59*** 1.96*** (empty) 2.32*** -0.12 (empty) 2.97***
Trades 1.87*** 1.06*** 1.41*** 2.43*** 3.94*** 1.63*** 3.30*** 3.61*** -0.40***
Plant Operaters 1.88*** 1.89*** 1.51*** 2.73*** 4.04*** 1.84*** 2.78** 3.27** -0.43***
Laborers 0.99** 1.09*** 1.10*** 1.65*** 3.82*** 1.42*** 2.46*** 3.15*** 1.05***
Special Occupation 2.98*** 2.76*** 2.38*** 3.21*** (empty) 2.52*** 2.86** (empty) 0.44*
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
4.6. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 223
4.6.13 Probability of Employment
The e↵ective returns to migration are a↵ected by the probability of employment in
the destination. Table 4.24 shows the results of multinomial logistic regression of
destination on occupation. The figures show the percentage change in the odds of
working in a major destination relative to minor destinations with respect to working
in a particular skilled occupation (relative to being a laborer or unskilled worker).
Being a trade worker increases the odds of working in Australia by over 6 times;
being a professional increases the odds by almost 4 times. Being a service worker
raises the odds of working in Canada by 2.8 times. Being a technician increases
the odds of working in China by 2.7 times. Being a technician and plant operator
raises the odds of working in Korea by 2.9 times and 3.2 times, respectively. Being
a technician and plant operator increases the chance of working in Japan by 2.3 and
2.4 times, respectively. Being a clerk raises the odds of working in Qatar by 2.2
times. Being a clerk, trade worker and professional increases the odds of working in
Saudi Arabia, by 2, 1.9 and 1.4 times, respectively. Being a clerk and service worker
raises the odds of working in the UK by 5 and 3 times, respectively. Being a clerk,
service worker, professional and technician raises the odds of working in the US by
9, 7.3, 4.30 and 4.33 times, respectively.
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Table 4.24: Multi-nomial Logit: Destination on Occupation (Odds Ratio)
AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials 2.85 0.3 1.02 0.00*** 0.07*** 0.00*** 0.52 0.30** 0.19
Professionals 3.76* 0.34 0.77 0.57 0.01*** 0.19* 0.78 0.16*** 0.43
Technicians 2.98 0.21 0.43 2.65* 0.02*** 0.17 2.89* 0.12*** 2.25*
Clerks 0.00*** 1.72 1.95 1.46 0.14** 0.95 0.00*** 0.33 1.46
Service Workers 2.52 0.8 2.82*** 1.23 0.11*** 1.39 1.22 0.30*** 1.12
Farmers 8.18 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 3.28
Trades 6.14** 0.54 0.44 0.82 0.03*** 0.53 1.67 0.14*** 1.91*
Plant Operaters 2.2 0.13** 0.45* 0.84 0.03*** 0.55 3.21** 0.07*** 2.39***
Constant 0.03*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.11*** 1.81*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 1.02 0.23***
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA
O cials 0.27 0.51 0.95 0.38* 0.28* 0.43* 1.55 1.55
Professionals 0.10** 0.45** 1.44* 0.45** 0.14*** 0.79 2.34 4.30***
Technicians 0.47 0.47* 0.82 0.54* 0.33* 0.78 1.08 4.33**
Clerks 1.04 2.16* 2.00* 0.66 0.54 4.16*** 4.96** 8.93***
Service Workers 0.48* 0.72 0.58** 0.20*** 0.47* 0.94 3.05** 7.33***
Farmers 0.00*** 0.32 0.27 0.22 1.61 0.16 2.98 0.00***
Trades 0.15** 1.24 1.87*** 0.15*** 0.44* 0.61* 0.93 1.12
Plant Operaters 0.12*** 0.22*** 0.72* 0.19*** 1.16 0.21*** 1.03 3.78***
Constant 0.32*** 0.77* 1.88*** 1.13 0.47*** 1.60*** 0.08*** 0.08***
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
4.6. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 225
4.6.14 Skilled employment by years of schooling
Table 4.25 shows the results of multinomial logistic regression of occupation on
schooling using the SOF data.6 This complements the information on years of
schooling by occupation across destinations in Table 4.9. The odds (relative risk)
ratios reported show the percentage change in the odds of taking on a particular
occupation relative to laborers and unskilled workers for each year of schooling. In
the US, the e↵ects of schooling on employment are higher for professionals, service
workers and plant and machine operators. These reinforce the positive earnings dif-
ferentials for these occupations. In Japan, the e↵ects are higher for plant operators,
lower for o cials, professionals, and clerks, but the same for the rest. In Australia,
each year of schooling increases the odds of taking on any particular occupation by
as much as that for being a laborer or unskilled worker. This is consistent with high
levels of education across occupations meaning that Filipino workers with di↵erent
schooling have the same chance of employment in all occupations in Australia. In
the UK, the e↵ect of schooling on the odds are the same for most occupations but
lower for farmers. This is consistent with the fact that while education levels are
high across most occupations, education level in agriculture is quite low. In China,
the e↵ects on the odds are surprisingly lower for professionals and clerks than labor-
ers. In Korea, the e↵ect is higher for plant operators and lower for o cials. In most
major destinations, schooling decreases the odds of all or most skilled employment.
In Singapore, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, the e↵ects are unexpectedly lower for all
occupations compared to laborers. In Canada, Hongkong, and Malaysia, the e↵ects
are lower for all occupations excluding farmers, but higher for service workers in
Canada. In Saudi Arabia, the odds are lower for all except professionals and trade
workers. In Bahrain, the e↵ects are lower for all occupations except service work-
ers. In Taiwan, the e↵ects are lower for all occupations except plant and machine
operators. In Italy, the e↵ects are lower for most occupations except for service
workers. The negative e↵ect of schooling on skilled employment is consistent with
lower returns to schooling in most of these destinations compared to the Philippines.
6Due to the di culty in achieving convergence with multi-variate regression, the reported esti-
mates are from a simple regression of occupation on schooling.
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Table 4.25: Odds ratio: Occupation on Schooling (Laborers and unskilled workers as base outcome) - Multi-nomial Logit
AUS BHR CAN CHN HKG ITA KOR KWT JPN
O cials 0.96 0.80** 0.88*** 0.69*** 0.82* 0.79*** 0.77**
Professionals 1.05 0.88* 0.93** 0.91* 0.63*** 0.83** 0.94 0.82*** 0.89**
Technicians 0.99 0.80** 0.85*** 0.97 0.63*** 0.77** 0.98 0.75*** 0.96
Service Workers 1.04 0.95 1.04* 0.98 0.79*** 0.99 0.97 0.87*** 0.97
Farmers 0.88 0.82***
Trades 1.08 0.89* 0.89*** 0.94 0.68*** 0.89** 0.99 0.79*** 1.00
Plant Operators 1.05 0.84** 0.92** 0.98 0.72*** 0.94* 1.08** 0.77*** 1.06***
Clerks 0.87** 0.88*** 0.87* 0.69*** 0.83** 0.75*** 0.87***
MYS QAT SAU SGP TWN ARE GBR USA OTHER
O cials 0.78*** 0.82*** 0.88*** 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.82*** 0.91 0.92 0.88***
Professionals 0.79*** 0.90*** 0.99 0.90*** 0.80*** 0.94*** 1.02 1.07* 0.96***
Technicians 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.81*** 0.89*** 0.92 1.02 0.91***
Service Workers 0.91** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.86*** 0.90*** 0.96*** 1.05 1.13*** 0.96**
Farmers 0.68*** 0.65*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.62*** 0.81* 0.73***
Trades 0.79*** 0.96** 1 0.82*** 0.87*** 0.91*** 0.95 0.96 0.94***
Plant Operators 0.84*** 0.86*** 0.96*** 0.87*** 0.99 0.87*** 1 1.10*** 0.99
Clerks 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.94*** 0.95 1 0.84***
legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
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4.6.15 Migration Selection
If migration were random, least squares estimates of returns to migration and ed-
ucation of migrants would be unbiased. However, if migrants self-select based on
observed and unobserved characteristics, migration will be correlated with the error
term and estimates of returns to migration and education would be biased. To ac-
count for selection bias, I employ the Heckman selection model on 2003 data from the
combined Labor Force Survey and Survey of Overseas Filipinos. Table 4.26 shows
the results of the human capital earnings function for migrants and non-migrants
using the Heckman model in comparison with the ordinary least squares. The selec-
tion equation and the SOF data allows the modeling of migration as a function of
age, marital status and family size (this last variable is not available in the POEA
dataset). The hypotheses are that younger individuals are more likely to migrate
as they have more energy and enthusiasm, married individuals are less likely to mi-
grate due to the psychic costs of being away from their partners, and individuals
from bigger families are more likely to migrate to help support the huge household
consumption. The results indicate that older individuals are actually more likely
to migrate. Married individuals are less likely to migrate as expected. Individuals
from larger families are actually less likely to migrate. Accounting for selection bias
increases the returns to schooling for non-migrant workers by 1 percentage point.
While the marginal increase for migrant workers is small, only 0.1 percentage point,
returns to schooling e↵ectively increases by 1.1 percentage points. The change in
the returns to schooling suggest selection bias and this is confirmed by the signif-
icance of the inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda). However, selection is not limited to
migrants; both migrants and non-migrants appear to be negatively selected. The
negative selection of migrants is confirmed by the negative coe cient of schooling in
the selection equation. As explained in the data section, however, remittance data
is used as a proxy for migrant wages. Other ways of addressing migration selection
are explained in the appendix.
4.7 Summary
In 2011, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration deployed 131,148 over-
seas Filipino workers on return contracts. Two-thirds of those deployed are males.
Seven out of ten were deployed in the Middle East, four in Saudi Arabia. There
are more males in most destinations, concentrated in certain jobs in some countries
like trade in Australia and Qatar and clerical work in Korea. In some destinations,
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Table 4.26: Migration Selection
OLS HECKMAN
LN Wage LN Wage Overseas Worker
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Constant 3.1352*** 0.0384 2.8595*** 0.0556 -2.5230*** 0.2946
Schooling 0.0510*** 0.0011 0.0612*** 0.0017 -0.5384*** 0.0464
Experience 0.0201*** 0.0007 0.0303*** 0.0014 -0.5384*** 0.0464
Experience2 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0005*** 0.0000 -0.0006*** 0.0000
OFW 0.0202 0.0812 0.0026 0.0753
OFW ⇥ Schooling 0.0287*** 0.0056 0.0297*** 0.0052
OFW ⇥ Experience 0.0115** 0.0039 0.0129*** 0.0035
OFW ⇥ Experience2 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001
Age 0.5689*** 0.0463
Married -0.0352** 0.0121
Family Size -0.0041** 0.0014
lambda 0.5545*** 0.0623
Adjusted R2 0.4855
Observations 37949 183817
Controls: Region, Occupation
there are more females, mostly laborers and unskilled workers in Hong Kong, Italy
and Kuwait; service and sales workers in Canada; and service and sales workers and
clerks in Taiwan.
Overseas workers on average have more years of schooling than local workers:
12.2 years for males compared to 8.4 years for their local counterparts; and 11.6
years for females compared to 8.9 years for their local counterparts. Overseas work-
ers in Canada, Australia and USA have the highest educational attainment at over
13 years. Across occupations, professional overseas workers have the highest school-
ing, followed by technicians and associate professionals, and o cials, managers and
executives.
On average, overseas workers earn 3.1 times more than their counterpart in
the Philippines. However, returns to education are generally lower than that in the
Philippines. Nevertheless, it appears that income gains are su cient to attract Fil-
ipino workers. Gains from migration accrue to both sexes, with females earning over
twice more than their local counterparts and males 73 percent more. However, re-
turns to schooling for females overseas are no di↵erent from those in the Philippines.
For males, returns to schooling are even lower than those of their local counterparts.
Among the top destinations, earnings of Filipino workers in Australia, Italy,
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Japan, Canada, China, Taiwan and USA are higher than in the Philippines. Returns
to schooling is higher in the UAE, but lower in Australia, China, Italy, Korea,
Kuwait, Japan, Malaysia and Taiwan. Returns to schooling in Bahrain, Canada,
Malaysia and USA are no di↵erent from that in the Philippines. Nevertheless, higher
labor returns still explain the temporary migration. While the return to labor is
lower in Qatar, the return to schooling is higher than in the Philippines. Although
returns to labor in Hong-Kong, Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and the UK is the
same as in the Philippines, returns to schooling is higher in Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
and Hong-Kong. However, the return to schooling in the UK is not di↵erent from
that in the Philippines, and they are even lower in Korea. This raises a question on
the motivation for temporary migration, given no apparent gains to either labor or
human capital.
The trade-o↵ between earnings and returns to schooling plays out across sexes.
Earnings for female overseas workers in Australia, China, Hong-Kong, Italy, Japan,
Kuwait, and Malaysia are higher than in the Philippines. However, returns to school-
ing are lower in Hong-Kong, Kuwait, Japan, Taiwan, and UK, and not significantly
di↵erent in Australia, China, Italy, and Malaysia. Earnings for females in Korea is
lower but return to schooling higher. Although returns on female labor in Bahrain,
Canada, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, UAE and USA are not significantly dif-
ferent from that in the Philippines, return to female schooling is higher in Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and UAE. However, returns to female schooling in Bahrain,
Canada, and USA are not significantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines.
For males, returns to labor are higher in Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and
UAE and returns to schooling are higher for Singapore but lower in Korea, Saudi
Arabia, and UAE. Although returns to labor are lower in Hong Kong, Kuwait,
Qatar, Taiwan, and the UK, returns to schooling are higher in Hong-Kong, Kuwait,
Taiwan and the UK, but not significantly di↵erent in Qatar. However, apart from
returns to male labor in Australia, Bahrain, Canada, China, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,
and the USA not being significantly di↵erent from that in the Philippines, returns
to schooling are also no better in Australia, Bahrain, Canada, China, Italy, Japan,
Malaysia, and USA. Some gains accrue from experience, as in Canada and China,
but for the rest, the puzzle remains.
Apart from real income gains for overseas workers, there are monetary gains
from currency conversions. Income gains in US dollars are between 3 percent to
117 percent higher than gains in purchasing power parity in most top destinations.
Without apparent real income gains for some overseas workers to their labor or
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human capital in purchasing power parity terms, gains may be realized through
the exchange rate as remittances sent or brought home are converted to the local
currency. While there are no real income gains in Korea and Saudi Arabia, there
are indeed exchange rate gains. There are also exchange rate gains in returns to
schooling in a third of the top destinations.
This paper provides the only known estimates of the impact of migration on
the earnings of workers for the most number of destination countries for a single
origin country with this level of disaggregation (including by sex). It is also the
only paper to estimate returns to schooling for migrants by destination country and
sex. With the foregoing estimates of gains to migration for most overseas workers,
the problem of accounting for migration selection and deriving unbiased estimates
of the returns to labor and human capital remains.
The estimation of earnings and returns to schooling for overseas workers from
various regions aims to correct for the bias in estimates of returns to schooling for
domestic workers across regions. The results show that returns to schooling for
overseas workers from the capital are not necessarily higher and may be lower than
the returns for those from other regions. This confirms that returns to education in
the capital are overestimated due to the in-migration of workers with higher ability,
and those in other regions are underestimated due to their out-migration.
With wage and education data contained in separate sources, estimating re-
turns to education relies on strong assumptions. An alternative approach is em-
ployed by separately relating earnings and destination to occupation using the
POEA data-set and occupation to schooling using the SOF data-set. The prob-
ability of working in a particular destination depends on the worker’s occupation.
Professionals and trade workers have the highest odds of working in Australia, ser-
vice workers in Canada, technicians in China, professionals in Italy, plant operators
in Korea, managers and executives, and services workers in Kuwait, technicians in
Japan, service workers in Malaysia, clerks in Qatar, trade workers and clerks in
Saudi Arabia, professionals and technicians in Singapore, service workers in Taiwan
and UAE, clerks and service workers in the UK and the US.
Consequently, earnings of professionals and trade workers in Australia are
3.46 times and 3.16 times higher than counterparts in the Philippines, respectively.
Service workers in Canada earn 3.3 times more, technicians in China earn 2.6 times
more, and professionals in Italy earn 3.6 times more, than in the Philippines. Plant
operators in Korea earn 1.9 times more, managers and executives earn 1.44 times
more and service workers earn 92 percent more in Kuwait, and technicians in Japan
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earn 1.7 times more, than their counterparts in the Philippines. Service workers in
Malaysia earn 55 percent more, clerks in Qatar earn 1.4 times more, and clerks in
Saudi Arabia earn 51 percent more, than their local counterparts. Professionals and
technicians in Singapore earn 2.5 times more, service workers in Taiwan earn 3.9
times more, clerks earn 3.6 times more and service workers earn 2.6 times more in
the US, than in the Philippines.
Relating occupation to schooling shows that the likelihood of skilled employ-
ment increases with schooling in a few destinations. The odds of working as a
professional, service worker, and plant and machine operator in the US and as a
plant operator in Japan increases with schooling. On the other hand, the odds of
all skilled employment in Australia and most skilled employment in the UK do not
rise with schooling. In most major destinations, schooling decreases the likelihood
of all or most skilled employment, contrary to expectation.
Appendix: Addressing Migration Selection7
If migration were random, this variable would be uncorrelated with the error term
and its coe cient unbiased. However, if migrants self-select based on observed and
unobserved characteristics, migration will be correlated with the error term and its
coe cient would be biased.
Propensity Score Matching
If migrants self-select on observed characteristics, the bias can be corrected using
propensity score matching. The first step is to estimate a probit/logit model of
migration on observed characteristics (i.e. age/experience, schooling, sex, marital
status, etc.).
Pr(Mi = 1|xi) =  (↵i +  Si +X 0i✓ + "i) (4.10)
The predicted values Mˆ i of the probability model are derived, representing the
estimated probability of migration or propensity score. The propensity score can
be estimated using the Stata estimation command pscore.ado developed by Becker
and Ichino (2002). The second step is to identify the overlap in propensity scores
between migrants and non-migrants. The third is to match migrants M to a non-
migrant comparison group C based on the propensity score. Finally, the average
7Adapted from the theory of impact evaluation (Khandker et al., 2010)
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e↵ect of migration is calculated as follows:
TOTPSM =
1
NM
[
X
i✏M
WMi  
X
j✏C
!(i, j)Y Cj ]. (4.11)
The nearest neighbor and stratification criteria are used to match migrants and
non-migrants and compute the average migration e↵ect.
Double-Di↵erence
As migration may be a↵ected by unobserved characteristics such as ability, propen-
sity score matching estimates may still be biased. To account for unobserved charac-
teristics, a double-di↵erence method is used, as it assumes the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity a↵ecting migration. Assuming that these unobserved characteristics,
↵i, are time-invariant, they can be di↵erenced out. Using panel data, the model
becomes:
ln(Wit)  ln(Wit 1) = (↵i   ↵i) +  (Sit   Sit 1) +  (Mit  Mit 1)
+  (Sit ⇤Mit   Sit 1 ⇤Mit 1) + (X 0it  X 0it 1)✓ + ("it   "it 1)
(4.12)
Instrumental Variable Regression
If unobserved characteristics are time-varying, the double di↵erence method esti-
mates may still be biased. To allow for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity, in-
strumental variable regression can be used. It involves finding an instrument that is
highly correlated with migration, but not correlated with unobserved characteristics
a↵ecting earnings (  6= 0). Instrumental variable regression is done using two-stage
least squares. The first stage is a probit regression of the Migration dummy on the
instrument Z, the other covariates X and a disturbance u:
Pr(Mi = 1|xi) =  (↵i +  Zi +  Si +X 0i✓ + ui) (4.13)
where the instrument Z is the number of members of the family / household. The
idea is that a larger dependency ratio would motivate a worker to migrate to earn
more for his/her family, but would not a↵ect his wage directly. The second stage
involves substituting the predicted value of the migration model into the wage model
as follows:
ln(Wi) = ↵i +  Si +  Mˆ i +  (Si ⇤ Mˆ i) +X 0i✓ + "i (4.14)
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To test for endogeneity, a regression-based Hausman test is used. The error term "i
is regress on ui; endogeneity is rule out if the coe cient of ui is not significant.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In the first part of this dissertation, I aimed to account for education quality and
ability in returns to education in the Philippines. This was done by considering pri-
mary and secondary test scores and sibling fixed-e↵ects in human capital earnings
functions. The results confirm the importance of ability and indicate that stan-
dard estimates of returns to education are overestimated as they capture the e↵ects
mainly of sector, occupation, region and ability. Most of what have hitherto been
considered as returns to education are actually due to ability. Contrary to earlier
findings of high returns to primary education and decreasing returns to education
(e.g. Hossain and Psacharopoulos (1994)), there are no significant returns to pri-
mary and secondary education. Earnings of workers with only basic education are
due not to its productive content but to the ability signaled by its completion, con-
sistent with the signaling hypothesis (Spence, 1973). On the other hand, there are
clear returns to tertiary and higher education, and these entail even higher abilities.
These suggests that reducing social inequalities that underlie di↵erences in ability
and learning outcomes may have the most impact on increasing worker productivity
and earnings.
Education quality is insignificant to wages when controlling for province and
key city fixed e↵ects, the level at which education quality data are available. Several
points are noteworthy in this light. The first is the reliability of the test scores. It is
important to determine the integrity of testing from question formulation, through to
implementation and evaluation. Second, the insignificance of test scores may be due
to migration of the best among the test cohorts. Third, individual level achievement
is best related to individual wages. This requires a tracing individual outcomes
over time, something that should be considered by the Department of Education or
the National Statistics O ce. If the measures of education quality are reliable but
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insignificant to wages, there remains a case for increasing the quantity of education as
the government thrust is. The Philippine government has just embarked on the K-12
program which includes adding senior high school to secondary education, e↵ectively
increasing the quantity of basic education from 10 to 12 years. It remains to be seen
whether the additional years of schooling would increase worker productivity and
wages. As this has shown, education completion and certification matter more than
additional schooling. Enhancing education quality may be as (more) important and
e cient as (than) increasing the quantity of schooling.
Uneven development across regions in the country accounts for inequalities
in earnings and returns to education. Greater economic development in certain
regions, especially the capital and other economic centers, creates advantages in
earnings. This drives migration into richer regions especially of the best from the
poorer regions, or a positive selection of migrants in terms of ability. This raises
productivity further in richer regions and decreases that in poorer regions, worsening
inequality.
International labor migration has long been an alternative to internal migra-
tion, and brain drain or the migration of more skilled workers has been a concern
for some. This concern seems warranted considering the findings in the second part
of this dissertation. In particular, permanent migrants are positively selected from
the local labor force, much like internal migrants. Permanent migration increases
despite increasing domestic employment as they have higher reservation wages rela-
tive to the equilibrium wage. On the other hand, temporary migrants are negatively
selected in the destination labor force. Temporary migration increases despite in-
creasing labor supply in Saudi Arabia as Filipino workers accept jobs at the lower
wages which Saudi nationals are unwilling to accept. The negative selection of tem-
porary migrants is confirmed in the third study in this dissertation showing higher
earnings and lower returns to schooling for overseas workers compared to local work-
ers and confirmed by a Heckman selection model.
Permanent and temporary migration are positively related to domestic wages,
controlling for income. Migration increases if wages increase without economic
growth. This means that poor employment rather than low wages is driving migra-
tion. However, permanent migration is positively related to domestic employment,
controlling for wages. Higher employment does not necessarily reduce permanent
migration and may in fact increase it, as this decreases what employers are willing
to pay and increases what additional workers are willing to accept. This makes
permanent migrants positively selected from the local labor force. These findings
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imply that changes in wages and employment should be consistent with changes in
labor demand and supply.
On the other hand, temporary migration is not significantly related to do-
mestic employment. Permanent migration is negatively related to remittances as
remittances complement national income, increasing labor demand at home. On
the other hand, temporary migration is positively related to remittances as these
serve defray the costs of migration. Domestic employment increases if wages increase
proportionately to labor demand. Otherwise, additional workers would migrate in-
stead.
Permanent and temporary migration are negatively related to domestic income
per capita, controlling for labor force, wages and employment. This confirms the
hypothesis that poverty drives migration (Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970) and
that migration decreases with economic development. However, economic growth
does not mitigate migration if employment does not increase proportionately. This
implies the imperative for broad-based development benefiting not just capital, but
more importantly labor. This also implies that migration may be inevitable during
economic downturns as both wages and employment fall, unless workers are willing
to accept even lower wages to keep their local employment. Permanent and tem-
porary migration are also negatively related to the labor force. The economy can
accommodate returning migrants despite an increasing labor force if employers can
pay their reservation wage.
Permanent and temporary migration are positively related to destination wages.
The quantity of destination labor demanded decreases as wages increase. If migrants
can be paid lower than the destination labor, they can fill the decrease in destina-
tion labor. This implies that Filipinos may have to accept wages lower than those
of natives in the destination country to be employed. Permanent and temporary
migration are also positively related to destination income; destination economic
growth increases labor demand. Permanent migration is negatively related to desti-
nation labor force; an increase in destination labor supply at existing wages creates
excess labor supply. On the other hand, temporary migration is positively related
to destination labor force. Filipino workers can take the additional employment at
lower wages if destination workers cannot accept lower wages. This makes temporary
migrants negatively selected in the destination labor force.
Temporary migration responds positively to destination wages, although these
wages may be lower than what natives in destination countries earn. The third
part of this dissertation estimated returns to migration and education of overseas
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Filipino workers. This was done by comparing earnings of overseas Filipino workers
with those of local workers with the same observable characteristics. It uses an
augmented human capital earnings function, relating wages to schooling, experience
and its square, migration and its interactions with the first three variables, with sex,
civil status, occupation, and region of origin in the Philippines as controls. It also
estimates the human capital earnings function by sex, for top destination countries
as a group, and by each destination country.
Results show that overseas workers earn more than local workers. This is con-
sistent with the model relating migration positively to destination wages and neg-
atively to origin wages (Borjas, 1987) and to the fact that labor is more abundant
in the Philippines. However, returns to predicted schooling of overseas workers are
lower than actual returns for local workers. While this is constrained by the impu-
tation of schooling for migrants, this may well reflect the relative scarcity of human
capital in the Philippines. While earnings of overseas workers in top destinations as
a group are lower than those of local workers, earnings in most top destinations are
higher. Returns to schooling in top destinations as a group are higher than in the
Philippines. This is consistent with the fact that overseas workers in top destinations
have more schooling than local workers (Borjas, 1999). However, returns to school-
ing of Filipino workers in most top destinations are not significantly di↵erent from
or even lower than those for local workers. The higher earnings and lower returns
to schooling together suggest high relative equality in the corresponding countries.
This indicates that overseas workers are negatively selected; if income inequality is
higher in the home country, the less able migrate and earn less than the average
worker in the destination country (Borjas, 1987). This is confirmed by the Heckman
selection model and consistent with the negative selection noted in the study on de-
terminants of migration. There appears to be a general trade o↵ between earnings
and returns to schooling. This applies to both male and female overseas workers.
Nevertheless, there are further gains from the conversion of earnings from the des-
tination currency to the Philippine currency through the o cial exchange rate (US
dollars). Earnings sent home as remittances also yield gains through di↵erences in
costs of living. However, there are no apparent gains in earnings and returns to
schooling in general for a few countries, and particularly for males and females in
several countries.
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